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Proposal
I would like to propose a new introductory statistical inference text-
book, which I believe takes a fresh look at a course that fits into
nearly every quantitative major at universities.
Initial Motivation
My motivation for this project stems from my dissatisfaction with
traditional approaches to the topic, and my belief that there is a bet-
ter way to approach it. A first semester statistics course is generally
divided into the following four parts:
I Basic Statistical Concepts
• Basic statistical concepts including population, parameter, sam-
ple, and statistic
• Types of data (ordinal, time-series, etc...), and sampling method-
ology
• Organizing the data visually or graphically - including his-
tograms, pie graphs, box plots, and stem-and-leaf plots
• Statistical computations including mean, median, mode, SD,
and percentiles
II Probability
• Properties of unions, intersections, conditional probability,
independence and mutual exclusivity
• Permutations and combinations
• Discrete distributions
• Continuous distributions
• Normal distribution
III One-sample Statistics
• Confidence intervals
24
• Sampling distributions
• Computations involving the normal distribution, t-distribution,
and binomial distribution (for proportions)
• Hypothesis testing
IV Two-sample Statistics
• Two sample problems Ð expanding topics from Part III to two
variables
Obviously, there is some variability to these topics, but as one can
see from most introductory statistics textbooks, there is a consistent
approach. My main concerns about the traditional approach can be
summarized as follows:
1 Part II (probability) generally covers at least one quarter of the ma-
terial in an introductory statistics course. There is a shift from data
collection and analysis (Part I) to probability theory. Subsequently,
Part III shifts back to a data centered approach and only a small
portion of Part II generally applies in Part III. This disconnect be-
tween Parts I, II, and III, impedes the learning process. It seems to
the students as if the parts are related somehow, but the connec-
tion is rarely made. The students are then left with a feeling that
the course concerns two completely unrelated topics: probability
and statistics.
2 The normal distribution is covered repetitively throughout many
chapters of most introductory statistics books. The coverage is
included in sections such as: empirical bell-shaped curve (Part
I), normal distribution as a type of continuous distribution (Part
II), sampling distributions (Part III), interval estimation (Part III),
hypothesis testing (Part III), and two population testing (Part
IV). There is redundant focus on the normal and t-distributions.
These topics are closely related, but not handled cohesively. More
importantly, there is little or no discussion of the assumptions of
the normal model or how to tell what constitutes “close enough”
to normal. In addition, there is generally equal consideration given
to the rare practical situation in which the standard deviation is
known (and knowing this does not generally alter the result much
at all).
3 After the concept of a “statistic” is covered, there are many chap-
ters which repeat essentially the same problem multiple times,
from only slightly different perspectives. This gives the student a
feeling that these are all very different problems, despite the ap-
pearances, and leads the student to approach solving problems
25
like a “cookbook”: just find the right recipe for the right problem.
The fundamental understanding of statistical inference is under-
mined by this approach.
It is my view that the traditional approach detracts from student
understanding, with its “cookbook” perspective, disjointed cover-
age of probability, and the almost exclusionary focus on the normal
distribution.
A New Approach
In the field of statistical inference, there are two primary schools of
thought. Each has its proponents, but it is generally accepted that on
all problems covered in an introductory course, that both approaches
are valid and lead to the same numerical values when applied to
actual problems. Only one of these approaches is covered in a tra-
ditional course, which denies the students access to an entire field
of statistical inference. The traditional approach, also called the fre-
quentist or orthodox perspective, leads almost directly to problem (1)
above. The other approach, also called Probability Theory as Logic1, 1 E. T. Jaynes. Probability Theory: The
Logic of Science. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 2003. Edited by
G. Larry Bretthorst
derives all statistical inference from probability theory directly. It is
this approach that I hope to expose students to in an introductory
course.
The probability theory approach to statistical inference has several
benefits:
1 All of the same problems as handled traditionally can be handled
with this perspective, yielding exactly the same answers2. 2 One reason why “Probability theory
as Logic” concepts are covered only in
advanced courses is the misperception
that they are applicable only to more
advanced problems, and not applica-
ble to problems normally found in an
introductory class. The fact that this
misperception exists is a strong argu-
ment for a book like this one, to dispel
this misperception and to communicate
both to students and instructors alike
the value of a this approach to basic
problems.
2 Statistical inference is theoretically grounded in probability the-
ory, which, although admittedly beyond an introductory course,
avoids the “cookbook” approach that students take away from the
traditional textbooks.
3 The reasoning process using the probability theory perspective
is more intuitive than the orthodox perspective, especially when
dealing with hypothesis testing.
For example, every statistics instructor faces the challenge of
getting students to interpret p-values properly, and the logic be-
hind setting up null-hypotheses. They have to combat the stu-
dents’ initial intuition that the p-value represents the “probability
that the null is true,” and many students never really obtain the
proper understanding.
In the Probability Theory as Logic perspective, this same calcu-
lated value is interpreted exactly like the students’ initial intuition!
Thus, testing hypotheses, estimating parameters, and determining
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uncertainties are far more direct and intuitive using this approach
than the traditional approach.
What I Am Proposing
This text can help solve the challenges described above, and more.
By focusing on models and data, as opposed to populations and
samples, this text can more cohesively bridge the topics described in
Parts I, II, and III above. Probability will be introduced as a natural
part of solving problems, as opposed to its standalone treatment
traditionally done in today’s texts.
In this text, I will use the Probability Theory as Logic approach
applied to the same problems that are traditionally covered. This
viewpoint can greatly enhance our understanding of statistics and
can handle topics such as confidence intervals and hypothesis testing
in a very intuitive manner. Statistical inference covered in this way
also addresses real-life questions that are not addressed by traditional
statistical methods.3 3 One of the reasons why this approach
is usually covered only in more ad-
vanced courses is the difficulty of the
mathematics generally associated with
it. Orthodox statistics makes heavy use
of sampling, which is deemed more
intuitive than probability distribu-
tions. It is my intention to start with
low-dimensional cases, building to dis-
tributions, and to augment all concepts
with numerical exercises.
Finally, this will be a problem oriented textbook. It is imperative
that the problems are cohesive with the pedagogy. I will also plan to
use technology, where appropriate, to further student learning and
make the textbook more interactive.
At the level targeted for this book, there is only one textbook that
I know of that covers inference from the perspective proposed here,
and that is Donald Berry’s book Statistics: A Bayesian Perspective,
1996. It is my intention to modernize the approach, and include some
topics that are not covered, specifically from the physical sciences
and business.
1 Introduction to Probability
Life’s most important questions are, for the most part, nothing but probability
problems. - Laplace
In 1968 a jury found defendant Malcolm Ricardo Collins and his
wife defendant Janet Louise Collins guilty of second degree robbery
(People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319 - Cal: Supreme Court 1968). The
decision hinged on the testimony of bystanders, which stated that
the perpetrators had been “black male, with a beard and moustache,
and a caucasian female with blonde hair tied in a ponytail,” and that
they escaped in a “yellow motor car.” A mathematician testified that
the odds against this couple being innocent were one in twelve million,
and this was enough for the jury to convict. Later, in an appeal, the
California Supreme Court reversed the decision primarily because of
lack of evidence, and faulty inference.
In another case, Sally Clark was convicted in 1999 of the murder
of her two young sons1. Again, the testimony hinged on a statistical 1 LORD JUSTICE KAY. R vs sally clark,
April 2003. URL http://www.bailii.
org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2003/1020.
html
argument - the chances of one baby dying in their bed 1 in 8500, so
therefore the chances of two of them dying in the same way is the
square of this, or 1 in 73 million. Several years later, and a public
statement from the Royal Statistical Society highlighting the erro-
neous logic, Sally Clark was released - although she never overcame
the resulting damage to her life that the conviction had caused.
We will cover these cases in more detail later, and why the in-
ference was faulty, but I introduce the stories here for two reasons.
First, is to point out that there are cases in which proper statistical
inference can be a life and death matter. Second, it is to highlight the
fact that such inference can run counter to one’s intuition. Part of the
purpose of this book is to retrain your intuitions and your habits of
intuition to avoid such failures.
We have to make decisions nearly every second of our lives, and
those decisions are based on our state of knowledge. Unfortunately,
we are never 100% sure of any information in our lives, so we are
constantly forced to make decisions in the face of uncertainty. In
many cases our common sense is enough to make sophisticated deci-
sions, taking into account the uncertain nature of the situation. How-
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ever, there are many times where our common sense is not enough to
quantitatively resolve the level of uncertainty, and make valid infer-
ences. It is in these cases that statistical inference is most useful.
Statistical inference refers to a field of study where we try to infer
unknown properties of the world, given our observed data, in the
face of uncertainty. It is a mathematical framework to quantify what
our common sense says in many situations, but allows us to exceed
our common sense in cases where common sense is not enough. Ig-
norance of proper statistical inference leads to poor decisions and
wasted money. As with ignorance in any other field, ignorance of sta-
tistical inference can also allow others to manipulate you, convincing
you of the truth of something that is false.
For example, in 1978 a Russian satellite deviated from its orbit and
became increasingly erratic, and was going to crash into the Earth.2 2 L Heaps. Operation morning light.
Paddington, S.l, 1978. ISBN 0709203233This sort of event occurs from time to time, even including a recent
crash of a US spy satellite in 2008.3 There was a local news broadcast 3 James Oberg. U.s. satellite shootdown:
The inside story. ieee spectrum, 2008about the impending Russian satellite crash which said something
like, “the scientists had studied the trajectory of the satellite, and
determined that there was only a 25% chance of it striking land, and
even a much smaller chance striking a populated area.” The report
was clearly designed to calm the public, and convince them that
the scientists had a good handle on the situation. Unfortunately,
given a little thought, one realizes that the Earth’s surface consists
of about 25% land and 75% water, so if you knew nothing about the
trajectory of the satellite, you would simply state that it had a 25%
chance of striking land. Instead of communicating knowledge of the
situation, the news broadcast communicated (to those who knew
basic statistical inference) that either the scientists were in complete
ignorance of the trajectory or the reporter had misinterpreted a casual
statement about probabilities and didn’t realize what was implied.
Either way, the intent of the message and the content of the message
(to those who understood basic probability) were in direct conflict.
1.1 Models and Data
There are two main aspects of statistical inference: description of
data and model analysis. In the description of data, one attempts to
summarize a set of data with a smaller set of numbers. Grades in
the classroom are summarized by the average, votes in a state are
summarized by a percentage, etc... This smaller description of the
data is useful for both practical and theoretical reasons. It is more
expedient to communicate a small set of numbers than the entire data
set, and it is almost always the case that the detailed properties of a
set of data are not relevant to the questions that you are asking.
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A model refers to a mathematical structure which is used to ap-
proximate the underlying causes of the data, and unify seemingly
unrelated problems. One may have a (mathematical) model for a
coin flip which ignores all of the details of the flip, the bounce, and
the catch and summarizes the possible results by a single number:
the chance that the coin will come up heads. You may then use that
same model to describe the voting behavior of citizens during a pres-
idential election, or to describe the radioactive decay of particles in a
physics experiment. The mathematics is identical, but the interpreta-
tion of the components of the model will be different depending on
the problem. Models simplify, by summarizing data with a small set
of causes, and they are used for inference, allowing one to predict the
outcome of subsequent events.
The goal of statistical inference is to take data, and update our
knowledge about various possible models that can describe the data.
This often means deciding which of several models is the most likely.
It can also entail the refinement of a single model, given the new
data. All of these activities are closely related to (and perhaps identi-
cal to) the methods in science. What we are trying to do is make the
best inferences from the data, improve our inferences as new data
come in, and plan what data would be the most useful to improve
our inferences. In a nutshell, the approach is:
Initial Inference + New Data→ Improved Inference
In order to deal with a wide variety of problems, we require a
minimal amount of mathematical structure and notation, which we
introduce in this chapter.
1.2 What is Probability?
Probability theory is nothing but common sense reduced to calculation. -
Laplace
When you think about probability, the first things that might come
to mind are coin flips (“there’s a 50-50 chance of landing heads”),
weather reports (“there’s a 20% chance of rain today”), and politi-
cal polls (“the incumbent candidate is leading the challenger 53% to
47%”). When we speak about probability, we speak about a percent-
age chance (0%-100%) for something to happen, although we often
write the percentage as a decimal number, between 0 and 1. If the
probability of an event is 0 then it is the same as saying that you are
certain that the event will never happen. If the probability is 1 then you
are certain that it will happen. Life is full of uncertainty, so we assign a
number somewhere between 0 and 1 to describe our state of knowl-
edge of the certainty of an event. The probability that you will get
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struck by lightning sometime in your life is p = 0.0002, or 1 out of
5000. Statistical inference is simply the inference in the presence of
uncertainty. We try to make the best decisions we can, given incom-
plete information. In this book, our approach is to deter-
mine, for each problem, what degree of
confidence we have in all of the possible
outcomes. The approach of statistical
inference covered in this book is about
the procedure of most rationally as-
signing various degrees of confidence
(which we call probability) to the possi-
ble outcomes of some process using all
the objectively available data.
One can think of probability as a mathematical short-hand for the
common sense statements we make in the presence of uncertainty.
This short-hand, however, becomes a very powerful tool when our
common sense is not up to the task of handling the complexity of a
problem. Thus, we will start with examples that will perhaps seem
simple and obvious, and move to examples where it would be a
challenge for you to determine the answer without the power of
statistical inference.
Let’s walk through a simple set of examples to establish the nota-
tion, and some of the basic mathematical properties of probabilities.
Card Game
A simple game can be used to explore all of the facets of probability.
We use a standard set of cards (Figure 1.1) as the starting point, and
use this system to set up the intuition, as well as the mathematical
notation and structure for approaching probability problems.
Figure 1.1: Standard 52-card deck.
13 cards of each suit, labeled Spades,
Clubs, Diamonds, Hearts.
We start with what I simply call the simple card game4, which goes 4 In this description of the game, we
do not reshuffle after each draw. The
differences between this non-reshuffled
version and the one with reshuffling
will be explored later, but will only
change some small details in the out-
comes.
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like:
simple card game ≡

From a standard initially shuffled deck,
we draw one card, note what card it is
and set it aside. We then draw another
card, note what card it is and set it
aside. Continue until there are no more
cards, noting each one along the way.
(1.1)
There are certain principles that guide us in developing the math-
ematical structure of probability. We start with some common sense
notions, written in English, and then write them as general princi-
ples. These principles, then, constrain our mathematics so that we
can apply the ideas quantitatively.
When asked “what is the probability of drawing a red on the
first draw?” you would generally say 50-50, or 50%, or equivalently
written as a probability, P(R1) = 0.5. The reason for this is that
we are completely ignorant of the initial conditions of the deck (i.e.
where each card is located in the deck after the initial shuffling).
Given this level of (or lack of) knowledge, we could swap the colors
of the two suits and we would have an equivalent state of knowledge
- the problem would be identical. We will keep coming back to this
concept, but in general:
Principle of Knowledge and Probability Equivalent states of Principle of Knowledge and Proba-
bility Equivalent states of knowledge
must yield equivalent probability
assignments.
knowledge must yield equivalent probability assignments.
Because of this principle, we are led to the conclusion that
P(R1) = P(B1)
where R1 represents the statement “a red on the first draw” and B1
represents “a black on the first draw.” Because these are the only two
options, and they are mutually exclusive, then they must add up to 1.
Thus we have
P(R1) = 1− P(B1)
which leads directly to our original assignment
P(R1) = P(B1) = 0.5
Mutually Exclusive If I have a list of mutually exclusive events, then Mutually Exclusive If I have a list of
mutually exclusive events, then that
means that only one of them could
possibly be true. Examples includes the
heads and tails outcomes of coins, or
the values of standard 6-sided dice. In
terms of probability, this means that, for
events A and B, P(A and B) = 0.
that means that only one of them could possibly be true. Example
events include flipping heads or tails with a coins, rolling a 1, 2,
3, 4, 5 or 6 on dice, or drawing a red or black card from a deck of
cards. In terms of probability, this means that, for events A and B,
P(A and B) = 0.
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Non Mutually Exclusive If I have a list of events that are not mutu- Non Mutually Exclusive If I have a list
of events that are not mutually exclusive,
then it is possible for two or more to be
true. Examples include weather with
rain and clouds or holding the high and
the low card in a poker game.
ally exclusive, then it is possible for two or more to be true. Examples
include weather with rain and clouds or holding the high and the
low card in a poker game.
Now, this was a long-winded way to get to the answer we knew
from the start, but that is how it must begin. We start working things
out where our common sense is strong, so that we know we are
proceeding correctly. We can then, confidently, apply the tools in
places where our common sense is not strong.
In summary, with no more information than that there are two
mutually exclusive possibilities, we assign equal probability to both.
If there are only two colors of cards in equal amounts, red and black,
then the probability of drawing a red is P(R1) = 0.5 and the probabil-
ity for a black is the same, P(B1) = 0.5.
Other Observations
If instead of just the color, we were interested in the suit (hearts,
diamonds, spades, and clubs), then there would be four equal and
mutually exclusive possibilities. We have a certain number of possi-
bilities, and our state of knowledge is exactly the same if we simply
swap around the labels on the cards. If we’re interested in the specific
card, not just the suit, the logic is the same. Thus, we have
P(♠) = P(♣) = P(♦) = P(♥)
and for drawing one specific card from the deck,
P(A♠) = P(2♠) = P(3♠) = · · · = P(K♥)
Further, they all must add up to 1, so we get for suits
P(♠) + P(♣) + P(♦) + P(♥) = 1
and for the specific card from the deck,
P(A♠) + P(2♠) + P(3♠) + · · ·+ P(K♥)︸ ︷︷ ︸
52 cards
= 1
Putting it together, we get for the suits
P(♠) = P(♣) = P(♦) = P(♥) = 1
4
and for the specific card
P(A♠) = P(2♠) = P(3♠) = · · · = P(K♥) = 1
52
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Probabilities for Mutually Exclusive Events In general, for mutu- Probabilities for Mutually Exclusive
Events
P(A) =
(number of cases favorable to A)
(total number of equally possible cases)
ally exclusive events, we have
P(A) =
(number of cases favorable to A)
(total number of equally possible cases)
(1.2)
1.3 Conditional Probability
It is important to understand that probability reflects our state of
knowledge about the system. As our knowledge changes, so do our
probability assignments. As we gain more information, we change
our probability assignments. Two people observing the same system,
but with different information about the system, will give different
probability assignments. All we need to make sure probability theory
matches our common sense is for two people with the same state of
knowledge, or the same information, to yield identical probability
assignments.
Because our information about a system is so important in assign-
ing probabilities, we introduce a way of writing it mathematically
that we will use for the rest of the book. It will be good for the reader
to get used to reading the mathematical short-hand in English in
order to gain an understanding for what it means.
Probability Notation
In math, we choose to abbreviate long sentences in English, in order
to use the economy of symbols. In this book we choose a middle-
ground between mathematical succinctness and the ease of under-
standing English. We start with the simple card game (Equation 1.1)
We then define a new symbol, |, which should be read as “given.”
When there is information given we call this probability conditional
on that information. When we write the following:
P(red on first draw|simple card game) (1.3)
or
P(R1|simple card game) (1.4)
this is short for
“The probability of drawing a red on the first draw, given that we have a
standard initially shuffled deck and we follow the procedure where we draw
one card, note what color it is and set it aside and continue drawing, noting,
and setting aside until there are no more cards.”
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One can easily see that the mathematical notation is far more
efficient. It is important to be able to read the notation, because it
describes what we know and what we want to know.
Conditional Probability When information is given, and ex- Conditional Probability When
information is given, and expressed on
the right-hand side of the | sign, we
say that the probability is conditional.
P (I’m going to get wet today|raining outside)
is an assessment of how likely it is that
I will get wet given, or conditional on, the
fact that it is raining outside. Clearly
this number will be different if it was
conditional on the fact that it is sunny
outside.
pressed on the right-hand side of the | sign, we say that the proba-
bility is conditional. P (I’m going to get wet today|raining outside) is
an assessment of how likely it is that I will get wet given, or condi-
tional on, the fact that it is raining outside. Clearly this number will
be different if it was conditional on the fact that it is sunny outside.
When we put a comma (“,”) on the right side then we read this as
“and we know that.” For example, when we write the following:
P(red on second draw|simple card game,red on first draw) (1.5)
or
P(R2|simple card game, R1) (1.6)
Causation. Imagine we have a 2-card
game: a small deck with one red card
and one black card. We’re tempted to
interpret
P(R2|R1, 2-card game) = 0
to mean that because we drew a red on the
first draw, this causes the impossibility of
drawing the red on the second, because
there is only 1 red card. However,
consider the following:
P(R1|R2, 2-card game) = 0
This is just as true: if you knew that
you drew a red on the second draw,
it makes it impossible to have drawn
one on the first. However, you can’t
interpret this as causation - the second
draw didn’t cause the first draw.
Instead, probability statements are
statements of logic, not causation. One can
use probabilities to describe causation
(i.e. P (rain|clouds)), but the statements
of probability have no time component
- later draws from the deck of cards act
exactly the same as earlier ones.
this is short for
“The probability of drawing a red on the second draw, given that we have a
standard initially shuffled deck and we follow the procedure where we draw
one card, note what color it is and set it aside and continue drawing, noting,
and setting aside until there are no more cards and we know that we drew a
red on the first draw.”
1.4 Rules of Probability
From the rule for mutually exclusive events (Equation 1.2), we assign
the following probabilities for the first draw from this deck5:
5 A face card is defined to be a Jack,
Queen, or King. A number card is
defined to be Ace (i.e. 1) through 10.
• P(10) = 452
• P(♥) = 1352 =
1
4
• P(10♥) = 152
• P(face card) = 1252
• P(number card) = 4052
It turns out that mathematically, the rules for fractions of things
and of probabilities are the same. Thus, to gain an understanding
for the rules of probability, we will calculate fractions (which are
more immediately intuitive), and then summarize the same rule for
probabilities.
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Negation Rule
In this section I’ll use the letter F for fraction, and we can determine
the values simply by counting. The fraction of cards which are hearts
(♥) is Either-or fallacy. The negation rule,
should not be taken to imply that
everything is “black and white,” or
“there are only two sides to every
story.” It really is just a statement of
logic, should be carefully considered
and has some limitations. For example,
the following is true,
P (object is black) + P (object is not black) = 1
However, this does not mean the same
thing as
P (object is black) + P (object is white) 6= 1
“Not black” is not the equivalent of
“white.” It could be red, or gray, or
some other color. A common logical
fallacy sometimes referred to as the
“either-or fallacy” or the “fallacy of the
excluded middle,” turns on this point.
Some examples of these fallacies are:
• If we don’t reduce public spending,
our economy will collapse.
• You’re either with us or you’re a
terrorist.
• Either modern medicine can explain
how Ms. X was cured, or it is a
miracle.
F(♥) =
13
52
=
1
4
The fraction of cards which are not hearts (i.e. the 3 other suits) is:
F(not ♥) =
13× 3
52
=
3
4
These numbers add up to one: F(♥) + F(not ♥) = 1. We can do this
with more complex statements.
F (first card is a face card) =
12
52
F (first card is not a face card) =
40
52
F (first card is a face card) + F (first card is not a face card) = 1
or conditionals, like “the first card is a jack given that we know that
the first card is a face card.” Notice that there are 12 cards that are
face cards, so we restrict our counts to those.
F (jack|face card) = 4
12
= 1/3
F (not a jack|face card) = 8
12
= 2/3
F (jack|face card) + F (not a jack|face card) = 1
and they add up to one.
Negation Rule Given any information, we have Negation Rule
P(A|B) + P(not A|B) = 1
P(statement|information) + P(not statement|information) = 1
or
P(A|B) + P(not A|B) = 1 (1.7)
Product Rule
The product rule comes from looking at the combination of events:
event A and event B. As before, we’ll work on the numbers from the
fractions of the card game. We’ll look at the question “what is the
fraction of cards that are Jacks and a heart?.” This is clearly F (J♥) =
1/52, but we can look at it a different way that is equivalent. We
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note that the Jacks constitute 4/52 of the cards, and that of those 4,
only one quarter of them are hearts (one card out of the four cards).
So, we can arrive at the fraction of J♥ by taking one quarter of the
fraction of jacks. So what we have is
F (jack and ♥) = F (♥|jack)× F (jack) = 1
4
× 4
52
=
1
52
One can equivalently reason from the suit first: the hearts constitute
13/52 of the cards, and that of those 13, the Jacks constitute 1/13
of the cards. So, we can arrive at the fraction of J♥ by taking one
thirteenth of the fraction of ♥. Again, we have
F (jack and ♥) = F (jack|♥)× F (♥) = 1
13
× 13
52
=
1
52
In general we have
Product Rule Product Rule
P(A and B) = P(A|B)P(B) = P(B|A)P(A)
P(A and B) = P(A|B)P(B) = P(B|A)P(A) (1.8)
Another example is the following: “what is the probability of
drawing two Kings in a row?” This is the same as
P(K2 and K1)
From the product rule (Equation 1.8) we have
P(K2 and K1) = P(K2|K1)P(K1)
The second part is straight forward: P(K1) = 4/52. The first part is
asking the probability of drawing a second king, knowing that we
have drawn a king on the first draw. Now, there are only 51 cards
remaining when we do the second draw, and only 3 kings. Thus, we
have P(K2|K1) = 3/51 and finally
P(K2 and K1) = P(K2|K1)P(K1)
=
3
51
× 4
52
=
1
221
Independence
As a specific case of the product rule, we can change the rule of the
card games such that we reshuffle the deck after each draw. In this
way, the result of one draw gives you no information about other
draws. In this case, the events are considered independent.
Independent Events Two events, A and B, are said to be inde- Independent Events Two events, A
and B, are said to be independent if
knowledge of one gives you no infor-
mation on the other. Mathematically,
this means
P(A|B) = P(A)
and
P(B|A) = P(B)
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pendent if knowledge of one gives you no information on the other.
Mathematically, this means
P(A|B) = P(A)
and
P(B|A) = P(B)
In this case, the product rule reduces to the simplified rule for
independent events: the product of the individual event probabilities.
Joint Probabilities for Independent Events Joint Probabilities for Independent
Events
P (A and B) = P(A)× P(B)P (A and B) = P(A)× P(B) (1.9)
We have already seen an example of this, when we looked at
drawing the Jack of Hearts: drawing a heart gives you no informa-
tion about whether it is a jack, and vice versa. Thus,
P (♥|jack) = P (♥)
The probability of getting “heads” on any given coin flip is P(H) =
0.5. The probability of flipping two heads in a row is then simply
P(H1) × P(H2) = 0.5 × 0.5 = 0.25, because the second flip is in-
dependent of the first. If it wasn’t, then you’d have to determine
how the knowledge of the first flip influences our knowledge of the
second flip, which is written as P(H2|H1) and the full product rule
(Equation 1.8) would need to be used.
Conjunction
Combinations of Events and the English
language I believe that the issue of the
conjunction fallacy studies is more sub-
tle than this. In English, if I were to say
“Do you want steak for dinner, or steak
and potatoes?” one would immediately
parse this as choice between
1 steak with no potatoes
2 steak with potatoes
Although strict logic would parse this
choice as
1 steak, possibly with potatoes and
possibly without potatoes
2 steak, definitely with potatoes,
it is common in English to have the
implied negative (i.e. steak with no
potatoes) when given a choice where
the alternative is a conjunction (i.e.
steak with potatoes).
One of the consequences of combinations of events is that the prob-
ability of two events happening, A and B, has to be less than (or
possibly equal to) the probability of just one of them, say A, happen-
ing. The mathematical fact is seen by looking at the magnitude of the
terms in the product rule
P (A and B) = P(B|A)︸ ︷︷ ︸
less
than or
equal to
1
×P(A) ≤ P(A)
In other words, coincidences are less likely than either event hap-
pening individually. We intuitively know this, when we make com-
ments like “Wow! What is the chances of that?” referring to, say,
someone winning the lottery and then getting struck by a car the
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next day. Sometimes, however, it seems as if one’s intuition does not
match the conclusions of the rules of probability. One such case is
called the conjunction fallacy.
In an interesting experiment, Tversky and Kahneman[Tversky and
Kahneman, 1983] gave the following survey:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored
in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of
discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear
demonstrations.
Which is more probable?
1 Linda is a bank teller.
2 Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.
85% chose option 2.[Tversky and Kahneman, 1974] This, they at-
tributed, to the conjunction fallacy - mistaking the conjunction of two
events as more probable than a single event. They went further and
did a survey of medical internists with the following
Which is more likely: the victim of an embolism (clot in the lung) will
experience partial paralysis or that the victim will experience both
partial paralysis and shortness of breath?
and again, 91 percent of the doctors chose that the clot was less likely
to cause the rare paralysis rather than to cause the combination of the
rare paralysis and the common shortness of breath. Combinations of Events and the English
language If we interpret the doctor’s
choice with this implied negative, we
have:
1 clot with paralysis and no shortness
of breath
2 clot with paralysis and shortness of
breath
and the first one is much less likely,
because it would be odd to have a
clot and not have a very common
symptom associated with it. The
doctor’s probability assessment is
absolutely correct: both symptoms
together are more likely than just one.
The “fallacy” arises because the English
language is sloppier than mathematical
language.
Even when correct, the consequence for conjunctions can be mis-
used, or at least misidentified. Returning to our example of someone
winning the lottery and then getting struck by a car the next day, rare
events occur frequently, as long as you have enough events. There are
millions of people each day playing the lottery, and millions getting
struck by cars each day. We will explore this problem later, but one
immediate consequence is that winning the lottery and getting struck
by a car the next day probably happens somewhere fairly regularly.
Sum Rule
Now we consider the statements of the form A or B. For example,
in the card game, what is the fraction of cards that are jacks or are
hearts. By counting we get the 13 hearts and 3 more jacks that are not
contained in the 13 hearts, or F (jack or ♥) = 13+352 = 16/52. Now, if
we tried to separate the terms, and do:
F (jack) + F (♥) =
4
52
+
13
52
=
17
52
then we get a number that is too big! It is too big because we’ve
double-counted the jack of hearts. Adjusting for this, by subtracting
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one copy of this fraction, we get
F (jack) + F (♥)− F (jack and ♥) = 4
52
+
13
52
− 1
52
=
16
52
= F (jack or ♥)
In general
Sum Rule Sum Rule
P(A or B) = P(A) + P(B)− P(A and B)
P(A or B) = P(A) + P(B)− P(A and B) (1.10)
Sum Rule for Exclusive Events If two events are mutually exclusive Sum Rule for Exclusive Events If two
events are mutually exclusive the sum
rule reduces to
P(A or B) = P(A) + P(B)
because P(A and B) = 0 for such
events.
the sum rule reduces to
P(A or B) = P(A) + P(B) (1.11)
because P(A and B) = 0 for such events.
So the probability of rolling a 1 or a 2 on one die is 2/6.
One more variant on the Sum Rule is where we have 3 propo-
sitions. It can be a bit tedious to write it all out, but the end result
looks a lot like the original Sum Rule. All we do is break up the
terms in pieces, and then apply the Sum Rule to each piece.
P(A or B or C) = P(A or [B or C])
= P(A) + P(B or C)− P(A and [B or C])
= P(A) + P(B) + P(C)− P(B and C)−
P(A and B or A and C)
= P(A) + P(B) + P(C)− P(B and C)−
[P(A and B) + P(A and C)−
P(A and B and A and C)]
which leads finally to
Sum Rule for Three Events Sum Rule for Three Events
P(A or B or C) = P(A) + P(B) + P(C)−
P(A and B)−
P(B and C)−
P(A and C) +
P(A and B and C)
P(A or B or C) = P(A) + P(B) + P(C)−
P(A and B)− P(B and C)− P(A and C) +
P(A and B and C) (1.12)
In words, when you’re looking for the sum of several events, we
add the probabilities (i.e. P(A) + P(B) + P(C)), then subtract the
double counting (i.e. P(A and B)) as before. Finally, we need to
add back in the triple count (i.e. P(A and B and C)) because it was
taken out too many times with the double count. The accounting
here can be somewhat prone to error, but the concepts are always the
same: when you add probabilities of events, say A and B, together
the term P(A) includes the probability of both P(A and B) and the
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term P(B) includes the probability of both P(A and B), so you’ve
included that probability twice and need to subtract one of them to
balance the books. Likewise (although it is harder to show), the first
six terms in Equation 1.12 end up subtracting one too many copies of
P(A and B and C), and we need to add one in at the end.
Marginalization
One of the consequences of the sum rule and the product rule is a
process called marginalization. Imagine we have a number of condi-
tional statements, like:
P (jack|♥) = 1
13
P (jack|♦) = 1
13
P (jack|♠) = 1
13
P (jack|♣) = 1
13
but we are interested in just the probability of drawing a jack, regard-
less of the suit, or in our notation
P (jack)
The marginalization procedure for this problem looks like:
P (jack) =
all possibilities︷ ︸︸ ︷
P (jack|♥)× P (♥) +
P (jack|♦)× P (♦) +
P (jack|♠)× P (♠) +
P (jack|♣)× P (♣)
=
1
13
× 1
4
+
1
13
× 1
4
+
1
13
× 1
4
+
1
13
× 1
4
=
4
52
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Marginalization If we have a complete set of conditional state- Marginalization If we have a complete
set of conditional statements, like
P(A|B1), P(A|B2), P(A|B3), P(A|B4), · · ·
then the unconditional probability is
found by marginalizing over all possible
values of the conditional events, like
P(A) =
all possible Bs︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(A|B1)P(B1) + P(A|B2)P(B2) + · · ·
ments, like
P(A|B1)
P(A|B2)
P(A|B3)
P(A|B4)
...
then the unconditional probability is found by marginalizing over all
possible values of the conditional events, like
P(A) =
all possible Bs︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(A|B1)P(B1) + P(A|B2)P(B2) + P(A|B3)P(B3) + · · · (1.13)
Bayes’ Rule
One of the most consequential rules of probability is what is known
as Bayes’ Rule. We will use this rule throughout this book, and see
its many applications. It comes as a direct result of the product rule
(Equation 1.8)
P(A and B) = P(A|B)P(B) = P(B|A)P(A)
Rearranging, we get
Bayes’ Rule Bayes’ Rule
P(A|B) = P(B|A)P(A)
P(B)P(A|B) = P(B|A)P(A)
P(B)
(1.14)
We can verify this again with the intuitions we have in the simple
card game. For instance, what is the probability of drawing a jack,
knowing that you’ve drawn a face card? In terms of fractions, this
should be F (jack|face card) = 4/12 = 1/3. Applying Bayes’ Rule to
the fractions we get:
F (jack|face) = F (face|jack)× F (jack)
F (face)
=
4
4 × 452
12
52
=
4
12
=
1
3
Although this calculation is true, it isn’t particularly enlightening.
It is nicer to cast the problem back into probability terms, rather
than fractions, and compare the probability of drawing a jack to the
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probability of the same thing (i.e. drawing a jack) given that we know
that we’ve drawn a face card. This is
P (jack) =
1
13
P (jack|face card) = 1
3
This comparison highlights what Bayes’ Rule represents: learning.
When you are asked what the probability of drawing a jack, from
the knowledge of the simple card game, you calculate the value of
1/13. Once you learn that you drew a face card, you update your
knowledge to include that information, and modify your probability
assignments to reflect this. This leads to an increased chance of the
card being a jack.
In a nutshell, Bayes’ Rule represents learning:
Initial Belief+New Data→ Improved Belief
It is used in science to infer causes from effects, and can thus be
written
P (cause|effect) = P (effect|cause)× P (cause)
P (effect)
To infer the probability of a particular cause, given the events you
observe in the world, you first have to know the probability of the
cause itself (i.e. rarer causes will reduce the prior probability), and
how likely that the cause you’re looking at could have produced
the effects you’ve observed. These two items are the P (cause) and
P (effect|cause) terms, respectively. The entire calculation is scaled
by P (effect) which is all of the other ways that the effects could have been
caused by other causes.. Thus, it is not enough to show that giving a
particular medicine is followed by the symptoms disappearing to
establish that the medicine was the likely cause of the symptoms
disappearing. You have to calculate what other possible causes could
have had those effects, such as the normal functioning of the immune
system or the placebo effect. This is why carefully controlled studies
are necessary, to eliminate all of the other possible causes and to
determine the true cause of the effects observed.
We will spend large portions of several chapters on Bayes’ Rule, to
explore its long-ranging consequences.
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1.5 Venn Mnemonic for the Rules of Probability UNIVERSE
A
1/4
not A
Figure 1.2: Venn diagram of a state-
ment, A, in a Universe of all possible
statements. It is customary to think of
the area of the Universe to be equal to 1
so that we can treat the actual areas as
fractional areas representing the prob-
ability of statements like P(A). In this
image, A takes up 1/4 of the Universe,
so that P(A) = 1/4. Also shown is the
negation rule. P(A) + P(not A) = 1 or
“inside” of A + “outside” of A adds up
to everything.
It is often useful to have a picture to represent the mathematics, so
that it is easier to remember the equations and to understand their
meaning. It is common to use what is called a Venn Diagram to rep-
resent probabilities in an intuitive, graphical way. The idea is that
probabilities are represented as the fractional area of simple geomet-
ric shapes. We can then find a picture representation of each of the
rules of probability. We start by looking at a sample Venn Diagram,
in Figure 1.2.
UNIVERSE
1/8
A
1/4
1/1
6
B
A and B
A or B
{
Figure 1.3: Venn diagram of the sum
and product. The rectangle B takes up
1/8 of the Universe, and the rectangle
A takes up 1/4 of the Universe. Their
overlap here is 1/16 of the Universe,
and represents P(A and B). Their total
area of 5/16 of the Universe represents
P(A or B).
The fractional area of the rectangle A represents the probability
P(A), and can be thought of as a probability of one of the statements
we’ve explored, such as P(♥). This diagram is strictly a mnemonic,
because the individual points on the diagram are not properly de-
fined. The diagram in Figure 1.2 also represents the Negation Rule
(Equation 1.7),
P(A) + P(not A) = 1
In the diagram it is easy to see that the sum of the areas inside of
A (i.e. 1/4) and outside of A (i.e. 3/4) cover the entire area of the
Universe of statements, and thus add up to 1.
Figure 1.3 shows the diagram which can help us remember the
sum and product rules. The Sum Rule (Equation 1.10)
P(A or B) = P(A) + P(B)− P(A and B)
is represented in the total area occupied by the rectangles A and B,
and makes up all of A (i.e. 1/4) and the half of B sticking out (i.e.
1/8-1/16=1/16) yielding P(A or B) = 5/16. This is also the area
of each added up (1/4+1/8), but subtracting the intersection (1/16)
because otherwise it is counted twice. Adding the areas this way
directly parallels the Sum Rule.
Conditional probabilities, like those that come into the Product
Rule (Equation 1.8) and Bayes Rule (Equation 1.14) are a little more
challenging to visualize. In Figure 1.4, P(A|B) is represented by the
fraction of the purple area (which was originally part of A) com-
pared not to the Universe but to the area of B, and thus represents
P(A|B) = 1/2. In a way, it is as if the conditional symbol, “|,” defines
the Universe with which to make the comparisons. On the left of Fig-
ure 1.4, the same purple area that was originally part of B represents
P(B|A) making up 1/4 of the area of A. Thus P(B|A) = 1/4. The
Product Rule (Equation 1.8) then follows,
P(A and B) = P(A|B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1/2
P(B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1/8
= P(B|A)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1/4
P(A)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1/4
=
1
16
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We can further see the special case of mutually exclusive state-
ments shown in Figure 1.5. The Sum Rule for Exclusive Events
(Equation 1.11) is simply the sum of the two areas because there is
no overlap
A
1/4
1/8
B
A|BB|A
Figure 1.4: Venn diagram of conditional
probabilities, P(A|B) and P(B|A).
(Right) P(A|B) is represented by the
fraction of the purple area (which was
originally part of A) compared not
to the Universe but to the area of B,
and thus represents P(A|B) = 1/2.
In a way, it is as if the conditional
symbol, “|,” defines the Universe with
which to make the comparisons. (Left)
Likewise, the same purple area that was
originally part of B represents P(B|A)
which makes up 1/4 of the area of A.
Thus P(B|A) = 1/4.
UNIVERSE
1/8
BA
1/4
Figure 1.5: Venn diagram of mutually
exclusive statements. One can see that
P(A and B) = 0 (the overlap is zero)
and P(A or B) = P(A) + P(B) (the total
area is just the sum of the two areas)
P(A or B) = P(A) + P(B)
Further, it is straightforward to see from this diagram the following
properties as well for mutually exclusive events
P(A and B) = 0
P(A|B) = 0
P(B|A) = 0
1.6 Lessons from Bayes’ Rule - A First Look
Bayes’ Rule is the gold standard for all statistical inference. It is a
mathematical theorem, proven from fundamental principles. It struc-
tures all inference in a systematic fashion. However, it can be used
without doing any calculations, as a guide to qualitative inference.
Some of the lessons which are consequences of Bayes’ Rule are listed
here, and will be noted throughout this text in various examples.
• Confidence in a claim should scale with the evidence for that claim
• Ockham’s razor, which is the philosophical idea that simpler the-
ories are preferred, is a consequence of Bayes’ Rule when compar-
ing models of differing complexity.
• Simpler means fewer adjustable parameters
• Simpler also means that the predictions are both specific and not
overly plastic. For example, a hypothesis which is consistent with
the observed data, and also be consistent if the data were the op-
posite would be overly plastic.
• Your inference is only as good as the hypotheses (i.e. models) that
you consider.
• Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.
• It is better to explicitly display your assumptions rather than im-
plicitly hold them.
• It is a good thing to update your beliefs when you receive new
information.
• Not all uncertainties are the same.
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There is not a universal agreement for the translation of numerical
probability values to qualitative terms in English (i.e. highly unlikely,
somewhat unlikely, etc...). One rough guide is shown in Table 1.1. I
will be following this convention throughout the book, but realize
that the specific probability distinctions are a bit arbitrary.
term probability
virtually impossible 1/1,000,000
extremely unlikely 0.01 (i.e. 1/100)
very unlikely 0.05 (i.e. 1/20)
unlikely 0.2 (i.e. 1/5)
slightly unlikely 0.4 (i.e. 2/5)
even odds 0.5 (i.e. 50-50)
slightly likely 0.6 (i.e. 3/5)
likely 0.8 (i.e. 4/5)
very likely 0.95 (i.e. 19/20)
extremely likely 0.99 (i.e. 99/100)
virtually certain 999,999/1,000,000
Table 1.1: Rough guide for the conver-
sion of qualitative labels to probability
values.

2 Applications of Probability
In this chapter we go through a number of examples of the uses of
probability, and present several useful mathematical tools along the
way.
2.1 The Birthday Problem
This is a famous problem in probability1, which we address here in 1 F. Mosteller. Fifty challenging problems
in probability with solutions. Dover
Pubns, 1965
stages. We introduce a simple version, and make it more complex in
steps until we can tackle the general problem.
Two People on April 3
Example 2.1 Let’s imagine we have the case where two people meet on the
street. What is the probability that they both have April 3 as their birthday?
This can be solved with a straightforward application of the prod-
uct rule, Equation 1.8.
A ≡ Person 1 has a birthday on, say, April 3
B ≡ Person 2 has a birthday on, say, April 3
P(A and B) = P(A|B)P(B)
Each of these terms can be calculated. Firstly, P(A|B) is the proba-
bility that person 1 has a certain birthday given that person 2 has the
same birthday. However, knowing the birthday of the second person
doesn’t tell us anything about the birthday of the first person, thus
they are independent and P(A|B) = P(A).
Secondly, the probability of having any particular birthday is sim-
ply P(A) = 1/365. Finally, we have This is the simplest assumption - that
each day is equally likely to be born
on. However, this is probably not true
- there are some days that are more
likely than others. In addition, once you
start including February 29, then things
obviously change.
A ≡ Person 1 has a birthday on, say, April 3
B ≡ Person 2 has a birthday on, say, April 3
P(A and B) =
1
365
× 1
365
=
1
133, 225
which is extremely unlikely (see Table 1.1)!
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Two People
Example 2.2 Two people meet on the street, and we ask what is the proba-
bility that they both have the same birthday?
How is this different than the previous question, where we spec-
ified which birthday they had? Our intuition immediately suggests
that this probability must be higher than the previous one, because
there are more possibilities - rather than April 3, they could be born
on January 1 or May 3 or any other day. Using our notation we have
the following definitions: In all of these examples we are not
considering leap days, which occur
approximately once every four years.
These extra days do not change any of
the qualitative results, and really only
serve as a small extra correction to any
analysis. However, it does add a fair
amount of bookkeeping with very little
increase in enlightenment, so we choose
to avoid this problem in our examples.
C1 ≡ Person 1 and Person 2 both have a birthday on January 1
C2 ≡ Person 1 and Person 2 both have a birthday on January 2
...
C365 ≡ Person 1 and Person 2 both have a birthday on December 31
and the probability we are looking for is
P(C1 or C2 or · · · or C365)
In this situation we can note that these are exclusive statements.
For example, it can’t be true that both C1 and C2 are true - you can’t
have more than one birthday. Thus, the Sum Rule (Equation 1.10)
reduces to the Limited Sum Rule (Equation 1.11) and we have
P(C1 or C2 or · · · or C365) =(
1
365
× 1
365
)
+
(
1
365
× 1
365
)
+ · · ·+
(
1
365
× 1
365
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
365 terms, one for each day
=
1
365
Another way to think of this is to imagine that person 1 randomly
“chooses” their birthday, D1, and person 2 randomly “chooses” their
birthday, D2, and then they compare to see if the days are the same,
or D1 = D2. In general, we can think of the problem broken up in
this way: Here we find another example of the
general requirement that equivalent
states of knowledge give rise to equiv-
alent probability assignments. In this
case it means that if there is more than
one way to arrive at a conclusion, they
each must give the same answer. We
can then choose the way that is easiest
to calculate, simply out of convenience.
P(D1 = D2) =
P
(
D1 is a specific day and
D2 is the same day
)
×
(
number of possible
specific days
)
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In this way, we get
P(D1 = D2) =
(
1
365
× 1
365
)
× (365)
=
1
365
which is extremely unlikely (see Table 1.1).
Three People
Example 2.3 What is the probability that three random people have the
same birthday?
Going through the same logic, we have
P(D1 = D2 = D3) =
(
1
365
× 1
365
× 1
365
)
× 365
=
1
133, 225
which is even more extremely unlikely (see Table 1.1). It is interesting
to note that this is the same answer we received when we asked for
the probability of two people with a specific birthday. One can think
of the the three people having the same, unspecified, birthday in the
following way if it helps. The first person’s birthday specifies the
necessary birthday for the other two, so it is the same as the case
where we specify a single birthday for two people.
Two People...Out of Three
Usually, we don’t have a situation where we have random people
meeting and all agreeing on birthdays. What we have is a group of
people talking, and two people in the group end up saying “Hey,
my birthday is April 3 too!” This is quite a bit different, and leads to
some unintuitive consequences. Let’s go through the situation with
three people, and we ask the question
Example 2.4 What is the probability that at least two have the same
birthday?
Writing the possibilities out like this is
quite tedious, and can lead to errors.
Directly after this calculation we find
an equivalent, and much easier, way of
writing the same calculation. However,
it is important to note that all ways of
writing the same information must lead
to the same answer.
Writing this out we get (somewhat messily)
P(at least two out of three have the same birthday) =
= P(exactly 2 the same or exactly 3 the same)
= P(exactly 2 the same) +
P(exactly 3 the same)︸ ︷︷ ︸
( 1365 )
3×365
− P(exactly 2 and exactly 3 the same)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
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The term P(exactly 2 the same) can be broken up like
P(exactly 2 the same) = P(a specific 2 are the same)×
number ofpossibilities of
2 the same

with
P(a specific 2 are the same) =
P(D1 = D2 and not D1 = D3)
= P(D1 = D2|not D1 = D3)P(not D1 = D3)
= P(D1 = D2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
365
P(not D1 = D3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
364
365
and there are 3 ways of getting a specific 2 the same, so finally we
have
P(at least two out of three have the same birthday) =
= P(exactly 2 the same or exactly 3 the same)
=
1
365
× 364
365
× 3+
(
1
365
)3
× 365
= 0.0082
A clever way of rethinking this problem, which significantly re-
duces the calculations, is found by asking the following question:
in a group of people, what is the probability that none of the people
have the same birthday? It can be approached in a step-wise fashion.
Person 1 “chooses” a birthday, out of 365. Person 2 “chooses” their
birthday, with probability P = 364/365 of not being the same as Per-
son 1. Person 3 now has 363 “choices” out of 365 to avoid both other
birthdays, etc... So the probability of using this process and getting to
Person 3 and not have any overlapping birthdays is simply
P(none the same in 3 people) =
364
365
× 363
365
Now, if we’re interested in the probability that at least two are the
same, then this is the exact opposite of the probability that none are
the same. Using the Negation Rule (Equation 1.7) we have
P
(
none the same
in 3 people
)
+ P
not “nonethe same in 3
people”
 = 1
P
(
none the same
in 3 people
)
+ P
at least 2 thesame in 3
people
 = 1
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P
at least 2 thesame in 3
people
 = 1− P(none the same
in 3 people
)
= 1− 364
365
× 363
365
= 0.082
Two People...Out of Thirty
Example 2.5 When you have a group of 30 people, like students in a class-
room, and you ask what the probability of finding two in the room with the
same birthday, would your intuition say it is greater or less than 50%?
Many people find that their intuition suggests reasonably strongly
that it would be less than 50%. We can now do this problem quite
easily, and we find that our intuition does not match. Following the We’ve often used our intuition to verify
the result, but now we’ve reached a
state where the problems get subtle
enough that our intuition fails. It is
good to use ones’ intuition on the
“easy” problems, but now that we’ve
established the process we can tackle
problems where our intuition is not
good enough to confirm a result.
same procedure as with 3 people, we imagine each person “choos-
ing” their birthday with a dwindling selection as we go on to avoid
“choosing” one that has already been taken. The probability that no
one in the room as the same birthday as any other is
P(none the same in 30 people) =
364
365
× 363
365
× · × 335
365︸ ︷︷ ︸
29 terms
= 0.27
So the probability of having at least 2 people in the room having
the same birthday is
P
at least 2 thesame in 30
people
 = 1− 0.27
= 0.73
which is 73%! Compare this likely outcome to the extremely rare out-
come of having two random people having matched birthdays, from
page 48. See Figure 2.1 to see a plot of this unintuitive observation.
2.2 The Lottery Problem
2.3 Origin of Life
2.4 Monte Hall Problem
One of the most popular probability problems is called the Monte
Hall problem, and is based on the television game show “Let’s Make
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Figure 2.1: Probability of having at least
two people in a group with the same
birthday depending on the number of
people in the group. The 50% mark is
exceeded once the group size exceeds
23 people.
a Deal.”2 It can take on many forms, but a common form is as fol- 2 S. Selvin. A problem in probability.
American Statistician, 29(1):67, 1975lows3
3 M. Vos Savant. Ask Marilyn [column].
Parade Magazine, page 16, 1990Example 2.6 Suppose you’re on a game show, and you’re given the choice
of three doors: Behind one door is a car; behind the others, goats. You pick a
door, say No. 1 (but the door is not opened), and the host, who knows what’s
behind the doors, opens another door, say No. 3, which has a goat. He then
says to you, "Do you want to pick door No. 2?" Is it to your advantage to
switch your choice?
The result is that it is always better to switch, where the probability
of getting the car moves up from 1/3 to 2/3 by switching! Because
this problem is particularly unintuitive, we will break it up into
smaller pieces. The critical aspect of this is that a change in our as- Most people will state that, because we
are left with 2 choices, it must be 50-50.
However there is added information
in the system which moves us from
knowing nothing about the two choices
(i.e. 50-50 chance) to knowing a little
bit more about the two choices (i.e. not
50-50 chance).
signment of probability to an event must be somehow tied to a change in our
information about that event. In order to understand the problem, we
must then understand where the extra information is coming from.
We will step up to the full problem listed, but for now we explore
some simpler versions of the problem.
Two Doors with Information
Example 2.7 Imagine we have a game with two doors: Behind one door
is a car; behind the other is a goat. You pick a door, say No. 1 (but the door
is not opened), and the host, who knows what’s behind the doors, says that
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there is a 90% chance that the car is behind door No. 2. Is it to your advan-
tage to switch your choice?
Initially there is a two-door choice, with no information about ei-
ther choice, so we assign equal probabilities to the choices: P (car behind No. 1) =
P (car behind No. 2) = 0.5 (i.e. a 50-50 chance). After the host gives
information, this changes. Although this is still a two-door choice, it
is no longer a 50-50 chance. By having a knowledgable person give
you information suddenly changes the situation to a 10-90 chance,
and it is much better for you to switch.
What if the host were a little less direct? Perhaps something like
Example 2.8 The host, who knows what’s behind the doors, points to a
door, choosing the correct door 90% of the time and the incorrect one 10%.
You pick a door, say No. 1, and the host points to door No. 2. Is it to your
advantage to switch your choice?
This amounts to an identical situation as the previous one - the host
is giving you correct information 90% of the time, and we are in a
much better position switching.
Three Doors with Information
We return to the three-door case with a slight variation
Example 2.9 Suppose you’re on a game show, and you’re given the choice
of three doors: Behind one door is a car; behind the others, goats. You pick a
door, say No. 1 (but the door is not opened), and the host, who knows what’s
behind the doors, says that another door, say No. 3, has a 0% chance of
having a car, and that the remaining door (that you haven’t chosen - i.e door
No. 2) has a 66% of having the car. He then says to you, "Do you want to
pick door No. 2?" Is it to your advantage to switch your choice?
In this case, switching to door No. 3 would be ridiculous - we
know the car isn’t there, because the (honest) host knows that it is not
there. The host also has told us that there is a 66% chance of the car
behind door No. 2, and thus we have P (car behind No. 1) = 0.34
and P (car behind No. 2) = 0.66 and it is better to switch to door No.
2.
It isn’t the number of choices that is important, it is the informa-
tion we have about those choices. When you have no information, we
assign equal probabilities. When we have information, we can assign
non-equal probabilities.
Three Doors Down To Two
Back to our original problem, we have
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Example 2.10 Suppose you’re on a game show, and you’re given the choice
of three doors: Behind one door is a car; behind the others, goats. You pick a
door, say No. 1 (but the door is not opened), and the host, who knows what’s
behind the doors, opens another door, say No. 3, which has a goat. He then
says to you, "Do you want to pick door No. 2?" Is it to your advantage to
switch your choice?
The key part is that, no matter what happens,
1 the host never opens your door
2 the host always opens a door with a goat
Given that your first choice, with three equal probability choices
(i.e. you have no information about any of the choices), we expect to
be correct only about 33% of the time. If we happened to get lucky
with our first choice, then the host has a pick of two doors with goats
and has some freedom. If we happened to get unlucky with our first
choice, then the host has no freedom at all, because there is only one
remaining door with a goat. So, about 66% of the time the host is
forced to reveal some of his information, because the door he leaves
closed (other than your door) must have the car. Thus, 66% of the
time the host is telling you where the car is, just a little indirectly.
Formally, we need to involve model comparison, so we postpone
this particular analysis until Section 5.1.
2.5 Weather
Example 2.11 If the probability that it will rain next Saturday is 0.25 and
the probability that it will rain next Sunday is 0.25, what is the probability
that it will rain during the weekend?
First Solution - Independence
If we assume that Sunday and Saturday weather are independent then
the sum-rule (Section 1.4) applies:
P(rain Saturday or rain Sunday) =
P(rain Saturday) + P(rain Sunday)− P(rain Saturday and rain Sunday)
= P(rain Saturday) + P(rain Sunday)− P(rain Saturday)× P(rain Sunday)
= 0.25+ 0.25− 0.25× 0.25 = 0.4375
Although the diagrams in Figure 1.3 are useful in making this
calculation more intuitive, especially the term where we subtract
P(rain Saturday) × P(rain Sunday). Another way to think of this
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term can be seen in answering a different question - what is the total
number of weekends with rain?. Imagine we have, in a year, 200 Sat-
urdays with rain (by simply going through all of the Saturdays and
counting them if it rains on that day) and we also have 200 Sundays
with rain. If we want to know the number of weekends with rain we
can add the Saturdays with rain and the Sundays with rain (coming
to four hundred!) and it becomes clear that we’ve over counted those
weekends where it rained both days, and we’d need to subtract those
to get a reasonable answer. The same logic applies to the calculation
of probabilities.
Second Solution - Correlation
Is it really reasonable that rain on Saturday and Sunday are indepen-
dent events? Probably not! It’s probably the case that knowing that
it rained on Saturday, then rain on Sunday is more likely. It may also
be that if it didn’t rain on Saturday then it will be less likely for rain on
Sunday. So we’d have information like:
P (rain Sunday|rain Saturday) = 0.35
P (rain Sunday|not rain Saturday) = 0.15
Knowing this changes the equation as
P(rain Saturday or rain Sunday) =
= P(rain Saturday) + P(rain Sunday)− P(rain Saturday and rain Sunday)
Notice, however, that we don’t have a direct expression for P(rain Sunday)
anymore. We only have the conditional or dependent forms, like P (rain Sunday|rain Saturday).
We can use the marginalization procedure (Equation 1.13), and sum
over all of the conditional expressions
P (rain Sunday) = P (rain Sunday|rain Saturday) P (rain Saturday) +
P (rain Sunday|not rain Saturday) P (not rain Saturday)
= 0.35× 0.25+ 0.15× (1− 0.25) = 0.2
and then we have
= P(rain Saturday) + P(rain Sunday)− P(rain Saturday)× P (rain Sunday|rain Saturday)
= 0.25+ 0.2− 0.25× 0.35 = 0.3625
which makes it less likely to rain on the weekend if the Sunday rain is
correlated with the Saturday rain. Why is that?
One way to think of it is that, although the probability of rain on
Sunday is increased due to rain on Saturday, it is more likely that Sat-
urday is not rainy. In those cases, which are more frequent, Sunday
56 statistical inference for everyone
is less likely to be rainy as well. When the two days are indepen-
dent, Sunday’s rain is the same probability regardless of Saturday’s
weather. When they are dependent, then the more often clear Satur-
day weather makes it a little less likely for the Sunday rain, and thus
lowers the chance of weekend rain by a little bit.
2.6 Claims, Priors, and Extreme Views
Doctors’ Claims - English Language and Probability
In Section 1.4 we introduced work by Tversky and Kahneman doc-
umenting supposed failures in proper reasoning. In the example
survey of medical internists, the internists were asked
Which is more likely: the victim of an embolism (clot in the lung) will
experience partial paralysis or that the victim will experience both
partial paralysis and shortness of breath?
and 91 percent of the doctors chose that the clot was less likely to
cause the rare paralysis rather than to cause the combination of the
rare paralysis and the common shortness of breath.
This may not be a failure of reasoning, but a (correct!) failure of
the doctors to translate the English language literally into logical
language. It is likely that when doctors are asked: “Which is more
likely: that the victim of an embolism will experience partial paral-
ysis or that the victim will experience both partial paralysis and
shortness of breath?” they interpret it as:
1 someone is claiming that the patient has an embolism
2 the patient is claiming, or someone has measured, that she has
partial paralysis
3 the patient is claiming, or someone has measured, that she has
shortness of breath
The doctors are separating the analysis of the claim of the clot,
which is given information, from the other claims. Another way of
looking at it is to include the knowledge of the method of reporting.
Someone who is reporting information about an ailment will tend to
report all of the information accessible to them. By reporting only the
paralysis, there are two possibilities concerning the person measuring
the symptoms of the patient:
1 they had the means to measure shortness breath in the patient, but
there was none
2 they did not have the means to measure shortness of breath
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In the first case, the doctor’s probability assessment is absolutely
correct: both symptoms together are more likely than just one. In the
second case, the doctors are also correct: one of the sets of diagnostic
results (i.e. just paralysis) is less dependable than the other set (i.e.
both symptoms), thus the second one is more likely to indicate a clot
or is consistent with the known clot.
It isn’t that the doctors are reasoning incorrectly. They are includ-
ing more information, and doing a more sophisticated inference than
the strict, formal, minimalistic interpretation of the statements would
lead one to do. This analysis works well for other examples stated
in the book A Drunkard’s Walk by Mlodinow[Mlodinow, 2008], like
“Is it more probable that the president will increase federal aid to
education or that he or she will increase federal aid to education with
funding freed by cutting other aid to states?”
All of this underscores the need to be careful translating state-
ments of probability into plain English and vice versa.
2.7 Diverging Opinions
Is it possible to have people informed by the same information, and
reasoning properly, to have diverging opinions? It might seem in-
tuitive that people given the same information, reasoning properly,
would tend to come to agreement, however this is not always the
case. What is interesting is that it turns on the prior probabilities for
claims. This example comes from Jaynes, 20034. We have the follow- 4 E. T. Jaynes. Probability Theory: The
Logic of Science. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 2003. Edited by
G. Larry Bretthorst
ing piece of information:
D :=
{
“Mr N. has gone on TV with a sensational claim
that a commonly used drug is unsafe”
and we have observers A, B, and C with different prior assignments
to the reliability of Mr N and of the safety of the drug. These prior
assignments may have been the result of previous inference by these
observers, in a different context, or possible due to expert knowledge.
Observers A and C believe, before the announcement, that the drug
is reasonably safe. Observer B does not. We have the probability
assignments then:
PA(Safe) = 0.9
PB(Safe) = 0.1
PC(Safe) = 0.9
They all agree that if the drug is not safe, then Mr N would an-
nounce it, so we have
PA(D|not Safe) = 1
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PB(D|not Safe) = 1
PC(D|not Safe) = 1
Finally, we have the perceptions from the observers about the reli-
ability of Mr N if the drug is actually safe. In this case, observer A is
trusting of Mr N, observer C is strongly distrustful, and observer B is
mildly distrustful. By “distrustful” we are referring to the probabili-
ties that Mr N would make the announcement even if the drug were
actually safe. So we have
PA(D|Safe) = 0.01
PB(D|Safe) = 0.3
PC(D|Safe) = 0.99
We want to know how each observer then determines whether the
drug is safe, given the announcement, or P(Safe|D) for each observer.
Applying Bayes’ Rule we have
PA(Safe|D) = PA(D|Safe)PA(Safe)PA(D|Safe)PA(Safe) + PA(D|not Safe)PA(not Safe)
=
0.01 · 0.9
0.01 · 0.9+ 1 · 0.1 = 0.083
Following the same calculation for the others, we get the observers
updating their probability assignments after the announcement, D, as
PA(Safe) = 0.9 → PA(Safe|D) = 0.083
PB(Safe) = 0.1 → PB(Safe|D) = 0.032
PC(Safe) = 0.9 → PC(Safe|D) = 0.899
Observer A changed their mind, Observer B had their assessment
confirmed a bit, and Observer C barely budged.
Although you’d think that hearing the announcement of the un-
safe nature of the drug would have moved all of the probabilities by
the same amount, but the information isn’t that the drug is unsafe,
but the someone is claiming that the drug is unsafe. Thus, ones prior
information about both the drug and who is making the claim comes
into play.
2.8 Adding Dice
Example 2.12 What is the probability of the sum of two dice getting a
particular value, say, 7?
In this case, we simply outline every single possibility, and count
the fractions. In a more complex case we may need to find a better
method of counting, but the idea will be the same.
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We find immediately that the probability of getting a sum of 7
is the largest, because there are more arrangements of the two dice
which yield a sum of 7 than for any other sum. All possible results from rolling two
dice:
sum (die 1,die 2)
2 (1,1)
3 (1,2),(2,1)
4 (3,1),(1,3),(2,2)
5 (1,4),(4,1),(3,2),(2,3)
6 (1,5),(5,1),(4,2),(2,4),(3,3)
7 (1,6),(6,1),(5,2),(2,5),(4,3),(3,4)
8 (3,5),(5,3),(6,2),(2,6),(4,4)
9 (5,4),(4,5),(3,6),(6,3)
10 (4,6),(6,4),(5,5)
11 (6,5),(5,6)
12 (6,6)
(36 arrangments total)
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Each probability of a particular sum is just the number of arrange-
ments to get that particular sum divided by the total number of ar-
rangements of a two dice (i.e. 36).
P(2) =
1
36
= 0.028
P(3) =
2
36
= 0.055
P(4) =
3
36
= 0.083
P(5) =
4
36
= 0.111
P(6) =
5
36
= 0.139
P(8) =
5
36
= 0.139
P(9) =
4
36
= 0.111
P(10) =
3
36
= 0.083
P(11) =
2
36
= 0.055
P(12) =
1
36
= 0.028
Example 2.13 What is the probability of rolling a sum more than 7 with
two dice?
In our notation this is
P(8 or 9 or 10 or 11 or 12)
which are all exclusive events, so we use the Sum Rule for exclusive
events (Equation 1.11) and obtain
P(8 or 9 or 10 or 11 or 12) = P(8) + P(9) + P(10) + P(11) + P(12)
= 0.139+ 0.111+ 0.083+ 0.055+ 0.028
= 0.416
Example 2.14 What is the probability of rolling various sums with two
dice each with 20 sides?
20-sided dice are common in some kinds of games, and provide a
nice alternative to the standard 6-sided variety.
2.9 Cancer and Probability
Imagine we have a population of 10000 people who have been tested
for cancer, and we get the following hypothetical data:
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Figure 2.2: Probability for rolling
various sums of two dice. Shown are
the results for two 6-sided dice (left)
and two 20-sided dice (right). The
dashed line is for clarity, but represents
the fact that you can’t roll a fractional
sum, such as 2.5.
Number of
Individuals
Negative Test (T=0) Positive Test (T=1) Total
Doesn’t Have
Cancer (C=0)
9200 700 9900
Has Cancer
(C=1)
20 80 100
9220 780 10000
We can change this into a joint probability which specifies the
probability of every combination of variables (C=0,T=0), (C=1,T=0),
(C=0,T=1), etc...
Posterior Prob-
ability
Negative Test (T=0) Positive Test (T=1) Total
Doesn’t Have
Cancer (C=0)
0.92 0.07 0.99
Has Cancer
(C=1)
0.002 0.008 0.01
0.922 0.078 1.0
Thus, for example, the probability of you not having cancer and
you get false positive is P(C = 0, T = 1) = 0.07. However, this is usu-
ally not the type of question you’re interested in. You’re interested in
questions like, given that you test positive, what is the probability that you
have cancer? This can be calculated in by focusing on just the column
Positive Test (T=1), the probability of having cancer is
P(T = 1|C = 0) = 80
780
= 0.10
or only 10%.
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If we want to find the overall probability of getting a positive test,
we can do it in two ways.
1 Counting the individuals.
P(T = 1) =
780
10000
= 0.078
or around 8%. You’ll notice that this is the value at the bottom of
the column Positive Test (T=1).
2 Marginalizing the Posterior Probability. To do this process (see Sec-
tion 1.4) we break up the probabilities,
P(T = 1) = P(T = 1, C = 0) + P(T = 1, C = 1)
= = 0.07+ 0.008 = 0.078
which is the same answer. What we’ve done here is simply sum-
ming the probability distribution over all of the values of the pa-
rameter we are not interested in (in this case, the parameter C).
2.10 Exercises
Exercise 2.1 What is the probability that at least 3 people have the same
birthday in a group of 50?
Exercise 2.2 Examine the case of Monte Hall with 4 doors, the host open-
ing one door with a goat, and leaving you with a choice of 3. Should you
switch? Does it matter which of the other two you choose?
Exercise 2.3 What is the probability of rolling various sums from two
9-sided dice?
Exercise 2.4 What is the probability of rolling an odd sum with two dice?
Exercise 2.5 What is the probability of rolling more than 7 from two 20-
sided dice?
Exercise 2.6 Given the table above, determine the following quantities, and
describe what they mean:
1 P(C = 1, T = 0)
2 P(C = 0)
3 P(C = 0) + P(C = 1)
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2.11 Probability and Juries
A problem of independence
As said in the beginning of Chapter , in 1968 a jury found defendant
Malcolm Ricardo Collins and his wife defendant Janet Louise Collins
guilty of second degree robbery. The prosecutor focussed on the the
distinctive features of the dependence, and assigned a probability to
each as follows5: 5 J. SULLIVAN. People v. collins
, 68 cal.2d 319, 1968. URL http:
//scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/
people-v-collins-22583
1 Partly yellow automobile 1/10
2 Man with mustache 1/4
3 Girl with ponytail 1/10
4 Girl with blond hair 1/3
5 Negro man with beard 1/10
6 Interracial couple in car 1/1000
He then followed with the calculation applying the product rule
(Section 1.4), to find the probability that all these things could have
been observed:
1
10
× 1
4
× 1
10
× 1
3
× 1
10
× 1
1000
=
1
12, 000, 000
The initial conviction was overturned for two primary reasons,
one legal and one mathematical. The legal argument was that the
prosecution had not established that these initial probabilities were
supported by the evidence. However, the really devastating part of
the argument was mathematical. As you may recall, the product rule
used in this way assumes the independence of the terms (Section 1.4).
For an example, the proper product rule for two of the terms above
would look like:
P (Negro man with beard and Man with mustache) =
P (Negro man with beard|Man with mustache) P (Man with mustache)
What the prosecutor was assuming is that
P (Negro man with beard|Man with mustache) = P (Negro man with beard)
which is equivalent to saying
Knowing the man has a mustache tells us nothing about the probability
of him having a beard!
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Similar sorts of absurdities occur with other terms, like “blond
hair” and “pony tail”, as well as others. Finally, even if it was the
case that this is a somewhat rare combination, given the number of
people in Los Angeles, one might be able to calculate the probability
that there is at least one more couple satisfying these characteris-
tics. Just like the lottery problem (Section 2.2), it becomes likely that
there are more couples in the area like this, and thus the ruling was
overturned.
Another problem with independence
Again as said in the beginning of Chapter , Sally Clark was convicted
in 1999 of the murder of her two young sons6. In the case, the statisti- 6 LORD JUSTICE KAY. R vs sally clark,
April 2003. URL http://www.bailii.
org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2003/1020.
html
cal argument was
Professor Meadow was asked if a figure of 1 in 8,543 reflected the risk
of there being a single SIDS within such a family. He agreed that it
was. A table from the CESDI report was placed before the jury. He was
then asked if the report calculated the risk of two infants dying of SIDS
in that family by chance. His reply was: ‘‘Yes, you have to multiply 1 in
8,543 times 1 in 8,543 and I think it gives that in the penultimate paragraph.
It points out that it’s approximately a chance of 1 in 73 million.”
What he was doing was equating the following in the product rule
(Section 1.4):
P (second child dying of SIDS|first child dying of SIDS) = P (second child dying of SIDS)
which is equivalent to saying
Knowing that the child dies of a [not well understood] disease tells us
nothing about the probability of the second child dying of the same [not
well understood] disease.
Clearly this is ridiculous, because if there is a common source to
the disease, the one death certainly increases the probability of the
second.
Prosecutor’s Fallacy
Both of the cases above are examples of what is called the prosecu-
tor’s fallacy. It occurs when someone assumes that the prior prob-
ability of an event is equal to the probability that the defendant is
innocent. A simple example is that “if a perpetrator is known to have
the same blood type as a defendant and 10% of the population share
that blood type; then to argue on that basis alone that the probability
of the defendant being guilty is 90% makes the prosecutors’s fallacy,
in a very simple form.”7 7 Wikipedia. Prosecutor’s fallacy —
Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, 2014.
URL http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Prosecutor’s_fallacy
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Essentially the prosecutor is ignoring the number of people who
match the rare event. Also, although double-deaths by SIDS are rare,
they are much more common than double-murders! One really have
to look at
P (innocence|evidence)
which is not the same as
P (evidence)
2.12 Computer Examples
Coin Flips
from s i e import *
Generate a small list of data...
data=randint (2 , s i z e =10)
p r i n t data
[1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0]
Generate a slightly larger list of data...
data=randint (2 , s i z e =30)
p r i n t data
[1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0]
data=randint (2 , s i z e = (2000 ,10 ) )
data
array([[1, 0, 1, ..., 1, 0, 0],
[1, 1, 1, ..., 0, 1, 0],
[0, 0, 1, ..., 0, 0, 0],
...,
[0, 0, 0, ..., 1, 1, 0],
[0, 1, 0, ..., 0, 1, 1],
[0, 1, 1, ..., 1, 0, 1]])
We have here a large collection of numbers (20000 of them!), organized in 2000 rows of 10 columns. We
can sum all of the 20000 values, or we can sum across columns or across rows, depending on what we
want.
sum( data ) # add up a l l of the 1 ’ s
9988
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sum( data , a x i s =0) # sum up a l l of the columns
array([1011, 1010, 1001, 1051, 1001, 1008, 962, 990, 976, 978])
sum( data , a x i s =1) # sum up a l l of the rows
array([3, 7, 3, ..., 5, 4, 6])
Typically the hist command makes its own bins, which may not center on the actual count values. That’s
why we call countbins(N), to make bins centered on the counts.
N=sum( data , a x i s =1) # number of heads in each of many f l i p s
h i s t (N, countbins ( 1 0 ) )
x l a b e l ( ’Number of Heads ’ )
y l a b e l ( ’Number of F l i p s ’ )
<matplotlib.text.Text at 0x10856e990>
To get a probability distribution, we divide the histogram result by N.
This distribution is Bernoulli’s equation, or in other words, the binomial distribution.
p(h, 10) =
(
10
h
)
0.5h · 0.510−h
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h=array ( [ 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 1 0 ] )
# or . . .
h=arange (0 ,11 )
(recall that ** is exponentiation in Python, because the caret (ˆ) was already used for a computer-sciency
role.) The spaces in the equation below are not needed, but highlight the three parts of the binomial distri-
bution.
p=nchoosek (10 , h ) * 0 . 5 * * h * 0 .5** (10−h )
h i s t (N, countbins ( 1 0 ) , normed=True )
p l o t ( h , p , ’−−o ’ )
x l a b e l ( ’Number of Heads , $h$ ’ )
y l a b e l ( ’ $p ( h|N=10) $ ’ )
<matplotlib.text.Text at 0x108560290>
Exercise 2.7 You flip a coin five times...
1 What is the probability of flipping 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 heads each in these
5 flips?
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2 Show in a simulation that this matches these probabilities you just found.

3 Random Sequences and Visualization
Now that we understand the rules of probability, and how they are
applied in a number of practical examples, we explore the use of
these rules to sequences of random events. This will produce several
interesting and unintuitive observations and failures of inference,
and the proper ways to handle them. Finally, we examine how visu-
alize both data in general and what we can communicate with such
visualization.
3.1 Coin Flipping
We’ll start with some simple examples of coin flipping, asking some
simple questions, and move to more complex observations and unin-
tuitive conclusions.
Example 3.1 What is the probability of flipping three heads in a row, with
a fair coin?
We can approach this problem in two different ways. The first way,
is a brute-force counting method with the definition of probability for
exclusive events (using Equation 1.2) and the second way makes use
of the other rules of probability. In the first way, we simply outline
every possible combination of three flips, see how many are “three
heads in a row” All possible results from three coin
flips:
1 T T T
2 T T H
3 T H T
4 T H H
5 H T T
6 H T H
7 H H T
8 H H H
Because there is only one case of “H H H” in all eight, the proba-
bility of three heads in a row is
P (three heads in a row) = 1/8
which is an unlikely outcome, but not extremely so (see Table 1.1).
In terms of the rule of probability, we have
P (three heads in a row) = P(H1 and H2 and H3)
where H1 is heads on the first flip, H2 is heads on the second flip,
etc... Because these are independent events (Section 1.4), the probabil-
ity is just the product of the probabilities of the individual events
(Equation 1.9) Yet again, we see that if there are
multiple ways of arriving at an answer,
that it must yield the same answer -
equivalent states of knowledge yield
equivalent probability assignments.
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P (three heads in a row) = P(H1 and H2 and H3)
= P(H1)× P(H2)× P(H3)
=
1
2
× 1
2
× 1
2
=
1
8
Example 3.2 What is the probability of flipping thirty heads in a row, with
a fair coin?
Our intuition will clearly insist that this will be a very small num-
ber, but how small? Our first method, of listing all of the possibilities
gets quite a bit cumbersome with this question. The second method
is quite straightforward
P (thirty heads in a row) = P(H1 and H2 and · · · and H30)
= P(H1)× P(H2)× · · · × P(H30)
=
30 times︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
2
× 1
2
× · · · × 1
2
=
(
1
2
)30
= 0.000000001 (one in a billion!)
This is virtually impossible (Table 1.1).
Example 3.3 What is the probability of flipping two heads in three flips,
with a fair coin?
Our intuition suggests that this should be a reasonably common
occurrence. We address this problem in exactly the same two ways:
first, by counting, the second with the rules of probability. In the
first method, we observe from the table that there are three ways of
getting two heads: “T H H,” “H T H,” and “H H T.” Thus,
P (two heads in three flips) =
3
8
In the second method we write
P (two heads in three flips) =
P ((T1 and H2 and H3) or (H1 and T2 and H3) or (H1 and H2 and T3))
from which we can apply the sum rule for exclusive events (Equa-
tion 1.11) and, like before, the product rule for independent events
(Equation 1.9),
P (two heads in three flips) =
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P(T1 and H2 and H3) + P(H1 and T2 and H3) + P(H1 and H2 and T3)
=
(
1
2
× 1
2
× 1
2
)
+
(
1
2
× 1
2
× 1
2
)
+
(
1
2
× 1
2
× 1
2
)
=
1
8
+
1
8
+
1
8
=
3
8
which is about a 38% chance, slightly unlikely (Table 1.1).
Example 3.4 What is the probability of flipping ten heads in thirty flips,
with a fair coin?
Once the numbers start getting large, our intuition fails, and we
can’t list all the possibilities. In order to proceed, we need to develop
a systematic way of approaching these sorts of problems. Essentially
it comes down to two parts:
1 What is the probability of one particular sequence being considered?
2 How many ways can this type of sequence appear in the process
described in the question?
Point 1 is asking, what is the probability of this particular se-
quence:
H H H H H H H H H H T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T
or this sequence:
T T H T T T T H H H H T T T T T H T T H T T T T T T H H T H
Although it is unintuitive, mathematically both of these specific se-
quences have exactly the same probability: each head or tail has equal
probability, is not related to the others, and there are the same num-
ber of them. So we have
P (HHHHHHHHHHTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT) =
P (TTHTTTTHHHHTTTTTHTTHTTTTTTHHTH)
=
(
1
2
)30
= 0.000000001 (one in a billion!)
Every single specific length-thirty sequence of heads and tails has the
same probability, one in a billion.
Point 2 is asking, how many sequences are there of thirty heads
and tails where ten of them are heads? Another way of phrasing it is,
given a sequence like:
H H H H H H H H H H T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T
how many different ways can I rearrange this sequence and get a
unique sequence?
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Counting the Rearrangements
We are going to determine the answer to our question in small steps. Symbols: A B C D
Boxes:
Choices Remaining Symbols
A B C D
B A C D
C A B D
D A B C
First, we ask,
Example 3.5 How many ways can we rearrange the unique symbols A, B,
C, and D?
To make this intuitive, we set up four empty boxes and we imagine
placing our symbols in the boxes, one at a time. How many choices
do we have? For the first box, we have four choices. For each of these
choices, we’ve removed one of the symbols, and one of the boxes.
Choices Remaining Symbols
A B C D
A C B D
A D B C
B A C D
B C A D
B D A C
C A B D
C B A D
C D A B
D A B C
D B A C
D C A B
Thus, we are left with three remaining symbols for each choice, and
three remaining boxes. For each of the original four choices, we now
have three choices for the second box. This immediately leads to
4× 3 = 12 possibilities by the time we’ve filled two boxes. For each of
these twelve possibilities, there are two symbols remaining and two
boxes. Continuing this logic, we have two choices for the third box,
and then only one choice for the final box. In summary, for each of
the four choices for the first box we have three choices for the second,
two choices for the third, and one for the final box. Thus we havenumber of rearrange-ments of four different
symbols
 = 4× 3× 2× 1 = 24
In general we have
Number of Rearrangements of N Unique Symbols Number of Rearrangements of N
Unique Symbols
C(N) = N × (N − 1)× · · · × 2× 1
= N!
C(N) = N × (N − 1)× · · · × 2× 1
= N! (3.1)
where we’ve introduced the notation for the factorial of N as N!.
Example 3.6 How many ways can we rearrange the symbols A, A, A, and
D?
Symbols: A A A D
Rearrangements
D A A A
A D A A
A A D A
A A A D
By eye we can see that there are only four rearrangements of these
symbols. How is this different from the previous question? We can
imagine going from the first question, with four unique symbols
“A B C D,” and replace both “B” and “C” with “A” to get it. Essen-
tially, by using the equation for four unique symbols, what we are
doing is over counting the duplicate symbols. All of the rearrangements
of unique symbols are being included in the count, and need to be
removed. For example, “BC” and “CB” are different sequences of
unique symbols. However, if we replace “B” with an “A” and “C”
with an “A”, both sequences become the same sequence, namely
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“AA”. If we try to apply Equation 3.1, the one for the number of rear-
rangements of unique symbols, to the case where there are duplicates,
we will overestimate the number of rearrangements because we are
over counting duplicate subsequences. Further, we can be specific
about how much we are over counting and thus find a new equation
which includes the possibility of duplicates.
For example, if we have three duplicates in a sequence, the num-
ber of over countings will be the number of possible rearrangements
of three unique symbols, because all of these rearrangements result in
the same sequence of duplicate symbols. Thus, our procedure could
be,
number of rear-rangements of “A
A A D”
 =
number of rearrange-ments of four unique
symbols


number of rearrange-
ments of the over-
counted duplicate three
symbols

=
4!
3!
=
4× 3× 2× 1
3× 2× 1
= 4
Example 3.7 How many ways are there of rearranging the symbols “A A
A D D”?
Following the same logic, we have
5! ways of
rearranging
5 unique
symbols︷ ︸︸ ︷
A A A︸ ︷︷ ︸
3! ways of
rearranging
3 duplicates
D D︸︷︷︸
2! ways of
rearranging
2 duplicates
All possible results of rearranging the
symbols “A A A D D”:
1 A A D D A
2 D A A D A
3 A D A D A
4 D A A A D
5 D A D A A
6 A A D A D
7 D D A A A
8 A D D A A
9 A A A D D
10 A D A A D
number of rear-rangements of
“A A A D D”
 = 5!
3!2!
=
5× 4× 3× 2× 1
(3× 2× 1)× (2× 1)
=
120
6× 2
= 10
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Sequences of Heads and Tails
Now we can return to our original question,
Example 3.8 What is the probability of flipping ten heads in thirty flips,
with a fair coin?
We broke it down into two parts:
1 What is the probability of one particular sequence being considered?
P
one sequence of10 heads and 20
tails
 = (1
2
)10
×
(
1
2
)20
=
(
1
2
)30
= 0.00000000093 (one in a billion!)
2 How many ways can this type of sequence appear in the process
described in the question?
Because we have a length-thirty sequence of “H” and “T” with
10 duplicate “H” symbols and 20 duplicate “T,” we have the fol-
lowing number of ways that this could occur (i.e. the number of
rearrangements of these sequences):
number of re-
arrangements
of a length-30
sequence with
10 “H” and 20
“T”

=
30!
10!20!
= 30045015
So the probability of flipping 10 heads in 30 flips is
P(h = 10, N = 30) =
30!
10!20!
(
1
2
)30
= 30045015× 0.00000000093
= 0.028
which is extremely unlikely (Table 1.1). In general we have
Probability of flipping h heads and t tails Given the probability Probability of flipping h heads and t
tails Given the probability of flipping
a single heads as 1/2, and the total
number of flips is N = h + t, we have
the following probability for h heads
and t tails:
P(h, t) =
(h + t)!
h!t!
×
(
1
2
)h
×
(
1
2
)t
of flipping a single heads as 1/2, and the total number of flips is
N = h + t, we have the following equivalent forms:
P(h, t) =
(h + t)!
h!t!
×
(
1
2
)h
×
(
1
2
)t
(3.2)
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P(h, N) =
N!
h!(N − h)! ×
(
1
2
)h
×
(
1
2
)N−h
P(h, N) =
(
N
h
)
×
(
1
2
)h
×
(
1
2
)N−h
where we have introduced the notation that is sometimes used, called
choose, read as “N choose h,”(
N
h
)
≡ N!
h!(N − h)!
Shown in Figure 3.1 is the probability of flipping h heads in 30
flips, for each value of h from h = 0 (no heads or, in other words, 30
tails) up to h = 30 (all 30 heads). Clearly the most likely value is 15,
but all of the numbers from 12 up to 18 have significant probability.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Number of heads
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
P
(h
,N
=
30
)
Figure 3.1: Probability of getting h
heads in 30 flips. Clearly the most
likely value is 15, but all of the numbers
from 12 up to 18 have significant
probability.
3.2 Binomial Distribution
The distribution of the possible number of heads, given N flips with
a coin with probability p of flipping heads, is referred to as the Bino-
mial Distribution. It has the form of Equation 3.3, with the “fair coin”
probability, 1/2, replaced with p:
P(h|N, p) = N!
h!(N − h)! × p
h × (1− p)N−h (3.3)
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Probability of flipping h heads and t tails with an unfair coin Probability of flipping h heads and
t tails with an unfair coin Given the
probability of flipping a single heads
as p, and the total number of flips is
N = h + t, we have the following
probability for h heads and t tails:
P(h, t) =
(h + t)!
h!t!
× ph × (1− p)t
Given the probability of flipping a single heads is, say, p and the total
number of flips is N = h + t, we have the following equivalent forms:
P(h, t) =
(h + t)!
h!t!
× ph × (1− p)t (3.4)
P(h, N) =
N!
h!(N − h)! × p
h × (1− p)N−h
P(h, N) =
(
N
h
)
× ph × (1− p)N−h
where the probability of tails is 1− p.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Number of heads
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
P
(h
,N
=
30
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p=0.1
p=0.5
p=0.8
Figure 3.2: Probability of getting h
heads in 30 flips given a possible unfair
coin. One coin has p = 0.1, where the
maximum is for 3 heads (or 1/10 of the
30 flips), but 2 heads is nearly as likely.
Another has p = 0.5, and is the fair coin
considered earlier with a maximum at
15 heads (or 1/2 of the 30 flips). Finally,
another coin shown as p = 0.8 where
24 heads (or 8/10 of the 30 flips) is
maximum.
3.3 Streaks
In the previous section we looked at the probability of getting a cer-
tain number of heads in a number of flips. Look at the following two
sequences:
1 HTTHTHHTTHTHTTHHHTHHTTHHTHHTTHTHHTHHTTHTTHHHTHTHTT
2 HHTHHHTTTTTTTHTHTTHTTTHTHTHHTHTTHTTTHHTTTHHHHTHHHH
One of these sequences was generated from actually flipping a coin
50 times. The other one is from a person pretending to flip a coin, and
writing down a sequence that they thought would look like a random
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flipping of a coin. Which one is which? While many people think
that sequence 1 looks more “random” (i.e. it seems to flip around a
lot), sequence 2 is actually the random sequence.
One of the truly unintuitive things about real random sequences,
as opposed to designed sequences, is that there are long runs or
streaks. Why is this? The general solution is beyond this book but
we can think about it this way. Although a sequence of, say, 5 heads
in a row is very unlikely (P (5 heads in a row) = (1/2)5 = 0.03),
there are many opportunities for such a sequence somewhere within a
sequence of 50. Because of these many opportunities, this raises the
probability from 3% (the probability of 5 heads in a row in 5 flips), to
over 55%, the probability of finding 5 heads in a row somewhere in 50
flips. Streaks of 6 heads in a row occur nearly one third of the time in
50 flips, or over half the time if you consider a run to be either heads
or tails. Even streaks of 9 heads or tails in a row, in 50 flips, is not
extremely unlikely!
3.4 Gambler’s Fallacy
When we look at a sequence of real coin flips, like:
• HHTHHHTTTTTTT
and we ask about the probability of flipping heads in the next flip, it
is common to (mistakenly!) reason that, because we’ve seen 7 tails in
a row, then the next flip is more likely to be heads. However, this is
not the case for two reasons:
1 long streaks are common in completely fair and random sequences
- so observing a streak of 7 tails does not contribute much to one’s
confidence that we are looking at a rigged coin or a fair one, or
one that has changed its probability properties.
2 the process of flipping a coin is independent each time, nearly by
definition, and thus the result of one flip cannot influence the
result of the next flip.1 1 One can imagine a flipping procedure
where the flips are not independent.
Say, you always place the resulting
face (heads or tails) initially up in a flip,
and the you do not flip particularly
vigorously. Thus, the result of one flip
would be related to the result of the
next flip. However, in nearly all real
cases, people go to great lengths to
avoid this sort of procedure.
The faulty, but intuitive, reasoning goes by the name of the Gam-
bler’s Fallacy and appears in many places. We can ask a question:
How could we tell the difference between a random, independent
sequence and one where the events are not independent, where the
next flip depended on a previous flip?
We’ll have to return to this question later, when we consider model
comparison, but roughly, one would have to look at all pairs of events
to see if one pair (say heads-tails) occurs more frequently (even if
only by a little) than another pair (say heads-heads).
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In a total fit of irony, casino slot machines do not produce inde-
pendent winnings - they are programmed so that if you’ve lost many
times, then that machine is a little less likely to lose the next time. In
effect, at gambling houses they train the gamblers in the Gambler’s
Fallacy!
3.5 The Hot Hand - Correlations in Random Sequences
Some work by Tversky and Gilovich2 looks at the following issue in 2 A. Tversky and T. Gilovich. The cold
facts about the" hot hand" in basketball.
Anthology of statistics in sports, 16:169,
2005
the sport of basketball: there are times when it seems as if basketball
players have a “hot hand” - they are on a shooting streak. Tversky
and Gilovich looked at how basketball fans perceived streaks, by hav-
ing them rate sequences of shots as random shooting or streak shooting.
Most (65%) of the respondents classified artificially generated, purely
random sequences as streak shooting. In real data, they discovered
that the actual probability of “making a given shot (i.e. a player’s
shooting percentage) is unaffected by the player’s prior performance.”
We examine this effect in a later section (see Example 8.8) where we
explore the quantitative procedure for assessing this conclusion. It is
enough here to note the large difference between the perception of the
sequence and the likely cause of the sequence, and thus the need to
always be vigilant against faulty perceptions. Tversky and Gilovich
insist that “their observations do not tell us anything general about
sports, but it does suggest a generalization about people, namely that
they tend to ’detect’ patterns even where none exist.”
What we have here, again, is the general perception that long se-
quences are somehow not “random,” when in fact the opposite is the
case. People have a natural tendency to see patterns in random data,
to infer order where there is none, and to ascribe importance to the
appearance of pattern. It is the role of statistical inference in gen-
eral to provide the tools to properly handle the distinction between
random effects and patterns, and to retune our intuitions.
3.6 Regression Toward the Mean
There is a peculiar phenomenon referred to as regression toward the
mean, which often is misinterpreted and leads to failures of proper
statistical inference. It can be seen in a simple example. Imagine that
we “test” a number of students by having them guess the results of a
coin flip. Clearly this will be entirely luck, because the coin flip has
no pattern. If a student guesses the results of 50 flips, there will be an
expectation of getting 25 correct. Here we simulate 20 students each
“predicting” the result of 50 flips, the results shown in Table 3.1. The
test is done twice, and we will look at a particular subset presently.
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One can, by eye, see that most of the students get around 25 correct -
exactly as expected from random performance.
Student Total Correct
First Round
Total Cor-
rect Second
Round
1 23 24
2 23 29
3 19 23
4 26 27
5 28 29
6 26 22
7 23 26
8 30 28
9 24 21
10 27 23
11 25 31
12 30 21
13 20 22
14 28 29
15 24 25
16 25 22
17 23 24
18 20 28
19 20 29
20 28 25
Table 3.1: Total Correct Guesses from
Students “Predicting” the Results of
50 Coin Flips. Shown are the results
of a first round and a second round of
guessing.
Now, imagine that we look at the top five coin flip predictors on
the first round. Will they do better or worse in the the second round?
What about the bottom five coin flip predictors? The results of these
two cases are summarized in Table 3.2. The pattern, even in this
small sample, is quite clear:
1 Those that did the best the first time did worse the second (on
average)
2 Those that did the worst the first time did better the second (on
average)
One might be tempted (had you not known that this is artificial data,
and completely random) to interpret this as a causal pattern, e.g.
“the students that did better the first time, grew over-confident the
second,” “the students that did worse the first time, worked harder
to improve the second,” etc... This interpretation of the results by stu-
dents has been observed in the classroom.3 However, it runs into se- 3 Andrew Gelman and Deborah
Nolan. Teaching Statistics: A Bag
of Tricks. Oxford University Press,
USA, 2002. ISBN 0198572247.
URL http://www.amazon.com/
Teaching-Statistics-A-Bag-Tricks/
dp/0198572247
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Top Five the First Time Bottom Five the First Time
Student Performance the
Second Time
8 Worse
12 Worse
14 Better
5 Better
20 Worse
Student Performance the
Second Time
3 Better
13 Better
18 Better
19 Better
1 Better
Table 3.2: Performance in the Second
Round of Students “Predicting” the
Results of 50 Coin Flips. Shown are
the results for those students who
performed best in the first round (left),
and those that performed worst in the
first round (right).
rious trouble when the data is something like the heights of children
compared to their parents - the tallest parents tend to have children
shorter than they are, the shortest parents tend to have children taller
than they are, a pattern first quantified by Galton in 18694. 4 F. Galton. Hereditary Genius: An
Inquiry Into Its Laws and Consequences.
Macmillan and Company, limited, 1914.
URL http://books.google.com/books?
id=bJB9AAAAMAAJ
What is happening here is that, if the process is dominated by luck
or simple random variation, then outliers occur, but are rare. Thus
a particularly high value will likely be followed by a lower value -
closer to the mean. The tendency is to regress toward the mean in pro-
cesses dominated by luck. This can be confused with the Gambler’s
Fallacy discussed earlier, where flipping 3 heads in a row doesn’t
give you any information about flipping another heads - it is not
more likely to be tails. Part of the difference is that we are dealing
with a process that has many possible values, not just two, and thus we
can have a mean value, and outliers.
When each of these ideas is applied to sports, the weather, or
business there are some interesting conclusions.
1 even when the process is entirely random, long streaks occur - and
are often misinterpreted as an increase in the probability of the
event.
2 when a person performs very well at their job (a number of suc-
cessful business decisions, a high batting average, etc...) they will
often do worse the next year - and again many are surprised, and
interpret the result as the person “losing their touch” - when in
fact, they may just have been lucky for a bit, and are now perform-
ing closer to their typical average level.
3 when one has a particularly bad winter, it may be more likely that
the next winter won’t be quite do bad - due entirely to regression
to the mean. It may, however, be part of a larger pattern (e.g. a
large-scale climate oscillation, such as El Niño) and the probability
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of another bad winter might be higher. In order to tell the differ-
ence, we need to construct reasonable models of the phenomena,
test those models with predictions, and apply those models into
the future. At each step, we need to be careful not to jump to the
conclusion of the existence of a pattern too quickly.
3.7 Visualization Examples
There are two main methods of visualizing data, and several others
that are related to these methods. In this section we introduce just
two, histograms and scatter plots, and we will use these throughout
the text.
Histograms
Histograms are a way of summarizing data, when presenting the
entire data set is impractical, or where some understanding of the
data is made clearer by summarizing. The histogram plot is done
with the following steps:
1 Choose a number of bins to divide the data.
2 Count up the data that fall into each bin
3 Make a bar plot, or a scatter plot to present the data.
The following is an example with a small data set. The process of
binning and counting is often done by computer, but it is instructive
to perform the process by hand a few times in order to understand
what the results are. Another advantage to learning to
understand how to generate histograms
is that it alerts you to the possible
abuses of these plots. These abuses
can be simple mistakes, which end
up giving a misleading message, or
a deliberate deception. Either way, a
proper understanding of the process
helps.
Table 3.3 shows a collection of 106 heights (in centimeters) of the
male students in a class5. As a collection of numbers it is relatively
5 Vincent Arel-Bundock. Rdatasets
r datasets: An archive of datasets
distributed with r, 2014. URL http:
//vincentarelbundock.github.io/
Rdatasets/
opaque, but as a histogram it is clearer.
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177.8 160.0 165.0 182.88 175.0 167.0
182.88 190.5 177.0 190.5 180.34 180.34
184.0 172.72 175.26 167.0 180.0 180.0
190.0 182.5 185.0 171.0 172.0 180.34
180.0 170.0 200.0 190.0 170.18 179.0
182.0 171.0 177.8 175.26 187.0 183.0
180.0 176.0 185.42 176.5 167.64 179.0
183.0 179.0 190.0 165.0 187.0 170.0
180.0 180.34 190.5 185.0 193.04 184.0
177.0 180.0 175.26 180.34 178.5 187.96
178.0 175.26 189.0 182.88 170.0 180.0
185.0 187.96 185.42 195.0 172.72 180.34
173.0 187.96 187.0 168.0 191.8 177.0
189.0 180.34 182.88 172.72 172.0 170.0
175.0 168.0 165.0 173.0 196.0 179.1
180.0 176.0 154.94 174.0 179.1 160.0
165.0 165.0 170.0 185.0 188.0 171.0
185.0 185.0 180.34 183.0
Table 3.3: 106 Male Student Heights (in
cm) from a Survey.
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From this histogram, we can immediately observe several quantities
which summarize there data:
1 The average value (around the middle) should be around 175 cm.
The actual value can be calculated from the data, as
x¯ =
177.8+ 160.0+ · · ·+ 180.34+ 183.0
106
= 178.83
2 The range of the data is around 155 cm up to about 205 cm. Again
we can be more precise, and find the minimum of the data (154.94
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cm) and the maximum (200 cm) but the histogram picture yields
an approximate value instantly.
3 The values are roughly symmetric about the mean (i.e. average)
value. This can give us a clue concerning how to model the data.
What is quite clear is that it is far easier to deal with a histogram, as
above, than find the same information from the table of numbers.
Too Few Bins Plotting the same histogram with too few bins might
look like:
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Clearly all the information is washed out.
Too Many Bins Plotting the same histogram with too many bins
might look like:
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We lose any of the summary information here, where we essen-
tially have one bar for each data-point.
Scatter Plots
A scatter plot is used to explore the relationship between two values.
For example, in the survey of male students, in addition to height the
students also measured the width of their writing hand viewed as a
histogram, here
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However, due to the possibility that these two variables could be
related, it makes more sense to make a scatter plot. In such a plot, one
designates one variable as “x” and another as “y,” and places a single
dot for each pair of values in the data set. Thus, each dot on the plot
corresponds to height and hand-width for a single student.
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What we can see here, which was obscured with a histogram, is
the relationship between these values - for the taller students, their
hands are wider. We will explore quantifying this relationship later,
but much can be done by eye using a scatter plot.
3.8 Computer Examples
This section summarizes how to make histograms and scatter plots
with the computer software.
Histograms
from s i e import *
Load a sample data set, and select only the Male data...
data=load_data ( ’ data/survey . csv ’ )
male_data=data [ data [ ’ Sex ’ ]== ’ Male ’ ]
select only the height data, and drop the missing data (na)...
male_height=male_data [ ’ Height ’ ] . dropna ( )
make the histogram
h i s t ( male_height , bins =20)
x l a b e l ( ’ Height [cm] ’ )
y l a b e l ( ’Number of People ’ )
<matplotlib.text.Text at 0x1085728d0>
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Scatter Plot
from s i e import *
Load a sample data set, and select only the Male data...
data=load_data ( ’ data/survey . csv ’ )
male_data=data [ data [ ’ Sex ’ ]== ’ Male ’ ]
select only the height and the width of writing hand data, and drop the missing data (na)...
subdata=male_data [ [ ’ Height ’ , ’Wr.Hnd ’ ] ] . dropna ( )
height=subdata [ ’ Height ’ ]
wr_hand=subdata [ ’Wr.Hnd ’ ]
plot the data
p l o t ( height , wr_hand , ’ o ’ )
y l a b e l ( ’ Writing Hand Span [cm] ’ )
x l a b e l ( ’ Height [cm] ’ )
<matplotlib.text.Text at 0x1085774d0>
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4 Introduction to Model Comparison
A model1 as we use the term in this book is a specific description of a 1 A similar term is hypothesis, and
model comparison would then be
hypothesis testing. We don’t choose
to use that term, partly because of
the colloquial use of hypothesis as
a kind of “guess,” but also because
hypothesis testing in some treatments
focus on true/false tests of hypotheses
which can lead to some significant
misunderstandings. The use of models
implies the possibility of multiple (i.e.
more than two) models.
possible state of nature. This is in contrast to an actual state of nature,
which we practically never have access to. We can never know any-
thing with 100% certainty, and must therefore be open to alternate
possible explanations, or models, describing our observations. For
example, in medicine such models could include “I have lung can-
cer,” “I have pneumonia,” and “I have a cold.” In physics, models
could include “the Earth moves around the Sun” and “the Sun moves
around the Earth.” We can imagine many possible models that are
consistent with the observed data, and our job in doing statistical in-
ference is to determine the probabilities of our models given the data
we observe. In our notation, what we are always looking for is
P(model|data) (4.1)
We will explore model comparison through a series of examples.
4.1 The High/Low Deck Game
In this example we use a simple card game as a platform for dis-
cussing model comparison in general. We start with two atypical
decks of cards called the High Deck and the Low Deck (Figures 4.1
and 4.2 respectively). The game goes as follows.
You’re handed one of the two decks, but you don’t know which. First,
you draw the top card and note the value. Second, you replace the
card and reshuffle the deck2. You repeat this procedure of drawing, 2 Although we could make a game
without replacement, which may be
simpler to implement, the version of the
game with reshuffling will help with an
example later.
noting, and reshuffling for as many turns as you need. The goal is to
determine which of the the two decks (High or Low) you are in fact
holding in your hand.
What does our intuition say?
We start by exploring our intuitions, before we do anything math-
ematically. Thus, we are in a position to check to see if the math is
reasonable before we use the same math in areas where our intuition
90 statistical inference for everyone
Figure 4.1: High Deck - 55 Cards with
ten 10’s, nine 9’s, etc... down to one
Ace. Aces are equivalent to the value 1.
Figure 4.2: Low Deck - 55 Cards with
ten Aces, two 2’s, etc... up to one 10.
Aces are equivalent to the value 1.
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is not as strong. Imagine we draw only one card, and it is a 9. Intu-
ition suggests that this constitutes reasonably strong evidence toward
the belief that we’re holding the High Deck. If we then (as the pro-
cedure states) place the 9 back in the deck, reshuffle and then draw
a 7 we can be more strongly convinced that we are holding the High
Deck. Repeating the reshuffle, and then drawing a 3 would make
us a little less confident in this conclusion, but still quite certain. In
this way we can sense how drawing different cards pushes our belief
around, depending on how often that card comes up in the different
decks.
Before the data - the prior
Before we take any data, we need to quantify our state of knowledge
concerning all of the models that we are considering. In this case it
is quite simple, because there are two models (High Deck and Low
Deck), and we have been given no information about whether either
is more common. With no such information, it is equivalent to a coin
flip - we assign equal probabilities to both models before we see data,
also known as the prior probabilities3. 3 The prior is sometimes mischaracter-
ized as simply our guess, or some other
completely subjective assessment of our
knowledge. In fact in this example, and
many others, we can make the positive
case for equal probabilities given the
state of our knowledge. This can be
quantified with the concept of entropy,
discussed elsewhere.
P(H) = 0.5
P(L) = 0.5
Surely this assessment will change after we see data, but that is the
rest of the problem.
The “easy” question - the likelihood
Although our ultimate goal is to infer the type of deck from the cards
that we draw from it, we can start looking at an easier part of this
question which serves as a first step toward the more challenging,
and interesting goal. That question is the following,
Example 4.1 What is the probability of drawing a 9, given that we know
that we’re holding the High Deck?
This related question is written
P(data = {9}|H)
where data = {9} means that we have observed (i.e. drawn) one 9.
This questions is “easy” in the sense that it is simply related to the
properties of the High Deck: the number of 9’s and total number
of cards. If you know that you have the high deck, then you know
there are nine 9’s in that deck out of 55 cards, and thus we have the
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probability of drawing one 9, given that we are holding the High
Deck, is
P(data = {9}|H) = 9
55
We give this the name likelihood4, and is simply the probability that 4 The term likelihood is a poorly chosen
word. In English, this word is nearly
synonymous with the word probability
and thus easily leads to confusion.
We could try to use a different term,
like consequent probability or generative
likelihood to stress the idea that the
likelihood is the probability that the data
we observe could be generated or could
be a consequence of the particular
model. However, we’d be going up
against two centuries of continued use
of the term likelihood and thus would
probably increase confusion rather than
decrease it.
the data could be the result of a known model. It is also the first part
of the top of Bayes’ Rule, Equation 1.14.
Applying the Bayes’ recipe
Now that we have our intuition, and we have the likelihoods, we can
address the math. The two models are:
H ≡ “We’re holding the High Deck”
L ≡ “We’re holding the Low Deck”
and the initial data is
data ≡ “We’ve drawn one card, and it is a 9”
According to Equation 4.1 we are looking for the two probabilities:
P(H|data = {9})
P(L|data = {9})
which are related to the prior and the likelihood via Bayes’ Rule (Equa-
tion 1.14):
P(H|data = {9}) = P(data = {9}|H)P(H)
P(data = {9})
P(L|data = {9}) = P(data = {9}|L)P(L)
P(data = {9})
To calculate actual numbers, we apply the Bayes’ Recipe to this
problem,
1 Specify the prior probabilities for the models being considered
P(H) = 0.5
P(L) = 0.5
2 Write the top of Bayes’ Rule for all models being considered
P(H|data = {9}) ∼ P(data = {9}|H)P(H)
P(L|data = {9}) ∼ P(data = {9}|L)P(L)
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where we are using the symbol ∼ to denote proportionality or re-
lated to. Essentially, by calculating the top of Bayes’ Rule first, the
numbers are not equal to the final (i.e. posterior) probabilities but
must be rescaled to make sure that they add up to 1. This is done
in the final step. Up until that rescaling, we use the symbol ∼ and
think of it as related to.
3 Put in the likelihood and prior values
P(H|data = {9}) ∼ 9
55
× 0.5 = 0.082
P(L|data = {9}) ∼ 2
55
× 0.5 = 0.018
4 Add these values for all models
K = 0.082+ 0.018 = 0.1
5 Divide each of the values by this sum, K, to get the final probabili-
ties
P(H|data = 0.082/0.1 = 0.82
P(L|data = 0.018/0.1 = 0.18
From which we can conclude that drawing a 9 does indeed consti-
tute reasonably strong evidence toward the belief that we’re holding
the High Deck - the probability of us holding the High Deck, given
the data, is 0.82.
Drawing the next card
So, when we draw a 7 next (after reshuffling), our intuition suggests
that we’d be more confident that we’re holding the High Deck. Re-
peating our recipe we have
The two models are:
H ≡ “We’re holding the High Deck”
L ≡ “We’re holding the Low Deck”
and data is
data ≡ “We’ve drawn one card, and it is a 9, replaced
and reshuffled, and then drawn a 7”
According to Equation 4.1 we are looking for the two probabilities:
P(H|data = {9 then a 7})
P(L|data = {9 then a 7})
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which are related to the prior and the likelihood via Bayes’ Rule (Equa-
tion 1.14):
P(H|data = {9 then a 7}) = P(data = {9 then a 7}|H)P(H)
P(data = {9})
P(L|data = {9 then a 7}) = P(data = {9 then a 7}|L)P(L)
P(data = {9})
To calculate actual numbers, we apply the Bayes’ recipe to this
problem,
1 Specify the prior probabilities for the models being considered
P(H) = 0.5
P(L) = 0.5
2 Write the top of Bayes’ Rule for all models being considered
P(H|data = {9 then a 7}) ∼ P(data = {9 then a 7}|H)P(H)
P(L|data = {9 then a 7}) ∼ P(data = {9 then a 7}|L)P(L)
3 Put in the likelihood and prior values
P(H|data = {9 then a 7}) ∼ 9
55
× 7
55
× 0.5 = 0.0104
P(L|data = {9 then a 7}) ∼ 2
55
× 4
55
× 0.5 = 0.0013
4 Add these values for all models
K = 0.0104+ 0.0013 = 0.0117
5 Divide each of the values by this sum, K, to get the final probabili-
ties
P(H|data = 0.0104/0.0117 = 0.889
P(L|data = 0.0013/0.0117 = 0.111
which again matches our intuition - we’re more confident that
we’re holding the High Deck, now with probability 0.889 increased
from 0.82 when we just observed the 9.
Prior information or not?
In the above example, we started with a prior probability of holding
the High Deck at P(H) = 0.5, because we had no information other
than that there were two possibilities. We then observed a 9, and
updated the probability to 0.82, and then observed a 7, and further
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updated the probability to 0.889 - making it more likely that we were
holding the High Deck. One of the basic tenets of probability the-
ory is that if there is more than one way to arrive at an answer, one
should arrive at the same answer.5 In the above, we calculated the 5 E. T. Jaynes uses the principle that
“if there is more than one way to
arrive at an answer, one should arrive
at the same answer” to help derive
the rules of probability from first
principles. Failures of this principle
result in paradoxes. This principle is
also applied in Section 2.1
probability of holding the High Deck given the observed data
data ≡ “We’ve drawn one card, and it is a 9, replaced
and reshuffled, and then drawn a 7”
and prior information
prior ≡ “We only know there are two decks.”
An equivalent situation is found after our first draw, after we’ve
observed the 9, and we’re about to draw our second card. In this case
we have the prior information:
prior ≡
“We only know there are two decks, and then
we draw one card and it is a 9, replace it and
reshuffle.”
and observed data:
data ≡ “We’ve drawn one card and it is a 7”
Mathematically, we apply the Bayes’ recipe, but with the different
prior information
1 Specify the prior probabilities for the models being considered
P(H, {9}) = 0.82
P(L, {9}) = 0.18
2 Write the top of Bayes’ Rule for all models being considered
P(H|data = {9 then a 7}) ∼ P(data = {7}|H)P(H, {9})
P(L|data = {9 then a 7}) ∼ P(data = {7}|L)P(L, {9})
3 Put in the likelihood and prior values
P(H|data = {9 then a 7}) ∼ 7
55
× 0.82 = 0.104
P(L|data = {9 then a 7}) ∼ 4
55
× 0.18 = 0.013
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4 Add these values for all models
K = 0.104+ 0.013 = 0.117
5 Divide each of the values by this sum, K, to get the final probabili-
ties
P(H|data = {9 then a 7}) = 0.104/0.117 = 0.889
P(L|data = {9 then a 7}) = 0.013/0.117 = 0.111
yielding the same result.
In other words our updated probabilities from the first draw can be
seen as our prior probabilities for the subsequent draws. Thus, Bayes’
Rule describes how we update our knowledge with new evidence.
4.2 Multiple Hypotheses
Consider the example where we have either the High or the Low
Deck, and we observe the following data:
data ≡

“We’ve drawn one card, and it is a 9, replaced
and reshuffled, redrawn and observed another
9, repeated this procedure and observed three
more 9’s.”
Technically, this should give us really strong confidence that you are
drawing from the High Deck. In general, if we look at m 9’s in a row,
where m could be 1, 2, 3, etc..., we can see this following the Bayes’
Recipe
1 Specify the prior probabilities for the models being considered
P(H) = 0.5
P(L) = 0.5
2 Write the top of Bayes’ Rule for all models being considered
P(H|data = {m 9’s in a row}) ∼ P(data = {m 9’s in a row}|H)P(H)
P(L|data = {m 9’s in a row}) ∼ P(data = {m 9’s in a row}|L)P(L)
3 Put in the likelihood and prior values
P(H|data = {m 9’s in a row}) ∼ 9
55
× 9
55
· · · 9
55︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
×P(H)
∼
(
9
55
)m
× 0.5
P(L|data = {m 9’s in a row}) ∼
(
2
55
)m
× 0.5
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4 Add these values for all models
K =
(
9
55
)m
× 0.5+
(
2
55
)m
× 0.5
5 Divide each of the values by this sum, K, to get the final proba-
bilities This step is easiest done in a table (Table 4.1), because the
resulting expression is pretty messy.
m P(H|data) P(L|data)
1 0.81818 0.18182
2 0.95294 0.047059
3 0.98915 0.010855
4 0.99757 0.0024327
5 0.99946 0.00054163
6 0.99988 0.00012041
7 0.99997 0.000026761
8 0.99999 0.0000059470
Table 4.1: Drawing m 9’s in a row, from
either a High Deck or Low Deck.
It is clear from Table 4.1 that after drawing five 9’s using our pro-
cedure, it should be extraordinarily likely that we are holding the
High Deck. However, after a certain number of 9’s observed, some-
thing starts to bother us. Perhaps not after five 9’s, but what if the
procedure were repeated and we drew ten 9’s in a row? Or perhaps
twenty 9’s. At some point, we’d refuse to believe this is the High
Deck because, although it was true that there are more 9’s in the
High Deck, there are many more other cards in the High Deck that we
should see. What do we do in this case?
The proper thing to do is to introduce a new model, say, a Nines
deck. Clearly this model should have a very low prior probability, What is interesting here is that once
we admit that there are many possible
models we could consider, we realize
that we have these models in our head
all the time, or we construct them as we
need them. Every model comparison
is a multiple model comparison, with
most of the models with very low prior
probabilities that our brain naturally
suppresses until needed. Mathemati-
cally, we need to unsuppress them as
needed.
because we didn’t even consider it before we saw the streak of 9’s.
Let’s say that we assign the prior probability for the Nines deck to
be a one in a million. To make all of the prior probabilities add up to
1, then the prior probabilities for the High and Low Deck must be a
little less than 0.5. After that, we simply apply the Bayes’ Recipe as
before
1 Specify the prior probabilities for the models being considered
P(N) =
1
1, 000, 000
= 0.000001
P(H) = 0.4999995
P(L) = 0.4999995
2 Write the top of Bayes’ Rule for all models being considered
P(N|data = {m 9’s in a row}) ∼ P(data = {m 9’s in a row}|N)P(N)
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P(H|data = {m 9’s in a row}) ∼ P(data = {m 9’s in a row}|H)P(H)
P(L|data = {m 9’s in a row}) ∼ P(data = {m 9’s in a row}|L)P(L)
3 Put in the likelihood and prior values
P(N|data = {m 9’s in a row}) ∼ 1× P(N) = 0.000001
P(H|data = {m 9’s in a row}) ∼ 9
55
× 9
55
· · · 9
55︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
×P(H)
∼
(
9
55
)m
× 0.4999995
P(L|data = {m 9’s in a row}) ∼
(
2
55
)m
× 0.0.4999995
4 Add these values for all models
K = 0.000001+
(
9
55
)m
× 0.4999995+
(
2
55
)m
× 0.4999995
5 Divide each of the values by this sum, K, to get the final proba-
bilities Again, this step is easiest done in a table or, even better, a
picture (Figure 4.3).
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Figure 4.3: Drawing a number of 9’s in
a row, possibly from a High, Low, and
Nines deck.
We have a clear picture here in Figure 4.3. As we initially draw
9’s, our confidence that we’re holding the High Deck goes up, at
the expense of our confidence that we’re holding the Low Deck. At
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a certain point (around six 9’s in our example), our confidence in
the High Deck starts to drop and we become more confident that
something odd is happening, and our previously ignored model of
the Nines deck becomes more likely. Eventually, this new model is
the one that we are the most confident.
Imagine further that if, after drawing ten 9’s in a row we draw a 1.
What do we do then? The likelihood for the Nines deck goes to zero
instantly - the probability of drawing a 1 from a Nines deck is zero,
P(1|N) = 0. Are we left again with the original two models, High
and Low Deck? No! We would then introduce other models, perhaps
something like a Mostly Nines Deck, or perhaps a High Deck with a
weird shuffling procedure, or perhaps others. No matter how many The creative part of science is not in
the calculations performed, but in the
generation of new and useful models.
Until we come up with a better model
for our data we make do with the ones
that we have, all the while being aware
that a better model may come into play
later. Newton’s Theory of Gravity was
used for over 200 years, even when
there was known data that contradicted
it, until it was replaced by Einstein’s
Theory of Gravity. Newton’s Laws,
however, are still used in nearly all
gravitational calculations because it is
“good enough” and is practically a lot
easier to work with.
models one has, the recipe is still the same. It is important to realize
that in any model comparison case, there are always other models
that could be brought to bear on the problem, perhaps with low prior
probability. Simply showing that a model is consistent with a set of
data does not insure against the possibility that another model could
be better, if we could only think of it.
Exercise 4.1 Complete the example demonstrating the updated probabil-
ities for the High and Low Deck, having drawn a 9, 7, and a 3. Compare
with the case of drawing just the 9 and the 7, and discuss how it matches
your intuition.
Exercise 4.2 Repeat the analysis of the sequence of 9’s drawn in a row
with an added hypothesis of a deck with one hundred 9’s and one 8. Discuss
the results. Demonstrate what happens to the probabilities for all of the
hypotheses after drawing one 8, after ten 9’s in a row. Discuss.
Exercise 4.3 I tell you that I have a coin that could have both sides heads,
both sides tails, or a normal single-heads single-tails coin.
1 Before seeing the data, what would be a reasonable prior probability for
the three hypotheses H0 (no-heads), H1 (one head), and H2 (two heads)?
2 Would this have been different if you had simply been given a coin by a
friend to flip to see who has to do the dishes? Why or why not?
3 Now I flip the coin once, and get a heads. Write down the likelihood of
this data given each of the models. In other words, what are the values of:
• P (data=1 heads|H0)
• P (data=1 heads|H1)
• P (data=1 heads|H2)
4 Apply Bayes’ Recipe, and determine the probability of each of these three
models given this data. In other words, what are the values of:
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• P (H0|data=1 heads)
• P (H1|data=1 heads)
• P (H2|data=1 heads)
5 Apply this recipe for the case of observing 3 heads in a row.
5 Applications of Model Comparison
This chapter presents several applications of the model comparison
concepts introduced in Chapter 4.
5.1 Monty Hall Problem
This problem was introduced in Section 2.4. You may recall that we
were presented with a choice of 3 doors where a car is behind one
and goats behind the others. Having picked one, the host opens up
a door with a goat, and offers you the opportunity to change your
answer. In order to assess the probabilities, we must remember that
1 the host never opens your door
2 the host always opens a door with a goat
We’ll go through a specific example, that of you choosing door 1
and the host opening door 2. The analysis proceeds in identical ways
for the other possibilities. We apply the Bayes’ Recipe, where the
models under consideration are
• “car behind door 1”
• “car behind door 2”
• “car behind door 3”
The Bayes’ Recipe proceeds as follows
1 Specify the prior probabilities for the models being considered
P (car 1|you 1) = 0.333
P (car 2|you 1) = 0.333
P (car 3|you 1) = 0.333
2 Write the top of Bayes’ Rule for all models being considered
P (car 1|you 1, host 2) ∼ P (host 2|you 1, car 1) P (car 1|you 1)
P (car 2|you 1, host 2) ∼ P (host 2|you 1, car 2) P (car 2|you 1)
P (car 3|you 1, host 2) ∼ P (host 2|you 1, car 3) P (car 3|you 1)
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3 Put in the likelihood and prior values
Due the restrictions on the host above, the host cannot open a
door with a car, so P (host 2|you 1, car 2) = 0. In the case where
you choose door 1 and the car is also behind door, the host has the
freedom to choose either door 2 or door 3, so P (host 2|you 1, car 1) =
0.5. Where the information comes in is when the car is behind
door 3 and you’ve chosen door 1. In that case, the host cannot
open your door (door 1) or the door with the car (door 3) and must
open door 2. Thus, P (host 2|you 1, car 3) = 1.
The final result of this step is
P (car 1|you 1, host 2) ∼ 0.5 · 0.333
P (car 2|you 1, host 2) ∼ 0 · 0.333
P (car 3|you 1, host 2) ∼ 1 · 0.333
4 Add these values for all models
K = 0.5 · 0.333+ 1 · 0.333 = 0.5
5 Divide each of the values by this sum, K, to get the final probabili-
ties
P (car 1|you 1, host 2) = 0.5 · 0.333
0.5
= 0.333
P (car 2|you 1, host 2) = 0 · 0.333
0.5
= 0
P (car 3|you 1, host 2) = 1 · 0.333
0.5
= 0.666
Thus, in the case, given that you choose door 1 and the host
chooses 2, the probability that the car is behind door 1 (your door)
is 0.333 and the other door (door 3) is 0.666. Following the same steps
through the other cases, we get in summary
Probability of...
Your Choice Host Choice Car Behind 1 Car Behind 2 Car Behind 3
1 1 (host can’t open your door)
1 2 0.333 0 0.666
1 3 0.333 0.666 0
2 1 0 0.333 0.666
2 2 (host can’t open your door)
2 3 0.666 0.333 0
3 1 0 0.666 0.333
3 2 0.666 0 0.333
3 3 (host can’t open your door)
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5.2 Psychic Octopi
There was a German octopus named Paul1 who was claimed to be 1 Paul the octopus, July 2012. URL
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Psychic_octopus
psychic during his lifetime. He was given this designation because
he was supposedly able to pick the result of World Cup matches
before they occurred2. His impressive results, across 2 years, shown 2 The basic procedure for Paul to make
a “prediction” was for his trainers to
present two food dishes, labeled with
a flag representing the two countries,
respectively, competing. Whichever
food dish Paul chose first was his
prediction for the winner of the game.
in Figure 5.1 can be summarized as follows:
data ≡ 12 out of 14 correctly predicted
Figure 5.1: The full results of
the predictions of Paul the
Octopus, reproduced from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychic_octopus.
The question we have to ask is, is this data strong evidence for a
psychic octopus? In order to have a well-posed problem we need the
following three components:
1 a set of hypotheses, or models, to compare - we need at least two,
otherwise the question is meaningless
2 for each model, an equation denoting the likelihood, or in other
words, how probable is the data given the particular model
3 a specification of the prior probability, or in other words, how
likely was our model before we saw the data
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Making a Well Posed Problem
We are interested in the probability of this octopus being psychic,
given this data, or
P(psychic|data)
which really is an example of a model comparison, or hypothesis
testing. In any kind of model comparison, we need to have multiple
model to compare to in order to proceed. The models we consider
constrain the problem, and define which ideas we are willing to
consider. To be specific, as a first step, let’s consider the following
two models
H := {Paul is psychic}
R := {Paul is completely random, like a coin flip}
The next step is to be able to assign probabilities from these mod-
els. It is easy for the random hypothesis
P(correct prediction|R) = 0.5
P(incorrect prediction|R) = 0.5
What does it mean to be psychic? What is the probability of get-
ting a correct result if you are psychic? According to James Randi3 3 J. Randi. Flim-flam!: psychics, ESP,
unicorns, and other delusions, volume 342.
Prometheus Books Amherst, NY, 1982
many of the psychics and dowsers claim 100% accuracy in their pre-
dictions before they are tested. However this would mean a single
wrong answer would drive the probability of that model to zero: a
perfect predictor cannot, logically, make any mistakes. For our case
here, we choose to be generous to the psychic and allow for a reason-
able failure rate, using 90% as our accuracy, thus
P(correct prediction|H) = 0.9
P(incorrect prediction|H) = 0.1
Specifying the prior probability of these two models is a bit more
challenging. It seems reasonable to assign a small prior probability to
a psychic octopus - how many psychic octopi have you ever encoun-
tered? A small, but still quite conservative value, would be 1/100, so
we have for the two models: It is possible that we could be accused
of an anti-psychic bias here, especially
from someone who is a true believer.
Why shouldn’t the prior be P(H) =
1/2? If you had no world experience,
that is what you’d start with, but then
the behavior of the first octopi that you
encounter would generally lower your
assignment of the probability of the
next octopi being psychic. After enough
world experience, updating your
probability with Bayes’ Rule, you’d
arrive at a very small prior for Paul, the
current octopus we are examining.
P(H) = 1/100
P(R) = 99/100
The First Model Comparison
Now that we’ve set up the problem, we can apply the Bayes’ Recipe
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1 Specify the prior probabilities for the models being considered
P(H) = 1/100
P(R) = 99/100
2 Write the top of Bayes’ Rule for all models being considered
P(H|data = 12 out of 14) ∼ P(data = 12 out of 14|H)P(H)
P(R|data = 12 out of 14) ∼ P(data = 12 out of 14|R)P(R)
where we are using the symbol ∼ to denote proportionality or re-
lated to. Essentially, by calculating the top of Bayes’ Rule first, the
numbers are not equal to the final (i.e. posterior) probabilities but
must be rescaled to make sure that they add up to 1. This is done
in the final step. Up until that rescaling, we use the symbol ∼ and
think of it as related to.
3 Put in the likelihood and prior values
P(H|data = 12 out of 14) ∼
(
14
12
)
0.9120.114−12 × 1
100
= 0.00257
P(R|data = 12 out of 14) ∼
(
14
12
)
0.5120.514−12 × 99
100
= 0.00549
4 Add these values for all models
K = 0.00257+ 0.00549 = 0.00806
5 Divide each of the values by this sum, K, to get the final probabili-
ties
P(H|data) = 0.00257
0.00806
= 0.32
P(R|data) = 0.00549
0.00806
= 0.68
and the psychic loses!
Furthering the Comparison
Typically, a person who is supportive of psychic phenomena would
choose a prior for our psychic hypothesis (H) that would be at least
as large as the prior for the random hypothesis (R). In this case, the
(posterior) probability of the octopus being psychic given the data
of 12 correct out of 14 would be much higher. After “ruling out” the
random octopus hypothesis, we’d be left with psychic. But is that all
that is really left? No, and the analysis is easy to do.
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5.3 Disease Testing
Let’s imagine there is a rare, one in a million, disease that is lethal
but does not have many outward symptoms at first. A new test
boasts 99.9% accuracy, so you go to get tested, and receive the bad
news that you test positive for the disease. Should you be devastated
by the news? What is the probability that you actually have the dis-
ease? We are looking at two, quite different, probabilities here. In the
first case, we have the claims of the test which state that if you have the
disease, the probability that the test will be positive is 0.999, or, if you have
the disease, test will discover that fact 99.9% of the time. In the second
case we have your concern which is, if you test positive for the test, what
is the probability that you have the disease. In our notation this is:
P(positive test|have the disease) = 0.999 (claim from test)
P(have the disease|positive test) = ? (your concern)
These two are related by Bayes’ Rule (Equation 1.14). Rewritten in
this case, we have
P(have the disease|positive test) = P(positive test|have the disease)P(have the disease)
P(positive test)
Let’s look at each term separately. We’ve already seen that P(positive test|have the disease)
is the accuracy of the test, given you have the disease. P(have the disease)
is the rarity of the disease, which in this case is one in a million. The
most interesting term is the one on the bottom, P(positive test). This
is the combined probability of all ways of getting a positive test. One
way, of course, is to have the disease and be part of the 99.9% cor-
rectly identified. Another way to get a positive test result, however,
is for the disease to give a false positive, returning a positive result
to someone who doesn’t have the disease. This is a regrettable, but
unavoidable occurrence of imperfect tests. Usually the rate of false
positives for a test are different than the rate of false negatives (i.e a
negative result to someone who actually has the disease), and clearly
their consequences are quite different for the patient. In this example,
let’s treat these rates as the same for simplicity. Thus the false posi-
tive rate is the same as the false negative, which is 1-0.999=0.001 or,
0.1% of the people taking the test who do not have the disease will
(wrongly) receive a positive result from the test. Since we have two
ways of getting the result, we have
One way to see this result is to visualize it, as in Figure 5.2. Even
though the test is quite good, there are many more healthy people
and 1 out of 100 of them will erroneously test positive. Thus, for rare
diseases, it is easy to have the probability of being healthy despite
getting a positive test result quite high. The rarer the disease, the
worse the situation.
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Has the Disease
Test Positive
Figure 5.2: Rare disease and testing.
Shown is a population of 3000 where
1 in every 200 people have the disease
(red circles). A test which is 99%
effective is applied to everyone in the
population, and the positive test results
(i.e. the test says that you have the
disease) are shown ask blue circles.
Notice that although nearly all of those
that have the disease test positive (a
blue circle in a red circle), there are
many false positives (blue circle in an
empty square) - healthy people that test
positive for the disease. Even though
the test is quite good, there are many
more healthy people and 1 out of 100 of
them will erroneously test positive.
Consequences
This sort of disease testing has serious consequences, especially for
rare diseases with test that aren’t precise. In the book “The Theory
That Would Not Die: How Bayes’ Rule Cracked the Enigma Code,
Hunted Down Russian Submarines, and Emerged Triumphant from
Two Centuries of Controversy”by Sharon McGrayne there is a discus-
sion concerning the 2009 advice from the U.S. government task force
that “most women in their forties not to have annual mammograms.”
(emphasis mine) According to McGrayne,
Thus the probability that a woman who tests positive has breast cancer
is only 3%. She has 97 chances out of 100 to be disease free. None of
this is static. Each time more research data become available, BayesÕ
rule should be recalculated. As far as Bayes is concerned, universal
screening for a disease that affects only 4/10 of 1% of the population
may subject many healthy women to needless worry and to additional treat-
ment which in turn can cause its own medical problems. In addition, the
money spent on universal screening could potentially be used for other
worthwhile projects. Thus Bayes highlights the importance of improv-
ing breast cancer screening techniques and reducing the number of
false positives.4 (emphasis mine) 4 Sharon McGrayne. The Theory That
Would Not Die: How Bayes’ Rule Cracked
the Enigma Code, Hunted Down Russian
Submarines, and Emerged Triumphant
from Two Centuries of Controversy. Yale
University Press, 2011. ISBN 0300169698
Thus the proper application of probability theory allows us to
separate true but unintuitive things from others which only seem
true and intuitive but are in fact false.

6 Introduction to Parameter Estimation
We will introduce the idea of what is called parameter estimation using
a simple system of bent coins. This will generalize to more complex
models, and form the basis for much of statistical inference.
6.1 Bent Coins
Figure 6.1: Bent Coin
Imagine we have a series of coins bent by various amounts (Fig-
ure 6.1). If the coin is bent completely in half, then we could have the
coin always flip heads (i.e. P (heads) = 1) or tails (i.e. P (tails) = 1)
depending on how it is bent. If you don’t bend the coin at all then
we’d have a fair coin (P (heads) = P (tails) = 0.5). So, let’s say Why do we number them from zero
here? It’s so that the number of the
coin, say number 7, corresponds the
probability that that coin flips heads,
P (heads) = 0.7
that we have a collection of bent coins which are bent by different
amounts. For convenience we will number them from 0 to 10. The
Table 6.1 summarizes the probability of each coin flipping heads.
Coin Number Probability for Flipping Heads (P (heads))
0 0.0
1 0.1
2 0.2
3 0.3
4 0.4
5 0.5
6 0.6
7 0.7
8 0.8
9 0.9
10 1.0
Table 6.1: Probabilities for flipping
heads given a collection of bent coins
Now I have the following scenario1, with a few questions. 1 D. V. Lindley and L. D. Phillips. Infer-
ence for a bernoulli process (a bayesian
view). The American Statistician, 30(3):
112–119, 1976
Imagine I have taken a random coin from my collection, flipped it and
got the following data:
T T T H T H T T T T T H (i.e. 9 tails and 3 heads)
1 From this data, which coin do I most likely have?
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2 Can we be significantly confident that this particular coin will result
in more tails than heads in the future?
The way we’ve set up this problem is exactly like the model com-
parison example with the High and Low Deck (Section 4.1), except in
this case we have 11 models (one for each coin). Applying the Bayes’
Recipe we have
1 Specify the prior probabilities for the models being considered.
Given no further information, we select a uniform distribution for
the prior (i.e. all models are initially equally probable):
P(M0) = 1/11
P(M1) = 1/11
...
P(M10) = 1/11 .
where M0 is the model defined by “we’re flipping coin 0,” M1 is
the model defined by “we’re flipping coin 1,” etc...
2 Write the top of Bayes’ Rule for all models being considered:
P(M0|data = {9T, 3H}) ∼ P(data = {9T, 3H}|M0)P(M0)
P(M1|data = {9T, 3H}) ∼ P(data = {9T, 3H}|M1)P(M1)
...
P(M10|data = {9T, 3H}) ∼ P(data = {9T, 3H}|M10)P(M10) .
3 Put in the likelihood and prior values. Here we are drawing from
a binomial distribution for the likelihood:
P(M0|data = {9T, 3H}) ∼
(
12
3
)
0.03 × (1− 0.0)9 × 1/11
P(M1|data = {9T, 3H}) ∼
(
12
3
)
0.13 × (1− 0.1)9 × 1/11
...
P(M10|data = {9T, 3H}) ∼
(
12
3
)
1.03 × (1− 1.0)9 × 1/11 .
4 Add these values for all models.
(see Table 6.2)
5 Divide each of the values by this sum, K, to get the final probabili-
ties.
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Model ∼ P(Mi|data = {9T, 3H}) ∼ P(Mi|data = {9T, 3H})/K
M0 0.000 0.000
M1 0.00774 0.110
M2 0.0214 0.306
M3 0.0217 0.310
M4 0.0128 0.184
M5 0.00488 0.0696
M6 0.00113 0.0161
M7 0.000135 0.00192
M8 0.00000524 0.0000748
M9 0.0000000145 0.000000208
M10 0.000 0.000
K=0.0700
Table 6.2: Probability for different bent-
coin models, given the data=9 tails,
3 heads. The middle column is the
non-normalized value from Bayes’ Rule,
needing to be divided by K (the sum
of the middle column) to get the final
column which is the actual probability.
(see Table 6.2)
When we are dealing with this many models, it is easier to plot
the results, which is shown in Figure 6.2. We can now address the
questions posed at the beginning of the section.
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Figure 6.2: Probability for different
bent-coin models, given the data=9
tails, 3 heads.
1 From this data, which coin do I most likely have?
The maximum probability is for coin 3, but coin 2 is a close sec-
ond. Thus we can be reasonably confident that we have been flip-
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ping one of those two coins, but can’t narrow our confidence any
more than that.
2 Can we be significantly confident that this particular coin will result
in more tails than heads in the future?
This is another way of asking for the total probability for coins less
than coin 5 (the fair coin), or
P (coin 0 or coin 1 or coin 2 or coin 3 or coin 4) =
0.000+ 0.110+ 0.306+ 0.310+ 0.184 = 0.912
which says that this coin is likely to very likely (Table 1.1) to have
a probability of yielding heads less than a fair coin, and thus yield
more tails in the future.
6.2 Priors versus Data
It is instructive to pause and look at this example one flip at a time,
to see how the probability and thus our state of knowledge adjusts as
we collect more data. In Figure 6.3 we see the result of our procedure
when there is no data (i.e. our initial, prior probabilities) and when
we’ve flipped once and then again, both times tails. The curve for no
data is the same as the prior probability, and in this case all models
are equally likely. When the first tails is observed, the model which
states that heads are certain (i.e. coin 10) goes to zero probability
because coin 10 cannot flip tails.2. At this point we know that it is 2 Notice that the only models with
probability equal to zero are ones that
are actually logically impossible. It’s not
the colloquial usage of impossible, as in
“it is impossible for the Red Sox to win
this year,” but in the strict usage, as in
“it is impossible to flip both heads and
tails at the same time.” The reason this
is the case is that a statement with zero
probability cannot be made possible
with any about of data - it is an utterly
dogmatic statement. Thus, we reserve
it only for things that are logically
impossible.
impossible for us to be flipping coin 10. We see also that the high-
numbered coins (i.e. the ones with high probability of flipping heads)
have greatly reduced probability while we’ve seen only tails.
As more tails are observed, the probability for the lower models
is increased. As we flip more tails we become more confident in the
lower-number models. Because at this point we haven’t flipped any
heads, the model 0 still has non-zero probability - it is still possible
that we are holding a coin that cannot flip heads.
When we continue with the next few flips (Figure 6.4) we en-
counter our first heads on the fourth flip. At this point the model
which states that heads are impossible (i.e coin 0) goes to zero proba-
bility. Finally, across our entire data set (Figure 6.5) we see that the
curve gets narrower, where more of the probability falls on only a
few of the models and the other models become less and less likely.
With only 12 data points, there is still a lot of uncertainty in which
model - several models have reasonably high probability values. We
still can rule out a few models confidently (like coins 0, 6, 7, 8, 9, and
10). We are most confident in coins 2 and 3, with the most probabil-
ity.
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Figure 6.3: Probability for different
bent-coin models, given no data (left),
the first tails (middle), and the second
tails (right). The curve for no data
is the same as the prior probability,
and in this case all models are equally
likely. When the first tails is observed,
the model which states that heads are
certain (coin 10) goes to zero proba-
bility. As more tails are observed, the
probability for the lower models is
increased.
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Figure 6.4: Probability for different
bent-coin models, given three tails (left),
the first heads (middle), and another
tails (right). When the first heads is
observed, the model which states that
heads are impossible (coin 0) goes to
zero probability.
6.3 Moving Toward the Continuous
There is a practical problem that we face at this point, when we
consider a generic bent coin. Perhaps it doesn’t fit in one of the 11
models considered, falling somewhere in between, for example with
P (heads) = 0.132464. Ones first thought might be to include one
thousand coins or one million coins instead of the 11 we’ve consid-
ered so far, so we could have coin 132464, coin 132465, coin 132466,
etc... Although this can be done, we run into two problems
1 Because we are dealing with so many models, the probability
associated with any single model gets very small - and gets smaller
with the more models you consider
2 We can’t practically distinguish between models such as P (heads) =
0.132464 and P (heads) = 0.132465 (the last digit is different here)
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Figure 6.5: Probability for different
bent-coin models, given no data (left),
the first half of the data set (middle),
and the entire data set of 9 tails and 3
heads (right).
In order to solve both of these problems mathematically, we in-
troduce the concept of a continuous distribution. We start by labeling
the model with a continuous number rather than an integer. In our
present case it makes sense to label the model with the probability
that the coin flips heads. We’ll call this label θ, and it will have a
value between 0 (heads are impossible) and 1 (heads are certain) and
can take on any value in between. Because we now have an infinite
number of labels, we have two consequences:
1 We can’t simply add up all the probabilities to get our value of K
to make everything add up to 1. Instead, we look at areas under the
curve and make sure the entire area equals 1.
2 Because, with distributions, areas under the curve (and not the
values of the distribution itself) are the probabilities, we can
only speak about ranges of values. For example, we can speak
meaningfully about the probability of θ between 0.3 and 0.4 (i.e.
P(0.3 < θ < 0.4)). When we write down something like P(θ) = 1
we’re not talking about a probability of a single label but rather
the magnitude of the distribution at that label, θ.
We revisit Bayes’ Recipe again, using the distributions. This time
we also will look at pictures of the distributions as we progress.
1 Specify the prior probabilities for the models being considered:
P(θ) = 1 .
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2 Write the top of Bayes’ Rule for all models being considered:
We can write one equation for all of the models labeled by θ at
once as
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P(θ|data = {9T, 3H}) ∼ P(data = {9T, 3H}|θ)P(θ) .
3 Put in the likelihood and prior values.
We use the binomial model, one equation for all models, remem-
bering that for a model labeled by θ the probability for that coin
flipping heads is P (heads) = θ. Thus we get the likelihood and
prior values as
P(θ|data) ∼ P(data|θ) · P(θ)
P(θ|data{9T, 3H}) ∼
(
12
3
)
θ3 × (1− θ)9 · 1
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4 Find the area under this curve, and call it K.
5 Divide each of the values of the curve by this are, K, to get the
final probabilities where the area under the curve is 1.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
θ
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
P
(θ
|da
ta
=
{ 9T,
3H
} )
Ar
ea
 U
nd
er
 C
ur
ve
=
1
Usually these steps are done for you, for a specific data set, and
you are given the final posterior distribution to use in answering
any questions. However, for any particular case it is important to
know what assumptions have been made in the choice of models and
model parameters.
6.4 MAP and Areas
Now we revisit the questions posed in Section 6.1 about the bent
coin, this time using the distribution found above, reproduced here in
Figure 6.6.
Imagine I have taken a random coin from my collection, flipped it and
got the following data:
T T T H T H T T T T T H (i.e. 9 tails and 3 heads)
1 From this data, which “coin” do I most likely have? (or in this
interpretation, what is my best estimate for the probability of this
coin flipping heads, denoted by θ)
2 Can we be significantly confident that this particular coin will result
in more tails than heads in the future?
One answer to the first question can be accomplished by looking at
the maximum of the posterior distribution, shown in Figure 6.6.3 By 3 The maximum of the posterior dis-
tribution, which represents the most
likely value of a quantity, is often re-
ferred to as the MAP estimate. It is also
commonly referred to as the mode of the
distribution.
eye, it seems to have a maximum 0.25. In fact one can demonstrate
that this distribution has a maximum at
θmax =
number of successes
total number of attempts
,
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Figure 6.6: Posterior probability dis-
tribution for the θ values of the bent
coin - the probability that the coin will
land heads. The distribution is shown
for data 3 heads and 9 tails, with a
maximum at θ = 0.25.
where in our example, a success is head, and an attempt is a flip.4 4 This distribution, given how common
it is, is given the name Beta distribu-
tion. There are a handful of common
distributions that are given names for
convenience. We’ve already seen the
uniform distribution, and there will be
others.
We take up this question of the best estimate of θ, given the posterior
probability for θ, in more detail in Section 6.6.
The answer to the second question can be done by looking at
the area under the curve from θ = 0 , the “all heads” coin, to θ =
0.5, the “fair” coin, as shown in Figure 6.7. This area represents the
probability, given the data, that the coin is skewed towards heads
or, in other words, how confident are we that this is an unfair coin.
Given the value of P(θ < 0.5) = 0.954 we can say that this is very
likely an unfair coin (refer to Table 1.1).
6.5 Quartiles
Given that we are dealing most often with continuous distributions,
and thus need to look at areas under the curve from one point to
another, it is useful to make a table for a distribution of these areas.
Typically we look at the values of the parameter at which we have a
given area under the curve from the minimum possible value of the
parameter up to to that value. For example, we might be interested
in the value of θ (i.e. how skewed the coin is) such that we have an
area of 50% from 0 up to θ, shown in Figure 6.8. This point (called
the median) represents the point where we would be just as confident
(given our data) that the coin is more skewed than this as less skewed.
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Figure 6.7: Posterior probability distri-
bution for the θ values of the bent coin
- the probability that the coin will land
heads. The distribution is shown for
data 3 heads and 9 tails. The area under
the curve from θ = 0 (the “all heads”
coin) to θ = 0.5 (the “fair” coin) is 0.954.
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Figure 6.8: Posterior probability dis-
tribution for the θ values of the bent
coin - the probability that the coin will
land heads. The distribution is shown
for data 3 heads and 9 tails. The area
under the curve from θ = 0 (the “all
heads” coin) to θ = 0.28 is 0.5 - half the
area. This represents the median of the
distribution.
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A table of these values for a distribution can be very useful. For
example, consider the table and plot shown in Figure 6.9. Shown are
the various points were the area under the curve up to those points
is specified. For example, the area under the curve from θ = 0 up
to θ = 0.11 is 5%. This means, given the data of 3 heads and 9 tails,
there is a probability P = 5% of the coin having less than θ = 0.11, or
an extreme skew towards heads.
Quartiles The term quartiles refers to the values of the parameter Quartiles The term quartiles refers
to the values of the parameter which
result in an area of 25%, 50%, or 75%, or
one, two, or three quarters of the area.
which result in an area of 25%, 50%, or 75%, or one, two, or three
quarters of the area.
When we wish to refer to a non-quarter percentage, then we’ll call
it a percentile.
Percentiles The term percentile refers to the value of the parameter Percentiles The term percentile refers to
the value of the parameter which result
in a particulare area under the curve.
which result in a particulare area under the curve.
For example, we can say from Figure 6.9 that the 99% percentile is
0.59. Thus, it is extremely unlikely to have the coin skewed towards
tails more than θ = 0.59 given the observation that we flipped 3
heads and 9 tails with this coin.
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0.11
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0.20
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0.28
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0.36
95%
0.49
99%
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3 heads and 9 tails
Beta(heads=3,tails=9)
Value Area
0.07 0.01
0.11 0.05
0.14 0.10
0.20 0.25
0.28 0.50
0.36 0.75
0.44 0.90
0.49 0.95
0.59 0.99
Figure 6.9: Posterior probability distri-
bution for the θ values of the bent coin
- the probability that the coin will land
heads. The distribution is shown for
data 3 heads and 9 tails. The various
quartiles are shown in the plot, and
summarized in the accompanying table.
6.6 Best Estimates
Perhaps surprisingly, there is not a single answer to the best estimate
for θ given the poster distribution, for example the one shown in
Figure 6.9. There are several plausible measures, each with their own
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advantages. Any specific estimate of a parameter (e.g. θ) is denoted
with a hat (e.g. θˆ) in the descriptions that follow.
The Mode Also known as the maximum a-posteriori probability The Mode Also known as the maximum
a-posteriori probability (MAP) estimate,
the mode is the maximum of the poste-
rior probability.
(MAP) estimate, the mode is the maximum of the posterior probabil-
ity. In the case of a Beta distribution with h successes in N trials, we
have
θˆmode =
h
N
The Mean Also known as the expected value, the mean of a distri- The Mean Also known as the expected
value, the mean of a distribution of a
parameter θ is defined to be the sum of
all of the possible values of θ times the
posterior probability of θ, as in
θˆmean =∑
θ
θ × P(θ|data)
It is one measure of the middle of the
distribution.
bution of a parameter θ is defined to be the sum of all of the possible
values of θ times the posterior probability of θ, as in
θˆmean =∑
θ
θ × P(θ|data)
It is one measure of the middle of the distribution. In the special case
of a Beta distribution with h successes in N trials, we have
θˆmean =
h + 1
N + 2
Intuitively this is the same as the MAP of the Beta distribution, with
one more success and one more failure than actually observed. Fur-
ther, for the Beta distribution, the mean value θˆmean represents the
predictive probability of a successful event on the next observation.
The Median Also known as the 50%-percentile, the median rep- The Median Also known as the 50%-
percentile, the median represents the
middle of the distribution such that the
probability of the parameter below the
median equal to the probability of the
parameter above the median.
P(θ ≤ θˆmedian|data) = 0.5
P(θ ≥ θˆmedian|data) = 0.5
resents the middle of the distribution such that the probability of the
parameter below the median equal to the probability of the parame-
ter above the median.
P(θ ≤ θˆmedian|data) = P(θ ≥ θˆmedian|data) = 0.5
For the Beta distribution there is no simple form for the median, but
a decent approximation which we will use is given by5 5 Alan Agresti and Brian Caffo. Simple
and effective confidence intervals for
proportions and differences of propor-
tions result from adding two successes
and two failures. The American Statisti-
cian, 54(4):280–288, 2000
θˆmedian ≈ h + 2N + 4
Intuitively this is the same as the MAP of the Beta distribution, with
two more successes and two more failures than actually observed.
Although each of these has their advantages, most notably ease of
computation (especially for the mode and the mean), we will typi-
cally use the median of the distribution as the best estimate for the
following reasons:
1 the median is intuitive as literally the middle of the distribution
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2 the median is not as sensitive to distributions that are highly
asymmetric
In most practical examples it may not make much difference, and
for some distributions (such as the Normal distribution described in
Chapter 7 (Priors, Likelihoods, and Posteriors)) there is not difference -
the mean is the median which is also the mode.
Example 6.1 What is the best estimate of the probability of a bent coin
flipping heads, given the observation of 9 tails and 3 heads?
If we take the best estimate to be the median, then we have from
the “assuming 2 successes and 2 failures” method,
θˆmedian ≈ h + 2N + 4
=
5
16
= 0.313
Notice that the maximum probability was at the somewhat lower
value
θˆmode =
h
N
=
3
12
= 0.25
One reason why the median is a better estimate in this case is
because, as shown in Figure 6.9, there is more probability (i.e. area
under the curve) to the right of the maximum than to the left, so the
best estimate should be greater than the one given by the mode.
6.7 Marginalization
In Section 1.4 we introduced the concept of marginalization, and in
Section 2.9 we performed a discrete example of this. In that section
it was seen as simply a consequence of the sum and product rules. It
was a way of taking a probability that depended on several factors,
and eliminating all but the single factor we’re interested in. If we
have a continuous distribution, this process involves calculus and we
will not cover it in detail, but it is the same process. In the case of the
distribution above, we have a distribution over a single variable, like
Beta(θ|h, t). Imagine that we have a distribution that depends on two
parameters,
MyDist(θ, ξ)
which specifies the probability of an event given each combination of
the parameters, θ and ξ. We’d have to do a three-dimensional plot to
visualize this. Many times, however, we want just the probability of
one of the single parameters. In those cases we will write
P(θ) ∼ [MyDist(θ, ξ)]marginalize over ξ
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where we are “summing” over all the values of the other parame-
ters, leaving the details to the mathematicians, and simply using the
result.
Likewise we can marginalize the parameter θ to get the distribution
of the other variable.
P(ξ) ∼ [MyDist(θ, ξ)]marginalize over θ
This becomes important in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8.
6.8 Exercises
Exercise 6.1 Given the posterior shown in Figure 6.10 for 10 heads and 20
tails, answer the following:
1 The most likely estimate for the parameter θ. What does this mean?
2 Is it likely that this is a fair coin?
3 What is P(0 ≤ θ ≤ 0.3) approximately?
4 What is P(0.2 ≤ θ ≤ 0.35) approximately?
5 What is the median value? What are the quartiles?
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
θ
0
1
2
3
4
5
P
(θ
)
1%
0.17
5%
0.21
25%
0.29
50%
0.34
75%
0.40
95%
0.49
99%
0.55
10 heads and 20 tails
Beta(heads=10,tails=20)
Value Area
0.17 0.01
0.21 0.05
0.24 0.10
0.29 0.25
0.34 0.50
0.40 0.75
0.45 0.90
0.49 0.95
0.55 0.99
Figure 6.10: Posterior probability
distribution for the θ values of the bent
coin - the probability that the coin will
land heads. The distribution is shown
for data 10 heads and 20 tails. The
various quartiles are shown in the plot,
and summarized in the accompanying
table.
122 statistical inference for everyone
6.9 Computer Examples
from s i e import *
Beta Distribution Example
3 heads and 9 tails Plot a beta distribution with 3 heads and 9 tails...
d i s t =beta ( h=3 ,N=12)
d i s t p l o t ( d i s t , xlim = [0 ,1 ] )
<matplotlib.figure.Figure at 0x10844e0d0>
The median of this distribution...
d i s t . median ( )
0.27527583248615201
the 95
c r e d i b l e _ i n t e r v a l ( d i s t )
(0.090920394572096622, 0.27527583248615201, 0.53813153923404089)
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1 heads and 3 tails This should be about the same fraction as the previous example, but broader
d i s t =beta ( h=1 ,N=4)
d i s t p l o t ( d i s t , xlim = [0 ,1 ] )
<matplotlib.figure.Figure at 0x108768cd0>
c r e d i b l e _ i n t e r v a l ( d i s t )
(0.052744950526316919, 0.31381017045569742, 0.71641793611808946)

7 Priors, Likelihoods, and Posteriors
7.1 Binomial and Beta Distributions
In Chapter 6 (Introduction to Parameter Estimation) we estimated the
chance, θ, that a bent coin would come up heads by combining a
uniform prior for θ (i.e. all possible values are a-priori equally likely)
and a binomial likelihood (i.e. given θ, what is the probability of the
data). This resulted in a Beta distribution for the posterior probability
for θ.
Notice what the procedure of Bayes’ Recipe is and how the Bayesian
inference works here.
1 Specify the prior probabilities for the models being considered
We want to estimate a quantity (which we label as θ), but begin
with absolutely no knowledge of its value - we have a uniform prior
probability.
2 Write the top of Bayes’ Rule for all models being considered
We construct a model for how different possible values of θ influ-
ence the outcome - a model we call the likelihood. In the case of the
bent coin, the likelihood model is a binomial model, and describes
the probability of flipping heads or tails given how bent the coin is
(i.e. given θ).
3 Put in the likelihood and prior values
4 Add these values for all models
5 Divide each of the values by this sum, K, to get the final probabili-
ties
Once we observe data, we can combine the prior and the model or
likelihood using the Bayes’ recipe, and obtain the posterior distribu-
tion for the unknown value, θ, giving us the probability for each
value, now updated with our new observations.
The last couple of steps of the recipe, for simple cases, is done by
the mathematicians so we don’t have to manually add and divide as
we did in the previous chapters. In the case of the coin flips we get:
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Beta(θ|data)︸ ︷︷ ︸
posterior probability
∼
likelihood︷ ︸︸ ︷
Binomial(data|θ)× Uniform(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
prior probability
From this Beta distribution, we can get the most likely values (i.e.
maximum probability value) for the unknown quantity of interest,
θ, our uncertainty in this quantity (i.e. the width of the Beta distribu-
tion) consistent with the known data. In other words, the posterior
probability summarizes all of our knowledge about the parameter of
interest given the data.
7.2 A Prelude
As a prelude of things to come, we want to summarize the forms
of the probabilities that we will be seeing. It is useful to see all of
these as resulting from the same Bayes’ Recipe, applied to different
models of the data and (possibly) different prior probabilities. As
we have stated, many of the simple cases have been worked out by
the mathematicians, so we don’t need to do the work of deriving
them. It will be our task to understand their properties, to be able to
apply them to real problems, and to understand their consequences.
One of the immediate observations that we make is the prevalence of
the so-called Normal distribution, so we follow this prelude with an
exploration of the properties of this distribution.
1 Proportions
Parameter of Interest: θ, the chances of a single event
Applications: coin flips, voting percentages, success in sports,
performance on tests
Form of the data: h successes in N total events
Model of the data:
data =
{
success , with probability θ
failure , otherwise (i.e. with probability 1− θ)
Posterior Probability:
Beta(θ|data)︸ ︷︷ ︸
posterior probability
∼
likelihood︷ ︸︸ ︷
Binomial(data|θ)× Uniform(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
prior probability
2 Magnitude with Known Deviation
priors, likelihoods, and posteriors 127
Parameter of Interest: µ, the true magnitude of a quantity, given
the deviation, labeled by σ, from the central value
Applications: percentages with large samples, scientific measure-
ments such as weight and size of objects, time scales of events
Form of the data: N total data points, labeled x1, x2, · · · , xN , and
given known σ
Model of the data:
data = µ+ uncertainty with probability Normal(µ = 0,known σ)
Posterior Probability:
Normal(µ2|data, σ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
posterior probability
∼
likelihood︷ ︸︸ ︷
Normal(data|µ, σ)× Uniform(µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
prior probability
3 Magnitude with Unknown Deviation
Parameter of Interest: µ, the true magnitude of a quantity, and
the unknown deviation, labeled by σ, from the central value
Applications: scientific measurements with small samples (less
than around 30), such as weight and size of objects, time scales
of a small number of events
Form of the data: N total data points, labeled x1, x2, · · · , xN
Model of the data:
data = µ+ uncertainty with probability Normal(µ = 0, σ)
Posterior Probability:
Normal(µ2, σ2|data)︸ ︷︷ ︸
posterior probability
∼
likelihood︷ ︸︸ ︷
Normal(data|µ, σ)×Uniform(µ) ·Uniform(log σ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
prior probability
Student− T(µ2|data)︸ ︷︷ ︸
posterior probability
∼ [Normal(µ2, σ2|data)]marginalized over σ2
F(σ2|data)︸ ︷︷ ︸
posterior probability
∼ [Normal(µ2, σ2|data)]marginalized over µ2
7.3 The Normal Distribution - Properties
The normal distribution, also referred to as the Gaussian distribution,1 1 The distribution is named after Carl
Friedrich Gauss who introduced it in
1809. However, it has been called in the
past the Gauss-Laplacian distribution,
due the the fact that Pierre Simone de
Laplace was the first to apply it to real
problems, and proved a number of very
useful properties of it.
is by far the most commonly occurring distribution in all of statistical
inference, so it requires some special attention.
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The Shape
The shape of the normal distribution is sometimes described as bell-
shaped, as shown in Figure 7.1, and is thus referred to as the bell-
curve (although there are several other mathematical functions which
are bell-shaped). The function is referred to as Normal(µ, σ) where µ
and σ are parameters of the model. (see Appendix B.1 for a review of
greek letters)
4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4
x
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
p
(x
)
=
N
or
m
al
(0
,1
)
Figure 7.1: The Normal Distribution.
The location parameter, µ
The location parameter (see Figure 7.2) is the value of x for which
the normal distribution has a maximum probability. In a real sense,
it is the middle of the distribution, and the best estimate of x. For the
Normal distribution, the location parameter, µ, is at once the mean,
median and mode of the distribution.
The deviation parameter, σ
As shown in Figure 7.3 the deviation parameter, σ, is a measure of
how spread out the distribution is. As the width increases, the height
goes down to keep the area under the curve constant (at 1). As a
result, more of the probability sits at larger values of x as σ gets larger.
Three useful properties of σ for the normal distribution are the
following:
1 the normal distribution value at the maximum (i.e. at x = µ)
is around 2.7 times larger than the value one-σ away from the
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Figure 7.2: The normal distribution
with different location parameters, µ.
maximum (at x = µ− σ and x = µ+ σ)
2 the total probability between these two points is 65%.
3 95% of the distribution lies between µ − 2σ and µ + 2σ (see Fig-
ure 7.3)
This is typically written, µ± σ. For example, writing 5± 2 typically
implies a Normal distribution with mean µ = 5 and deviation σ = 2.
One is 65% certain that the range of the estimated value is between
3 and 7, and 95% certain that the range is between 1 and 9 (i.e. mean
minus two deviations and mean plus two deviations).
Summarizing the Distribution
We can specify the normal distribution with just the two parameters,
µ and σ - the location and deviation parameters, respectively. How-
ever, due to its symmetry, we can summarize this distribution for
all cases by looking a a single special case called the standard normal
distribution.
The Standard Normal Distribution is the normal distribution in The Standard Normal Distribution
The normal distribution in the special
case where µ = 0 (the distribution
is centered at x = 0) and σ = 1 (the
distribution has a spread of 1).
the special case where µ = 0 (the distribution is centered at x = 0)
and σ = 1 (the distribution has a spread of 1).
For any normal distribution, the area within 1-σ is 0.68, within 2-σ
is 0.95, and 3-σ is 0.99. These locations are the most prevalently used
in any kind of statistical testing, and thus we will see them many
times.
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Figure 7.3: The normal distribution
with different deviation parameters, σ.
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Figure 7.4: The Standard Normal
Distribution (the normal distribution
in the special case where µ = 0 and
σ = 1). The percentiles shown are for
positions 1-σ away from the center, 2-σ
away, and 3-σ away. The area within
1-σ is 0.68, within 2-σ is 0.95, and
3-σ is 0.99. These locations are the
most prevalently used in any kind of
statistical testing, and thus we will see
them many times.
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Moving from a General Normal to the Standard Normal and Back
In order to use the table of percentiles for the standard normal distri-
bution, we need to be able to translate from the normal to the stan-
dard and back again. Luckily, it is a simple process, and is one of the
main reasons for using the normal distribution - other distributions
are not so easily manipulated.
To facilitate this translation, we will use the variable x for the
normal distribution and z for the standard normal. So now, we need
to have a recipe for translating x to z (or vice versa), given µ and σ.
These recipes are:
1 x to z: subtract x by µ, and divide by σ
2 z to x: multiply z by σ and add µ
Example 7.1 Given a normal distribution with a mean of µ = 150 and a
σ = 20, what is the most likely value?
The most likely value is the peak of the probability distribution,
xˆ = µ = 150.
Example 7.2 Given a normal distribution with a mean of µ = 150 and
σ = 30, what is the probability P(x > 170)
To use the tables in Section D.3, we first need to translate every-
thing to the standard normal values.
x = 170 ⇒ z = x− 150
30
= 0.67
From the table in Section D.3, the area to the left of z = 0.67 is
0.7486. Because we are asked the probability greater than x = 170 we
need to have the area to the right of the curve, or
P(x > 170) = 1− 0.7486 = 0.2514
or about 1/4. In other words, with a mean µ = 150 and deviation
σ = 20, we’d expect about a quarter of the time that the value of the
variable would be greater than 170. Or, given our uncertainty of a
specific value, we’d assign a probability of around 25% to it being
larger than 170.
Exercise 7.1 Given a normal distribution, with parameters µ = 10 and
σ = 2, determine the following probabilities:
1 P(x < 12)
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2 P(6 < x < 14)
3 P(2 < x < 12)
Exercise 7.2 Given a normal distribution, with parameters µ = 2 and
σ = 10, answer the following questions (see Table 1.1 for reference):
1 Make a qualitative plot of the distribution to help you with the other parts
of the question
2 Is likely that x > 0?
3 Above which value of x is it very unlikely to observe?
4 Below which value of x is it extremely unlikely to observe?
Exercise 7.3 Given a normal distribution, with parameters µ = 2 and
σ = 0.5, answer the following questions (see Table 1.1 for reference):
1 Make a qualitative plot of the distribution to help you with the other parts
of the question
2 Is likely that x > 0?
3 Above which value of x is it very unlikely to observe?
4 Below which value of x is it extremely unlikely to observe?
Sum and Differences
One more convenient property of the normal distribution is that
sums and differences of variables that have a normal distribution
also have a normal distribution, with a different mean and deviation
parameter. The relationships are summarized as follows.
Sum of two normally distributed variables If we have two vari- Sum of two normally distributed
variables If we have two normally
distributed variables, x and y, we have
P(x) = Normal(µx , σx)
P(y) = Normal(µy, σy)
P(x + y) = Normal(µx + µy,
√
σ2x + σ
2
y )
ables, x and y, which have normal distributions
P(x) = Normal(µx, σx)
P(y) = Normal(µy, σy)
then their sum, x + y, has a mean the sum of the two, µx + µy and a
deviation
√
σ2x + σ
2
y .
One way to remember this is that the new squared deviation pa-
rameter is the sum of the two old ones,
σ2x+y = σ
2
x + σ
2
y
Differences between two normally distributed variables For Differences between two normally
distributed variables
P(x− y) = Normal(µx − µy,
√
σ2x + σ
2
y )
(Note the “+” sign in the new σ.)
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differences, x − y, we have a new mean of µx − µy and deviation
parameter again
√
σ2x + σ
2
y . Note the “+” sign in the new σ, which
keeps the new σ positive which is must be by definition.
If we are asked for the distribution of a quantity with an added
constant, like
z = x + constant
then the probability of z is just the same as that of x (i.e. Normal
distribution with the same deviation), with the location parameter
moved by the constant
P(z) = Normal(µx + constant, σx)
Example 7.3 We have two normal distributions P(x) = Normal(µ =
8, σ = 2) and P(y) = Normal(µ = 20, σ = 7). What is the distribution
for z = y− x?
The distribution P(z) is also a normal distribution, with mean
µz = 20− 8 = 12 and deviation σz =
√
72 + 22 = 7.3.
10 0 10 20 30 40
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
p(x) =Normal(8,2)
p(y) =Normal(20,7)
p(z) =p(y−x) =Normal(12.0,7.3)
Significance
There is a term used in the literature called statistical significance.
Roughly it means a value that is very unlikely to be zero (see Ta-
ble 1.1), or in other words, the value of zero is not within the 95%
percentile. This is within 2 standard deviations of the value, so the
following estimated values are not statistically significant:
• 5± 3 - the two-deviation range is [-1,11] contains the value 0
• 7± 4
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• −3± 2
but the following are statistically significant:
• 5± 2 - the two-deviation range is [1,9] does not contain the value 0
• 7± 3
• −3± 1
Statistical significance, at the very unlikely level (i.e. 95% percentile)
is often used as a rough guideline to publish a positive effect.
number of de-
viations away
from zero
term probability
1σ slightly likely/likely 0.7 (i.e. 7/10)
2σ very likely 0.95 (i.e. 19/20)
3σ extremely likely/vir-
tually certain
0.002 (i.e. 1/500)
> 4σ virtually certain > 999, 999/1, 000, 000
Table 7.1: Rough guide for the conver-
sion of deviations away from zero and
the qualitative labels for probability
values for being a significant deviation.
An unintuitive consequence One consequence of this is that two stud-
ies that seem different may not be statistically different. The follow-
ing example is from Gelman and Hill’s book on Data Analysis.2 Say, 2 A. Gelman, J. Hill, and Ebooks Cor-
poration. Data analysis using regression
and multilevel/hierarchical models, vol-
ume 625. Cambridge University Press
Cambridge, UK:, 2007
we have two measurements with means and standard deviations:
• 25±10
• 10±10
The first study shows a significant effect (the two-deviation range
is [5,45] does not contain zero), while the second one doesn’t (the
two-deviation range is [-10,30] contains zero). The difference between
them is
(25− 10)±
√
102 + 102 = 15± 14
which is not significant. One should be careful comparing the magni-
tudes and uncertainties of measurements!
7.4 The Normal Distribution - Estimating From Data
Estimating the mean, µ, knowing the deviation, σ
Typically one is provided with a series of measurements of a quan-
tity, and we want to estimate the value of that quantity, and have a
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description of our uncertainty in the estimate. In Chapter 8 (Applica-
tions of Parameter Estimation and Inference) we go through a number
of detailed examples of this process. Here, we simply summarize the
result. We are given:
1 A series of N measurements, data={x1, x2, x3, . . . , xN}
2 The real deviation, σ
3 We are modeling the data as a true value, µ, with uncertainty with
a likelihood from the normal distribution with known deviation, σ,
as in Normal(0, σ). Further, we assume independence between the
measurements.
Since in this case we are given σ, we wish then to estimate the pa-
rameter µ. The result will be a probability distribution over µ, with a
best (i.e. most probable) value and an uncertainty in that value. The
result is that the distribution of µ is also a Normal distribution, In scientific applications, this notation
is often shortened to µ = x¯ ± σ/√N,
so it is clear what is the best estimate of
µ (i.e. x¯) and what is the uncertainty in
that estimate (i.e. σ/
√
N).
P(µ|data, σ) = Normal(x¯, σ/
√
N)
where the center value (and thus the most probable value of µ) is
given by the sample mean of the data.
Sample Mean The sample mean of a set of N samples, x1, x2, · · · , xN Sample Mean The sample mean of a set
of N samples, x1, x2, · · · , xN is given by
x¯ ≡ x1 + x2 + x3 + · · ·+ xN
N
is given by
x¯ ≡ x1 + x2 + x3 + · · ·+ xN
N
The uncertainty in µ is given by σ/
√
N. As a consequence, larger
N (i.e. more data points), makes us more confident in the particular
estimate for µ.
Estimate of location parameter µ given N samples and known
deviation, σ In summary, the best estimate for the location parameter Estimate of location parameter µ given
N samples and known deviation,
σ The best estimate for the location
parameter µ in the Normal distribution
given a set of N samples, x1, x2, · · · , xN
is given by
µˆ =
x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xN
N
± σ/
√
N
µ in the Normal distribution given a set of N samples, x1, x2, · · · , xN
is given by
µˆ =
x1 + x2 + x3 + · · ·+ xN
N
± σ/
√
N
Example 7.4 Estimating the True Length of an Object
Say we have an object, and 5 measurements of its length from the
same ruler but from different people,
5.1[cm], 4.9[cm], 4.7[cm], 4.9[cm], 5.0[cm]
Say that we further know that the uncertainty (given this ruler) of
one measurement has σ = 0.5[cm]. What is the best estimate of the In real measurements, there is always
the problem of bias or systematic uncer-
tainties, where there uncertainty does
not follow a Normal distribution. We
will not consider this issue here.
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length? The best estimate should be given by the sample mean of
these 5 samples,
µˆ =
x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xN
N
=
5.1[cm] + 4.9[cm] + 4.7[cm] + 4.9[cm] + 5.0[cm]
5
= 4.92[cm]
with uncertainty related to the known uncertainty of a single mea-
surement,
σˆ =
σ√
N
=
0.5[cm]√
5
= 0.223[cm]
yielding a final best estimate of
µˆ = 4.92[cm]± 0.223[cm]
or (with 2σ range), The 95% credible interval (CI) is
really at the 1.96σ level, yielding
[4.481[cm], 5.358[cm]]. We will almost
always approximate it as 2σ by hand,
but the computer will generate the true
95% credible interval when requested.
µˆ = 4.92[cm], 95% CI = [4.474[cm], 5.366[cm]]
Estimating the mean, µ, not knowing the deviation, σ
If we are not so fortunate to be given the deviation, as in the previous
case, then this parameter too must be estimated from the data. As a
first step we can estimate the deviation with the sample deviation.
Sample Deviation The sample deviation of a set of N samples, Sample Deviation The sample devia-
tion of a set of N samples, x1, x2, · · · , xN
is given by
S ≡
√
1
N − 1 ((x1 − x¯)
2 + · · ·+ (xN − x¯)2)
x1, x2, · · · , xN is given by
S ≡
√
1
N − 1 ((x1 − x¯)
2 + (x2 − x¯)2 + · · ·+ (xN − x¯)2)
Approximate estimate of location parameter µ and deviation σ
given N samples The posterior probability for µ and σ given a set of Approximate estimate of location
parameter µ and deviation σ given
N samples The posterior probability
for µ and σ given a set of N samples,
x1, x2, · · · , xN can be approximated with
P(µ|data) ∼ Normal(x¯, S/
√
N)
P(σ|data) ∼ Normal (S,
S2/
√
(N − 1)/3
)
which works well if we have many
(N > 30) data points.
N samples, x1, x2, · · · , xN can be approximated with
P(µ|data) ∼ Normal(x¯, S/
√
N)
P(σ|data) ∼ Normal
(
S, S2/
√
(N − 1)/3
)
which works well if we have many (N > 30) data points.
With a smaller data set, the value of S as an estimate for the devi-
ation becomes too small. When the estimate for σ is too small, then
the result is claiming more confidence in the estimate of the mean, µ,
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than is warranted. This discrepancy depends on the number of data Because the uncertainty in the mean
depends explicitly on the number of
data points, it goes beyond the level
of this chapter to give a form for the
posterior probability distribution for the
deviation, σ.
points, and thus it makes sense that the proper distribution should
depend on the number of data points, in addition to the sample
mean and deviation. The proper, although less convenient, result is
that the posterior probability for µ takes the form of the Student’s t
distribution,
Estimate of location parameter µ given N samples and unknown
σ The posterior probability for µ takes the form of the Student’s t Estimate of location parameter µ
given N samples and unknown σ The
posterior probability for µ takes the
form of the Student’s t distribution,
P(µ|data) = Studentdof=N−1(x¯, S/
√
N)
This distribution requires three numbers
to specify, referred to as the mean (µ),
deviation (σ) and the degrees of freedom
(dof). The degrees of freedom is defined
in this case to be the number of data
points less one, N − 1.
distribution,
P(µ|data) = Studentdof=N−1(x¯, S/
√
N)
This distribution requires three numbers to specify, referred to as the
mean (µ), deviation (σ) and the degrees of freedom (dof). The degrees
of freedom is defined in this case to be the number of data points less
one, N − 1.
Example 7.5 Estimating the True Length of an Object...Again
Say we have an object, and 5 measurements of its length from the
same ruler but from different people,
5.1[cm], 4.9[cm], 4.7[cm], 4.9[cm], 5.0[cm]
Unlike earlier, let’s say that we don’t know the uncertainty (given this
ruler) of one measurement What is the best estimate of the length?
Again, the best estimate should be given by the sample mean of these
5 samples,
µˆ =
x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xN
N
=
5.1[cm] + 4.9[cm] + 4.7[cm] + 4.9[cm] + 5.0[cm]
5
= 4.92[cm]
with uncertainty related to the sample deviation
S2 =
1
N − 1
(
(x1 − x¯)2 + · · ·+ (xN − x¯)2
)
=
1
5− 1
(
(5.1[cm]− 4.92[cm])2 + (4.9[cm]− 4.92[cm])2 + (4.7[cm]− 4.92[cm])2+
(4.9[cm]− 4.92[cm])2 + (5.0[cm]− 4.92[cm])2
)
= 0.024[cm]2
S =
√
0.024[cm]2 = 0.155[cm]
S√
N
=
0.155[cm]√
5
= 0.069[cm]
Looking at Table D.2 with “Degrees of Freedom” equal to 4, we
find that the 95% credible interval for µ (between areas 0.025 and
0.975) falls ±2.776 · S/√N, thus we have
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µˆ = 4.92[cm], 95% CI = [4.92[cm]− 2.776 · 0.069[cm], 4.92[cm] + 2.776 · 0.069[cm]]
= 4.92[cm], 95% CI = [4.73[cm], 5.11[cm]]
Although much of this is easier with the computer, it is instructive
to go through simple examples by hand.
7.5 Normal Approximation
The normal distribution is useful for many reasons: its simple shape,
the fact that there are only two parameters which describe it, and the
ease with which one can compare the general normal distribution to
the single standard normal. Further, it can be used as an approxima-
tion for several other distributions, under certain limits.
The Beta Distribution
We first saw the beta distribution as the posterior description in a
bent-coin parameter estimation problem (see Section 6.3 in Chapter 6
(Introduction to Parameter Estimation)). The normal approximation
occurs when the number of flips gets large, compared to how likely
the coin flips heads. For notation, we will write the frequency of
heads as
f ≡ h
N
Normal Approximation to the Beta Distribution The Normal Normal Approximation to the Beta
Distribution The Normal Approxima-
tion to the Beta Distribution , for large
number of flips (N) of which a fraction
f ≡ h/N are successful is given by
Beta(h, N) ∼ Normal (µ = f ,
σ =
√
f ( f − 1)/N
)
Approximation to the Beta Distribution , for large number of flips (N)
of which a fraction f ≡ h/N are successful is given by
Beta(h, N) ∼ Normal
(
µ = f , σ =
√
f ( f − 1)/N
)
This is an approximation, and as such
will certainly give seriously incorrect
answers under certain circumstances.
For example, in this case, the normal
approximation predicts that there is
around a 1.8% chance that the bent coin
might have a negative θ, or probability
of flipping heads (look a the normal
curve to the left of θ = 0)! The beta
distribution is zero for any value below
zero or over one, and thus will never
lead to such absurd answers.
To see how close this approximation can be, observe the following
two cases:
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0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
θ
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
P
(θ
)
µ=0.25
σ=0.12
3 heads and 9 tails
Beta
Normal
With ten times as many flips, we have
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
θ
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
P
(θ
)
µ=0.25
σ=0.04
30 heads and 90 tails
Beta
Normal
and the curves are so close as to be nearly identical! There still is
a (small) probability for getting a negative θ, which is problematic
in theory but not typically in practice. To use the properties of the
normal distribution here to quantify our uncertainty about the bent
coin. Given 30 heads and 90 tails, the best estimate for θ (i.e. the
top of the curve) is 0.25. Our uncertainty is quantified by the width
of the distribution, given by σ. Thus, we can be confident to a 95%
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degree for θ within 2σ, or between 0.17 and 0.33 (0.25− 2 · 0.04 and
0.25+ 2 · 0.04, respectively).
The Binomial Distribution
Similarly, with the (discrete) binomial distribution (see Equation 3.3)
we have the normal approximation.
Normal Approximation to the Discrete Binomial Distribution Normal Approximation to the Discrete
Binomial Distribution
Binomial(N, p) = Normal(µ = N · p,
σ =
√
N · p(1− p))
Binomial(N, p) = Normal(µ = N · p, σ =
√
N · p(1− p))
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The Student’s t Distribution
For smallish data sets, 5 < N < 30, we can replace the estimate of the
mean from the Student’s t distribution to a Normal distribution with
an increased estimate for the deviation. It then becomes practical to
use the more convenient z-score to estimate credible intervals rather
than the full t tables. The approximation in this domain looks like3 3 D. Berry. Statistics: A Bayesian Perspec-
tive. Duxbury, 1996
Normal Approximation to the Student’s t Distribution For Normal Approximation to the Stu-
dent’s t Distribution For smallish data
sets, 5 < N < 30,
Studentdof=N−1(x¯, S/
√
N) ∼ Normal(x¯, k · S/
√
N)
k ≡ 1+ 20
N2
smallish data sets, 5 < N < 30,
Studentdof=N−1(x¯, S/
√
N) ∼ Normal(x¯, Sk/
√
N)
k ≡ 1+ 20
N2
Example 7.6 Estimating the True Length of an Object...Yet Again
Say we have an object, and 5 measurements of its length from the
same ruler but from different people,
5.1[cm], 4.9[cm], 4.7[cm], 4.9[cm], 5.0[cm]
Unlike earlier, let’s say that we don’t know the uncertainty (given this
ruler) of one measurement. What is the best estimate of the length?
Again, the best estimate should be given by the sample mean of these
5 samples,
µˆ =
x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xN
N
142 statistical inference for everyone
=
5.1[cm] + 4.9[cm] + 4.7[cm] + 4.9[cm] + 5.0[cm]
5
= 4.92[cm]
with uncertainty related to the adjusted sample deviation,
S2 =
1
N − 1
(
(x1 − x¯)2 + · · ·+ (xN − x¯)2
)
=
1
5− 1
(
(5.1[cm]− 4.92[cm])2 + (4.9[cm]− 4.92[cm])2 + (4.7[cm]− 4.92[cm])2+
(4.9[cm]− 4.92[cm])2 + (5.0[cm]− 4.92[cm])2
)
= 0.024[cm]2
S =
√
0.024[cm]2 = 0.155[cm]
S√
N
=
0.155[cm]√
5
= 0.069[cm]
k = 1+
20
52
= 1.8
k · S√
N
= 1.8 · 0.069[cm] = 0.124[cm]
yielding a final best estimate of
µˆ = 4.92[cm]± 0.124[cm]
or (with 2σ range),
4.92[cm], 95% CI = [4.672[cm], 5.168[cm]]
Compare this range to the one shown in Example 7.5 on page 137.
The one here has a slightly larger range, which is a bit more conser-
vative than is needed, but the calculation is quite a bit easier. .
7.6 Computer Examples
from s i e import *
Estimating Lengths
Known deviation, σ
x = [5 .1 , 4 .9 , 4 .7 , 4 .9 , 5 . 0 ]
sigma =0 .5
mu=sample_mean ( x )
N=len ( x )
d i s t =normal (mu, sigma/ s q r t (N) )
d i s t p l o t ( d i s t )
priors, likelihoods, and posteriors 143
<matplotlib.figure.Figure at 0x10713c710>
c r e d i b l e _ i n t e r v a l ( d i s t )
(4.4817387297117088, 4.9199999999999999, 5.358261270288291)
Unknown σ
mu=sample_mean ( x )
s=sample_deviation ( x )
p r i n t mu, s
4.92 0.148323969742
d i s t = t d i s t (N−1 ,mu, s/ s q r t (N) )
d i s t p l o t ( d i s t , xlim = [ 4 . 6 , 5 . 4 ] )
<matplotlib.figure.Figure at 0x1085b5c50>
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c r e d i b l e _ i n t e r v a l ( d i s t )
(4.7358314667008017, 4.9199999999999999, 5.1041685332991982)
8 Applications of Parameter Estimation and Inference
8.1 Normal Model - Inference about Means
Example 8.1 Iris petal lengths - Best estimate
1.4 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.4
1.7 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.5
1.5 1.6 1.4 1.1 1.2
1.5 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.5
1.7 1.5 1.0 1.7 1.9
1.6 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.6
1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5
1.2 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.5
1.3 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.9
1.4 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.4
Table 8.1: Iris petal lengths, in centime-
ters, for Iris type Setosa.
Table 8.1 shows data for the lengths (in centimeters) of the petals
of one species of Iris flower1. If we want to estimate the “true” length 1 K. Bache and M. Lichman. UCI
machine learning repository, 2013. URL
http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml
of the the petal for this species, given all of these examples, we would
apply the following model of the data:
0 µ
(unknown true value)
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
σ
(known deviation)
data = true value+Normal(mean=0,known σ)
or equivalently
data = Normal(mean=true value,known σ)
The resulting distribution for the “true value”, µ, is also a Normal
distribution (Section 7.4),
P(µ|data, σ) = Normal(x¯, σ/
√
N)
where the best estimate of the true value, µ is the sample mean, x¯,
and the uncertainty is related to the sample deviation (which we’re
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going to take as the “known” deviation, σ ∼ 0.174) in this case. Thus,
µˆ = x¯ =
1.4+ 1.4+ 1.3+ 1.5+ · · ·+ 1.6+ 1.4+ 1.5+ 1.4
50
= 1.464
and the full answer, with uncertainty, is
µˆ = 1.464[cm]± 0.174√
50
[cm]
= 1.464[cm]± 0.025[cm]
Example 8.2 Iris petal lengths - A different species?
Imagine we have a single observation of another iris with petal
length 2.5 [cm]. Is this likely to be the same type as the Setosa type
above? As outlined in Section 7.3, we get the best estimate for the
difference as:
µdiff = 2.5− 1.464 = 1.036
with uncertainty the same as the uncertainty of the Setosa type, so the
final estimate with uncertainty is:
1.036[cm]± 0.025[cm]
which is
1.036[cm]
0.025[cm]
= 41 deviations away from zero!
which makes it virtually certain to be a different type (see Table 7.1).
8.2 Normal Model Again - Inference about Means and Deviations
Setosa 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.4
Virginica 6.0 5.1 5.9 5.6 5.8
Versicolor 4.7 4.5 4.9 4.0 4.6
Table 8.2: Subset of iris petal lengths,
in centimeters, for iris types Virginica,
Setosa, and Versicolor.
Example 8.3 Iris petal lengths - Significantly different?
Shown in Table 8.2 is a very small subset of the full iris petal-
length data. Are the types Virginica and Versicolor longer than the
type Setosa? Is the Virginica longer than Versicolor? For each of these,
we need to specify the model, determine the best estimate for the
parameters of the model, and then compare the distributions.
The model we will use is the simple Normal model,
data = Normal(mean=true value,unknown σ)
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which is the same as the previous example, except that the deviation,
σ, is unknown. In addition to being unknown, there are so few data
points that the deviation can’t be well approximated with the sample
deviation.
The resulting distribution for the “true value”, µ, is a Student-t
distribution (Section 7.4),
P(µ|data) = Studentdof=N−1(x¯, S/
√
N)
The best estimates for the true length-values of each type is given by
their sample means,
µˆsetosa =
1.4+ 1.4+ 1.3+ 1.5+ 1.4
5
= 1.40
µˆvirginica =
6.0+ 5.1+ 5.9+ 5.6+ 5.8
5
= 5.68
µˆversicolor =
4.7+ 4.5+ 4.9+ 4.0+ 4.6
5
= 4.54
and the sample deviations for each is given by
Ssetosa =
√
1
5− 1 · ((1.4− 1.40)
2 + (1.4− 1.40)2 + (1.3− 1.40)2 + (1.5− 1.40)2 + (1.4− 1.40)2)
= = 0.07
Svirginica =
√
1
5− 1 · ((6.0− 5.68)
2 + (5.1− 5.68)2 + (5.9− 5.68)2 + (5.6− 5.68)2 + (5.8− 5.68)2)
= = 0.36
Sversicolor =
√
1
5− 1 · ((4.7− 4.54)
2 + (4.5− 4.54)2 + (4.9− 4.54)2 + (4.0− 4.54)2 + (4.6− 4.54)2)
= 0.34
The posterior probability distributions, shown in Figure 8.1, have
the following form:
P(µsetosa|data) = Studentdof=4(1.40, 0.07/
√
5)
P(µvirginica|data) = Studentdof=4(5.68, 0.36/
√
5)
P(µversicolor|data) = Studentdof=4(4.64, 0.34/
√
5)
It is clear from the picture that they are very well separated, but we
can quantify this by looking at the probability that the difference
between their means is greater than zero.
The probability of their difference approximately takes the form of This approximation is called Welch’s
method. The exact analysis is be-
yond this book, but numerically
one can calculate it and it doesn’t
differ from this approximate anal-
ysis in any significant way. Essen-
tially you calculate P(µversicolor >
µvirginica|data) by adding up the
P(µversicolor|data)× P(µvirginica|data) for
all possible lengths where versicolor is
longer than virginica.
a Student’s t distribution, with the same center and deviation shown
for the Normal in Section 7.3. Here we do the calculation between the
closest two iris types, Virginica and Versicolor:
µdiff = 5.68− 4.64 = 1.04
σdiff =
√
0.362
5
+
0.342
5
= 0.22
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Figure 8.1: Probability distributions for
the subset of iris petal lengths. Each
distribution follows a Student-t form.
The degrees of freedom used for this Student’s t distribution is ap-
proximately the smallest one from the two samples, or in this case
(since both samples have the same number of data points), dof=4.
The resulting posterior probability distribution for the difference of
means is shown in Figure 8.2.
We observe that the difference of the means is over 4 times the
deviation away from zero, so even with 4 degrees of freedom, this is
significant at the 99% level. We can be highly certain that these two
species have different petal lengths, and that the difference observed
is not just a product of the random sample.
8.3 Beta Model - Inference About Proportions
Example 8.4 The Sunrise Problem
The sunrise problem, as first stated by Laplace, is “What is the
probability that the sun will rise tomorrow?” We’ll start with the as-
sumption that initially one has never seen a sunrise, and then observe
a year of sunrises each morning with no morning without one. Thus
we have the form of the data as h successes (days with a sunrise) in
N total days. Our model of the data is specified as before with a bi-
nomial distribution, resulting in the posterior Beta, as described in
Section 6.6.
After a only 10 years of watching sunrises, and no failures of a
sunrise, the best estimate for the probability of a sunrise is
θˆmedian ≈ h + 2N + 4
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Figure 8.2: Probability distributions for
the difference between iris petal lengths
for the closest two iris types, Virginica
and Versicolor. The distribution follows
a Student-t form, and clearly shows
significant probability (greater than
99%) for being greater than zero.
=
3650+ 2
3650+ 4
= 0.9995
making it virtually certain for a sunrise.
Example 8.5 Cancer Rates
This example is from Donald Berry’s Statistics textbook2: 2 D. Berry. Statistics: A Bayesian Perspec-
tive. Duxbury, 1996
pp 192: A study (Murphy and Abbey, Cancer in Families, 1959) ad-
dressed the question of whether cancer runs in families. The investiga-
tor identified 200 women with breast cancer and another 200 women
without breast cancer and asked them whether their mothers had had
breast cancer. Of the 400 women in the two groups combined, 10 of the
mothers had had breast cancer. If there is no genetic connection, then
about half of these 10 would come from each group.
The data is that 7 of the daughters had cancer and 3 did not. Is there
strong evidence of a connection?
The proper way, assuming total initial ignorance, is to use the Beta
distribution:
P (θcancer|data) = Beta(h = 7, N = 10)
which has a median of θˆcancer = 0.68, but a 95% credible interval of
θˆcancer = 0.39 up to θˆcancer = 0.89. This means there is not strong
evidence of an effect.
Example 8.6 Cancer Rates - Normal Approximation
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We can estimate the the Beta distribution median and credible
intervals with a Normal distribution, by using the “assuming 2 suc-
cesses and 2 failures” method.
θˆcancer =
h + 2
N + 4
=
7+ 2
10+ 4
= 0.643
and
σ =
√
θˆcancer(1− θˆcancer)/(N + 4)
=
√
0.643(1− 0.643)/(10+ 4)
= 0.128
So the approximate 95% credible interval is
θˆcancer ± 2σ
which is between 0.387 and 0.899, again with the same conclusion of
no strong evidence of an effect.
Example 8.7 Will it rain on the 4th of July?
In the United States, the 4th of July is Independence Day, and is
known for parades. The oldest continuously running parade is in
Bristol, RI, and it runs rain or shine. Is it likely to rain on the pa-
rade? Climate data from nearby Providence is here from wunder-
ground.com:
We can estimate the the Beta distribution median and credible
intervals with a Normal distribution, by using the “assuming 2 suc-
cesses and 2 failures” method.
θˆrain =
h + 2
N + 4
=
19+ 2
48+ 4
= 0.404
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around 40%, less than an even chance (50%) of rain, but
σ =
√
θˆrain(1− θˆrain)/(N + 4)
=
√
0.404(1− 0.404)/(48+ 4)
= 0.068
So the approximate 95% credible interval is
θˆrain ± 2σ
which is between 0.268 and 0.540, demonstrating that there is not
strong evidence for a purely even chance of rain on the 4th of July.
Example 8.8 Hot Hand Reexamined
In Tversky and Gilovich3 we have the following data for Larry 3 A. Tversky and T. Gilovich. The cold
facts about the" hot hand" in basketball.
Anthology of statistics in sports, 16:169,
2005
Bird free throws in basketball:
• Given each of 53 missed shots, Larry Bird successfully shot 48 of
the next attempt.
• Given each of 285 successful shots, Larry Bird successfully shot
251 of the next attempt.
This data alone almost suggests an anti-hot-hand (where you’re
less likely to make a successful attempt following a successful shot).
However, we can demonstrate that these numbers are not in fact
statically different. Given the relatively large number of attempts
(greater than 30) we can use the Normal approximation to estimate
the two probabilities of success:
θafter a miss =
48+ 2
53+ 4
= 0.877
θafter a success =
251+ 2
285+ 4
= 0.875
and the uncertainty,
σafter a miss =
√
0.877(1− 0.877)/(53+ 4) = 0.044
σafter a success =
√
0.875(1− 0.875)/(285+ 4) = 0.019
making the 95% credible intervals for probability of a Larry Bird
successful attempt
95%CIafter a miss = 0.877± 2 · 0.044 = [0.789, 0.965]
95%CIafter a success = 0.875± 2 · 0.019 = [0.837, 0.913]
Notice that the intervals overlap, so there is no significant evidence
for a difference in Larry Bird’s success following another success
or following a miss. Thus, there is no significant evidence for a hot
hand, or an anti-hot hand.
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8.4 Computer Examples
from s i e import *
Iris Example
data=load_data ( ’ data/ i r i s . csv ’ )
x _ s e r t o s a =data [ data [ ’ c l a s s ’ ]== ’ I r i s−s e t o s a ’ ] [ ’ p e t a l length [cm] ’ ]
x _ v i r g i n i c a =data [ data [ ’ c l a s s ’ ]== ’ I r i s−v i r g i n i c a ’ ] [ ’ p e t a l length [cm] ’ ]
x _ v e r s i c o l o r =data [ data [ ’ c l a s s ’ ]== ’ I r i s−v e r s i c o l o r ’ ] [ ’ p e t a l length [cm] ’ ]
p r i n t x _ s e r t o s a
0 1.4
1 1.4
2 1.3
3 1.5
4 1.4
5 1.7
6 1.4
7 1.5
8 1.4
9 1.5
10 1.5
11 1.6
12 1.4
13 1.1
14 1.2
15 1.5
16 1.3
17 1.4
18 1.7
19 1.5
20 1.7
21 1.5
22 1.0
23 1.7
24 1.9
25 1.6
26 1.6
27 1.5
28 1.4
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29 1.6
30 1.6
31 1.5
32 1.5
33 1.4
34 1.5
35 1.2
36 1.3
37 1.5
38 1.3
39 1.5
40 1.3
41 1.3
42 1.3
43 1.6
44 1.9
45 1.4
46 1.6
47 1.4
48 1.5
49 1.4
Name: petal length [cm], dtype: float64
x= x _ s e r t o s a
mu=sample_mean ( x )
N=len ( x )
sigma=sample_deviation ( x )/ s q r t (N)
t _ s e r t o s a = t d i s t (N,mu, sigma )
x= x _ v e r s i c o l o r
mu=sample_mean ( x )
N=len ( x )
sigma=sample_deviation ( x )/ s q r t (N)
t _ v e r s i c o l o r = t d i s t (N,mu, sigma )
x= x _ v i r g i n i c a
mu=sample_mean ( x )
N=len ( x )
sigma=sample_deviation ( x )/ s q r t (N)
t _ v i r g i n i c a = t d i s t (N,mu, sigma )
d i s t p l o t2 ( [ t _ s e r t o s a , t _ v e r s i c o l o r , t _ v i r g i n i c a ] , show_quart i les=Fa l se )
<matplotlib.figure.Figure at 0x1058d9690>
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d i s t p l o t ( t _ v i r g i n i c a )
applications of parameter estimation and inference 155
c r e d i b l e _ i n t e r v a l ( t _ v e r s i c o l o r )
(4.1265203051077082, 4.2599999999999998, 4.3934796948922914)
c r e d i b l e _ i n t e r v a l ( t _ v i r g i n i c a )
(5.3952325713636533, 5.5519999999999996, 5.7087674286363459)
Sunrise
d i s t =beta ( h=365 ,N=365)
d i s t p l o t ( d i s t )
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c r e d i b l e _ i n t e r v a l ( d i s t )
(0.98997171634278669, 0.99810794743679487, 0.99993082805373457)
Cancer Example
d i s t =beta ( h=7 ,N=10)
d i s t p l o t ( d i s t , f i g s i z e = (8 ,5 ) )
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c r e d i b l e _ i n t e r v a l ( d i s t )
(0.39025744042757882, 0.67619553741481253, 0.89073655618090186)
Essentially no evidence of any effect over 50 percent.

9 Concluding Thoughts
9.1 Where have we come?
We have tried in this book to present a particular picture of the
world: everything is probability. We started with basic definitions
and applications, and followed the consequences of the rules of prob-
ability to examine more complex problems. It is our hope that the
reader sees that all of the analysis stems from a single perspective. In
this way, one can approach any problem of inference in a unified way,
applying the recipe we’ve used throughout:
1 Propose a model for the data you observe (which could be as
simple as “there is an unknown true value for the observations”)
2 Specify your prior knowledge of the parameters in the model, in
the form of a prior probability (which is often as simple as “I don’t
know anything about the parameters, so all possible values are
equally likely”)
3 Specify how likely your data would be if your model were true,
which is the likelihood part of Bayes’ rule
4 Apply the rules of probability, namely Bayes’ rule, to determine
the posterior probability for the parameters in the model
5 Use the properties of probability functions to calculate answers
to specific questions, for example “is it likely that this number is
greater than zero?” or “are these two measurements different?”
Although I haven’t covered all possible examples, and there are
additions and clarifications still planned, this approach can be used
for all new problems one faces. The only steps that can be daunting,
at times, is the mathematical consequences and even there we have
seen that the judicious use of approximations can go a long way.
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9.2 Where are we going?
Topics I’d love to add, and will when I have the chance, include (in
no particular order),
• Measurement in Science
• Linear Regression and Correlation
• Two-sample inferences
• Classification
• Model Building in Science
• Analysis of Social Science Data
• Inference for Deviation Parameters
• Experimental Design
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Appendix A
Computational Analysis
The book is written with an accompanying software package, writ-
ten in Python. As of this writing the recommended distribution for
installing python is the Anaconda distribution, available here:
https://store.continuum.io/cshop/anaconda/
It is
• Free
• Easy to Use
• Easy to Extend
• Very Powerful
The accompanying software for the book can be obtained from the
book website,

Appendix B
Notation
B.1 Useful Greek Letters
α Alpha slope of a line
β Beta slope of a line, intercept
γ Gamma
Γ Gamma
δ Delta A small change in a variable
∆ Delta A change in a variable
e Epsilon
ζ Zeta
η Eta
θ Theta The parameters in a binomial/-
beta distribution
Θ Theta
κ Kappa
λ Lambda the mean in a poisson distribu-
tion
Λ Lambda
µ Mu the mean in a normal distribu-
tion (pronounced “mew”)
ν Nu (pronounced “new”)
ξ Xi
Ξ Xi
pi Pi Represents the constant
3.1415· · ·, the ratio of the cir-
cumference to the diameter of a
circle
Π Pi A product of a series of num-
bers
ρ Rho
σ Sigma The standard width parameter
of the normal distribution
Σ Sigma A sum of a series of numbers
τ Tau
φ Phi
Φ Phi
χ Chi A distribution related to the
sum of normally distributed
variables
ψ Psi
Ψ Psi
ω Omega
Ω Omega
B.2 Some Math Notation
Variables
A set of values, labeled with subscripts...
x1 = 1
x2 = 5
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x3 = −3
x4 = 2
x5 = 8
referred collectively as xi.
Sums
x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5 = 1+ 5+ (−3) + 2+ 8 = 13
is equivalent to
5
∑
i=1
xi = 1+ 5+ (−3) + 2+ 8 = 13
Products
x1 · x2 · x3 · x4 · x5 = 1 · 5 · (−3) · 2 · 8 = −240
is equivalent to
5
∏
i=1
xi = 1 · 5 · (−3) · 2 · 8 = −240
Sample Mean
The sample mean of a set of numbers is defined as...
x¯ ≡ x1 + x2 + · · · xN
N
In the example above
x¯ ≡ x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5
5
= 2
3
5
It can also be written
x¯ ≡ ∑
N
i=1 xi
N
or
x¯ ≡ ∑i xi
N
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Sample Standard Deviation
s2 ≡ 1
N − 1
N
∑
i=1
(x− x¯)2
Although the justification for the N − 1
part is beyond this book, one easy
way to remember it is that the sample
distribution of a set of numbers is an
estimate for the σ parameter of the
normal distribution, representing the
spread of the data. You can think of the
N − 1 part as a check to keep you from
doing the crazy thing of estimating a
spread with only 1 data point!
s ≡
√√√√ 1
N − 1
N
∑
i=1
(x− x¯)2
Estimates
Any specific estimate of a parameter, such as θ, is denoted with a hat,
such as θˆ.
Factorials
Factorials are defined as
N! = 1 · 2 · 3 · · · (N − 1) · N
for example
5! = 1 · 2 · 3 · 4 · 5 = 120
The N-choose-k notation is a shorthand for the factorials that arise
in binomial and Beta distributions.
(
N
k
)
≡ N!
k!(N − k)!

Appendix C
Common Distributions and Their Properties
This chapter is really a reference for the standard distributions en-
countered in statistical inference. Although you are encouraged to
read this chapter through, it can also be read out-of-order to look at a
specific distribution.
C.1 Discrete and Continuous
Some distributions apply to a discrete (i.e. countable) number of
possibilities while others apply to continuous values. In the case
of discrete variables, the probability is given by the actual value of
the distribution, so it makes sense to speak of the probability of an
individual label, P(coin1). In the case of continuous variables, the
probability is given by the area under the distribution, so it makes
sense only to speak of the probability if a range of labels, P(0.2 < θ <
0.3).
C.2 Uniform
Discrete
Discrete uniform distribution The discrete uniform distribution is Discrete uniform distribution The dis-
crete uniform distribution is defined to
be a constant value for all possibilities.
Mathematically this is written
p(xi) =
1
N
where N is the total number of possibil-
ities, labeled x1 to xN .
defined to be a constant value for all possibilities. Mathematically this
is written
p(xi) =
1
N
where N is the total number of possibilities, labeled x1 to xN . The
picture of the distribution is shown in Figure C.1
Continuous
Continuous uniform distribution The continuous uniform distri- Continuous uniform distribution
The continuous uniform distribution
is defined to be a constant between a
minimum and maximum value, and
zero everywhere else. Mathematically
this is written
p(x) =
1
max−min for min < x < max
.
bution is defined to be a constant between a minimum and maximum
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0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
x
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
P
(x
)
5%
0.05
25%
0.25
50%
0.50
75%
0.75
95%
0.95
Min=0, Max=1
Figure C.1: Discrete uniform distri-
bution for values 1 to 6. The value for
each is p(xi) = 1/6.
value, and zero everywhere else. Mathematically this is written
p(x) =
1
max−min for min < x < max
. The picture of the distribution is shown in Figure C.2.
Example C.1 You call a plumber, and they say that they can come anytime
in the next 4 hours. The probability of them arriving at any particular time
can be represented with a uniform distribution. What is the probability that
they arrive in the first 20 minutes of the second hour?
In order to ask questions about total probability from a continuous
distribution you take the area under the curve between the relevant
values. In this case it’d be the area under the curve from the time t = The reason for the particular constant
value for the uniform distribution,
1/(max −min), is simply that the
area of the entire rectangle must be
1, which means that there is a 100%
chance of the values falling between the
minimum and maximum values.
2hr and t = 2hr + 20minutes = 2.333hr, as shown in Figure C.3. The
area under the curve is just the area of the shaded region between
times t = 2hr and t = 2.333hr, or just the area of a rectangle - A =
base× height. The base of the rectangle is the length of time, or
base = 0.333hr
The height of the rectangle is given by the constant value of the uni-
form distribution, or
height =
1
max−min =
1
4hr− 0hr = 0.25
1
hr
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0.95
Min=0, Max=1
Figure C.2: Continuous uniform distri-
bution between values 0 and 1
0 1 2 3 4
time
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
P
(t
im
e
)
5%
0.20
25%
1.00
50%
2.00
75%
3.00
95%
3.80
20 minutes
Min=0, Max=4
Figure C.3: Continuous uniform dis-
tribution for the plumber example
(Example C.1).
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So the total probability of the plumber coming in the first 20 minutes
of the second hour is
P(2 < t < 2.25) = (0.333hr)×
(
0.25
1
hr
)
= 0.0833
C.3 Binomial
Binomial distribution The discrete binomial distribution is de- Binomial distribution The discrete
binomial distribution is defined to be
the probability of achieving h successes
in a given N events where each event
has a given θ probability of success.
P(h|N, θ) =
(
h
N
)
θh(1− θ)N−h
fined to be the probability of achieving h successes in a given N
events where each event has a given θ probability of success.
P(h|N, θ) =
(
h
N
)
θh(1− θ)N−h
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Number of heads
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
P
(h
,N
=
30
)
p=0.1
p=0.5
p=0.8
Figure C.4: Probability of getting h
heads in 30 flips given a possible unfair
coin. One coin has p = 0.1, where the
maximum is for 3 heads (or 1/10 of the
30 flips), but 2 heads is nearly as likely.
Another has p = 0.5, and is the fair coin
considered earlier with a maximum at
15 heads (or 1/2 of the 30 flips). Finally,
another coin shown as p = 0.8 where
24 heads (or 8/10 of the 30 flips) is
maximum.
Although it may look like a Beta, the binomial distribution is used
to find the best estimate for the number of successes, h, given the
number of events, N, and the probability of the success of a single
event, θ.
C.4 Beta
Beta distribution The continuous Beta distribution is the posterior Beta distribution The continuous Beta
distribution is the posterior probability
distribution for the parameter θ, where
one has observed h successes in a given
N events, and each event is assumed to
have a θ probability of success.
P(θ|h, N) = (N + 1) ·
(
N
h
)
θh(1− θ)N−h
probability distribution for the parameter θ, where one has observed
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h successes in a given N events, and each event is assumed to have a
θ probability of success.
P(θ|h, N) = (N + 1) ·
(
N
h
)
θh(1− θ)N−h
Although it may look like a binomial, the Beta distribution is used
to find the best estimate for the parameter θ where the number of
successes and events, h and N are given.
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
θ
0
1
2
3
4
P
(θ
)
1%
0.07
5%
0.11
25%
0.20
50%
0.28
75%
0.36
95%
0.49
99%
0.59
3 heads and 9 tails
Figure C.5: Posterior probability distri-
bution for the θ values of the bent coin
- the probability that the coin will land
heads. The distribution is shown for
data 3 heads and 9 tails. The various
quartiles are shown in the plot.
C.5 Normal (Gaussian)
Normal distribution The Normal distribution is the most com- Normal distribution The Normal
distribution is the most common dis-
tribution found in all of statistical
inference. It is the best prior distribu-
tion to use, when all you know is that
your data has a constant true value and
some constant variation around that
true value. It is the posterior probability
distribution for the unknown true value
given N samples and the known devia-
tion, σ. It is also the approximate form
for nearly every distribution when you
have many samples. The mathematical
form for the normal, or Gaussian, is
Normal(µ, σ) =
1√
2piσ2
e−(x−µ)
2/2σ2
mon distribution found in all of statistical inference. It is the best
prior distribution to use, when all you know is that your data has
a constant true value and some constant variation around that true
value. It is the posterior probability distribution for the unknown
true value given N samples and the known deviation, σ. It is also the
approximate form for nearly every distribution when you have many
samples. The mathematical form for the normal, or Gaussian, is
Normal(µ, σ) =
1√
2piσ2
e−(x−µ)
2/2σ2
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Figure C.6: The normal distribution.
Three useful properties of σ for the normal distribution are the
following:
1 the normal distribution value at the maximum (i.e. at x = µ)
is around 2.7 times larger than the value one-σ away from the
maximum (at x = µ− σ and x = µ+ σ)
2 the total probability between these two points is 65%.
3 95% of the distribution lies between µ − 2σ and µ + 2σ (see Fig-
ure 7.3)
Appendix D
Tables
D.1 Credible Intervals for Standard Normal Distribution
4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4
z
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
P
(z
)
68% CI at µ±1σ
Credible Interval ±z Approximately
50.0% 0.6745σ
68.0% 0.9945σ 1σ
90.0% 1.6449σ
95.0% 1.9600σ 2σ
99.0% 2.5758σ
99.8% 3.0902σ 3σ
99.995% 4.0556σ 4σ
Example D.1 Usage of the Credible Interval Table for the Normal Distri-
bution
Given a set of 10 samples with sample mean x¯ = 5.2 and known
deviation σ = 0.3, the best estimate for the mean parameter µ, repre-
senting the true value of the data, is the sample mean, µˆ = 5.2 with
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uncertainty σ/
√
N or 0.3/
√
10 = 0.095. Some of the credible intervals
for this estimate then are the following
• 68% - [5.2− 0.9945 · 0.095, 5.2+ 0.9945 · 0.095] = [5.11, 5.29]
• 95% - [5.2− 1.9600 · 0.095, 5.2+ 1.9600 · 0.095] = [5.01, 5.39]
• 99.8% - [5.2− 3.0902 · 0.095, 5.2+ 3.0902 · 0.095] = [4.91, 5.49]
or approximately
• 68% - [5.2− 1 · 0.095, 5.2+ 1 · 0.095] = [5.11, 5.29]
• 95% - [5.2− 2 · 0.095, 5.2+ 2 · 0.095] = [5.01, 5.39]
• 99.8% - [5.2− 3 · 0.095, 5.2+ 3 · 0.095] = [4.91, 5.49]
D.2 Credible Intervals for Student’s t Distribution
Degrees of Freedom
Credible
Interval
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
50.0% 1.000σ 0.816σ 0.765σ 0.741σ 0.727σ 0.718σ 0.711σ 0.706σ 0.703σ 0.700σ
68.0% 1.819σ 1.312σ 1.189σ 1.134σ 1.104σ 1.084σ 1.070σ 1.060σ 1.053σ 1.046σ
90.0% 6.314σ 2.920σ 2.353σ 2.132σ 2.015σ 1.943σ 1.895σ 1.860σ 1.833σ 1.812σ
95.0% 12.706σ 4.303σ 3.182σ 2.776σ 2.571σ 2.447σ 2.365σ 2.306σ 2.262σ 2.228σ
99.0% 63.657σ 9.925σ 5.841σ 4.604σ 4.032σ 3.707σ 3.499σ 3.355σ 3.250σ 3.169σ
99.8% 318.309σ 22.327σ 10.215σ 7.173σ 5.893σ 5.208σ 4.785σ 4.501σ 4.297σ 4.144σ
99.995% 12732.395σ 141.416σ 35.298σ 18.522σ 12.893σ 10.261σ 8.783σ 7.851σ 7.215σ 6.757σ
Degrees of Freedom
Credible
Interval
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
50.0% 0.697σ 0.695σ 0.694σ 0.692σ 0.691σ 0.690σ 0.689σ 0.688σ 0.688σ 0.687σ
68.0% 1.041σ 1.037σ 1.034σ 1.031σ 1.029σ 1.026σ 1.024σ 1.023σ 1.021σ 1.020σ
90.0% 1.796σ 1.782σ 1.771σ 1.761σ 1.753σ 1.746σ 1.740σ 1.734σ 1.729σ 1.725σ
95.0% 2.201σ 2.179σ 2.160σ 2.145σ 2.131σ 2.120σ 2.110σ 2.101σ 2.093σ 2.086σ
99.0% 3.106σ 3.055σ 3.012σ 2.977σ 2.947σ 2.921σ 2.898σ 2.878σ 2.861σ 2.845σ
99.8% 4.025σ 3.930σ 3.852σ 3.787σ 3.733σ 3.686σ 3.646σ 3.610σ 3.579σ 3.552σ
99.995% 6.412σ 6.143σ 5.928σ 5.753σ 5.607σ 5.484σ 5.379σ 5.288σ 5.209σ 5.139σ
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Degrees of Freedom
Credible
Interval
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
50.0% 0.686σ 0.686σ 0.685σ 0.685σ 0.684σ 0.684σ 0.684σ 0.683σ 0.683σ 0.683σ
68.0% 1.019σ 1.017σ 1.016σ 1.015σ 1.015σ 1.014σ 1.013σ 1.012σ 1.012σ 1.011σ
90.0% 1.721σ 1.717σ 1.714σ 1.711σ 1.708σ 1.706σ 1.703σ 1.701σ 1.699σ 1.697σ
95.0% 2.080σ 2.074σ 2.069σ 2.064σ 2.060σ 2.056σ 2.052σ 2.048σ 2.045σ 2.042σ
99.0% 2.831σ 2.819σ 2.807σ 2.797σ 2.787σ 2.779σ 2.771σ 2.763σ 2.756σ 2.750σ
99.8% 3.527σ 3.505σ 3.485σ 3.467σ 3.450σ 3.435σ 3.421σ 3.408σ 3.396σ 3.385σ
99.995% 5.077σ 5.022σ 4.972σ 4.927σ 4.887σ 4.849σ 4.816σ 4.784σ 4.756σ 4.729σ
Degrees of Freedom
Credible
Interval
31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
50.0% 0.682σ 0.682σ 0.682σ 0.682σ 0.682σ 0.681σ 0.681σ 0.681σ 0.681σ 0.681σ
68.0% 1.011σ 1.010σ 1.010σ 1.009σ 1.009σ 1.008σ 1.008σ 1.008σ 1.007σ 1.007σ
90.0% 1.696σ 1.694σ 1.692σ 1.691σ 1.690σ 1.688σ 1.687σ 1.686σ 1.685σ 1.684σ
95.0% 2.040σ 2.037σ 2.035σ 2.032σ 2.030σ 2.028σ 2.026σ 2.024σ 2.023σ 2.021σ
99.0% 2.744σ 2.738σ 2.733σ 2.728σ 2.724σ 2.719σ 2.715σ 2.712σ 2.708σ 2.704σ
99.8% 3.375σ 3.365σ 3.356σ 3.348σ 3.340σ 3.333σ 3.326σ 3.319σ 3.313σ 3.307σ
99.995% 4.705σ 4.682σ 4.660σ 4.640σ 4.622σ 4.604σ 4.588σ 4.572σ 4.558σ 4.544σ
Example D.2 Usage of the Credible Interval Table for the Student’s t
Distribution
Given a set of 10 samples (9 degrees of freedom) with sample
mean x¯ = 5.2 and sample deviation s = 0.3, the best estimate for
the mean parameter µ, representing the true value of the data, is the
sample mean, µˆ = 5.2 with uncertainty s/
√
N or 0.3/
√
10 = 0.095.
Some of the credible intervals for this estimate then are the following
• 68% - [5.2− 1.053 · 0.095, 5.2+ 1.053 · 0.095] = [5.09, 5.3]
• 95% - [5.2− 2.262 · 0.095, 5.2+ 2.262 · 0.095] = [4.99, 5.41]
• 99.8% - [5.2− 4.297 · 0.095, 5.2+ 4.297 · 0.095] = [4.79, 5.61]
178 statistical inference for everyone
D.3 Cumulative Standard Normal Distribution
4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4
z
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
P
(z
)
area
z Area
on Left
-3.70 0.0001
-3.69 0.0001
-3.68 0.0001
-3.67 0.0001
-3.66 0.0001
-3.65 0.0001
-3.64 0.0001
-3.63 0.0001
-3.62 0.0001
-3.61 0.0002
-3.60 0.0002
-3.59 0.0002
-3.58 0.0002
-3.57 0.0002
-3.56 0.0002
-3.55 0.0002
-3.54 0.0002
-3.53 0.0002
-3.52 0.0002
-3.51 0.0002
-3.50 0.0002
-3.49 0.0002
-3.48 0.0003
-3.47 0.0003
-3.46 0.0003
-3.45 0.0003
-3.44 0.0003
-3.43 0.0003
-3.42 0.0003
-3.41 0.0003
-3.40 0.0003
z Area
on Left
-3.40 0.0003
-3.39 0.0003
-3.38 0.0004
-3.37 0.0004
-3.36 0.0004
-3.35 0.0004
-3.34 0.0004
-3.33 0.0004
-3.32 0.0005
-3.31 0.0005
-3.30 0.0005
-3.29 0.0005
-3.28 0.0005
-3.27 0.0005
-3.26 0.0006
-3.25 0.0006
-3.24 0.0006
-3.23 0.0006
-3.22 0.0006
-3.21 0.0007
-3.20 0.0007
-3.19 0.0007
-3.18 0.0007
-3.17 0.0008
-3.16 0.0008
-3.15 0.0008
-3.14 0.0008
-3.13 0.0009
-3.12 0.0009
-3.11 0.0009
-3.10 0.0010
z Area
on Left
-3.10 0.0010
-3.09 0.0010
-3.08 0.0010
-3.07 0.0011
-3.06 0.0011
-3.05 0.0011
-3.04 0.0012
-3.03 0.0012
-3.02 0.0013
-3.01 0.0013
-3.00 0.0013
-2.99 0.0014
-2.98 0.0014
-2.97 0.0015
-2.96 0.0015
-2.95 0.0016
-2.94 0.0016
-2.93 0.0017
-2.92 0.0018
-2.91 0.0018
-2.90 0.0019
-2.89 0.0019
-2.88 0.0020
-2.87 0.0021
-2.86 0.0021
-2.85 0.0022
-2.84 0.0023
-2.83 0.0023
-2.82 0.0024
-2.81 0.0025
-2.80 0.0026
z Area
on Left
-2.80 0.0026
-2.79 0.0026
-2.78 0.0027
-2.77 0.0028
-2.76 0.0029
-2.75 0.0030
-2.74 0.0031
-2.73 0.0032
-2.72 0.0033
-2.71 0.0034
-2.70 0.0035
-2.69 0.0036
-2.68 0.0037
-2.67 0.0038
-2.66 0.0039
-2.65 0.0040
-2.64 0.0041
-2.63 0.0043
-2.62 0.0044
-2.61 0.0045
-2.60 0.0047
-2.59 0.0048
-2.58 0.0049
-2.57 0.0051
-2.56 0.0052
-2.55 0.0054
-2.54 0.0055
-2.53 0.0057
-2.52 0.0059
-2.51 0.0060
-2.50 0.0062
z Area
on Left
-2.50 0.0062
-2.49 0.0064
-2.48 0.0066
-2.47 0.0068
-2.46 0.0069
-2.45 0.0071
-2.44 0.0073
-2.43 0.0075
-2.42 0.0078
-2.41 0.0080
-2.40 0.0082
-2.39 0.0084
-2.38 0.0087
-2.37 0.0089
-2.36 0.0091
-2.35 0.0094
-2.34 0.0096
-2.33 0.0099
-2.32 0.0102
-2.31 0.0104
-2.30 0.0107
-2.29 0.0110
-2.28 0.0113
-2.27 0.0116
-2.26 0.0119
-2.25 0.0122
-2.24 0.0125
-2.23 0.0129
-2.22 0.0132
-2.21 0.0136
-2.20 0.0139
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Cumulative Normal Distribution (cont.)
4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4
z
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
P
(z
)
area
z Area
on Left
-2.20 0.0139
-2.19 0.0143
-2.18 0.0146
-2.17 0.0150
-2.16 0.0154
-2.15 0.0158
-2.14 0.0162
-2.13 0.0166
-2.12 0.0170
-2.11 0.0174
-2.10 0.0179
-2.09 0.0183
-2.08 0.0188
-2.07 0.0192
-2.06 0.0197
-2.05 0.0202
-2.04 0.0207
-2.03 0.0212
-2.02 0.0217
-2.01 0.0222
-2.00 0.0228
-1.99 0.0233
-1.98 0.0239
-1.97 0.0244
-1.96 0.0250
-1.95 0.0256
-1.94 0.0262
-1.93 0.0268
-1.92 0.0274
-1.91 0.0281
-1.90 0.0287
z Area
on Left
-1.90 0.0287
-1.89 0.0294
-1.88 0.0301
-1.87 0.0307
-1.86 0.0314
-1.85 0.0322
-1.84 0.0329
-1.83 0.0336
-1.82 0.0344
-1.81 0.0351
-1.80 0.0359
-1.79 0.0367
-1.78 0.0375
-1.77 0.0384
-1.76 0.0392
-1.75 0.0401
-1.74 0.0409
-1.73 0.0418
-1.72 0.0427
-1.71 0.0436
-1.70 0.0446
-1.69 0.0455
-1.68 0.0465
-1.67 0.0475
-1.66 0.0485
-1.65 0.0495
-1.64 0.0505
-1.63 0.0516
-1.62 0.0526
-1.61 0.0537
-1.60 0.0548
z Area
on Left
-1.60 0.0548
-1.59 0.0559
-1.58 0.0571
-1.57 0.0582
-1.56 0.0594
-1.55 0.0606
-1.54 0.0618
-1.53 0.0630
-1.52 0.0643
-1.51 0.0655
-1.50 0.0668
-1.49 0.0681
-1.48 0.0694
-1.47 0.0708
-1.46 0.0721
-1.45 0.0735
-1.44 0.0749
-1.43 0.0764
-1.42 0.0778
-1.41 0.0793
-1.40 0.0808
-1.39 0.0823
-1.38 0.0838
-1.37 0.0853
-1.36 0.0869
-1.35 0.0885
-1.34 0.0901
-1.33 0.0918
-1.32 0.0934
-1.31 0.0951
-1.30 0.0968
z Area
on Left
-1.30 0.0968
-1.29 0.0985
-1.28 0.1003
-1.27 0.1020
-1.26 0.1038
-1.25 0.1056
-1.24 0.1075
-1.23 0.1093
-1.22 0.1112
-1.21 0.1131
-1.20 0.1151
-1.19 0.1170
-1.18 0.1190
-1.17 0.1210
-1.16 0.1230
-1.15 0.1251
-1.14 0.1271
-1.13 0.1292
-1.12 0.1314
-1.11 0.1335
-1.10 0.1357
-1.09 0.1379
-1.08 0.1401
-1.07 0.1423
-1.06 0.1446
-1.05 0.1469
-1.04 0.1492
-1.03 0.1515
-1.02 0.1539
-1.01 0.1562
-1.00 0.1587
z Area
on Left
-1.00 0.1587
-0.99 0.1611
-0.98 0.1635
-0.97 0.1660
-0.96 0.1685
-0.95 0.1711
-0.94 0.1736
-0.93 0.1762
-0.92 0.1788
-0.91 0.1814
-0.90 0.1841
-0.89 0.1867
-0.88 0.1894
-0.87 0.1922
-0.86 0.1949
-0.85 0.1977
-0.84 0.2005
-0.83 0.2033
-0.82 0.2061
-0.81 0.2090
-0.80 0.2119
-0.79 0.2148
-0.78 0.2177
-0.77 0.2206
-0.76 0.2236
-0.75 0.2266
-0.74 0.2296
-0.73 0.2327
-0.72 0.2358
-0.71 0.2389
-0.70 0.2420
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Cumulative Normal Distribution (cont.)
4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4
z
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
P
(z
)
area
z Area
on Left
-0.70 0.2420
-0.69 0.2451
-0.68 0.2483
-0.67 0.2514
-0.66 0.2546
-0.65 0.2578
-0.64 0.2611
-0.63 0.2643
-0.62 0.2676
-0.61 0.2709
-0.60 0.2743
-0.59 0.2776
-0.58 0.2810
-0.57 0.2843
-0.56 0.2877
-0.55 0.2912
-0.54 0.2946
-0.53 0.2981
-0.52 0.3015
-0.51 0.3050
-0.50 0.3085
-0.49 0.3121
-0.48 0.3156
-0.47 0.3192
-0.46 0.3228
-0.45 0.3264
-0.44 0.3300
-0.43 0.3336
-0.42 0.3372
-0.41 0.3409
-0.40 0.3446
z Area
on Left
-0.40 0.3446
-0.39 0.3483
-0.38 0.3520
-0.37 0.3557
-0.36 0.3594
-0.35 0.3632
-0.34 0.3669
-0.33 0.3707
-0.32 0.3745
-0.31 0.3783
-0.30 0.3821
-0.29 0.3859
-0.28 0.3897
-0.27 0.3936
-0.26 0.3974
-0.25 0.4013
-0.24 0.4052
-0.23 0.4090
-0.22 0.4129
-0.21 0.4168
-0.20 0.4207
-0.19 0.4247
-0.18 0.4286
-0.17 0.4325
-0.16 0.4364
-0.15 0.4404
-0.14 0.4443
-0.13 0.4483
-0.12 0.4522
-0.11 0.4562
-0.10 0.4602
z Area
on Left
-0.10 0.4602
-0.09 0.4641
-0.08 0.4681
-0.07 0.4721
-0.06 0.4761
-0.05 0.4801
-0.04 0.4840
-0.03 0.4880
-0.02 0.4920
-0.01 0.4960
0.00 0.5000
0.01 0.5040
0.02 0.5080
0.03 0.5120
0.04 0.5160
0.05 0.5199
0.06 0.5239
0.07 0.5279
0.08 0.5319
0.09 0.5359
0.10 0.5398
0.11 0.5438
0.12 0.5478
0.13 0.5517
0.14 0.5557
0.15 0.5596
0.16 0.5636
0.17 0.5675
0.18 0.5714
0.19 0.5753
0.20 0.5793
z Area
on Left
0.20 0.5793
0.21 0.5832
0.22 0.5871
0.23 0.5910
0.24 0.5948
0.25 0.5987
0.26 0.6026
0.27 0.6064
0.28 0.6103
0.29 0.6141
0.30 0.6179
0.31 0.6217
0.32 0.6255
0.33 0.6293
0.34 0.6331
0.35 0.6368
0.36 0.6406
0.37 0.6443
0.38 0.6480
0.39 0.6517
0.40 0.6554
0.41 0.6591
0.42 0.6628
0.43 0.6664
0.44 0.6700
0.45 0.6736
0.46 0.6772
0.47 0.6808
0.48 0.6844
0.49 0.6879
0.50 0.6915
z Area
on Left
0.50 0.6915
0.51 0.6950
0.52 0.6985
0.53 0.7019
0.54 0.7054
0.55 0.7088
0.56 0.7123
0.57 0.7157
0.58 0.7190
0.59 0.7224
0.60 0.7257
0.61 0.7291
0.62 0.7324
0.63 0.7357
0.64 0.7389
0.65 0.7422
0.66 0.7454
0.67 0.7486
0.68 0.7517
0.69 0.7549
0.70 0.7580
0.71 0.7611
0.72 0.7642
0.73 0.7673
0.74 0.7704
0.75 0.7734
0.76 0.7764
0.77 0.7794
0.78 0.7823
0.79 0.7852
0.80 0.7881
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Cumulative Normal Distribution (cont.)
4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4
z
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
P
(z
)
area
z Area
on Left
0.80 0.7881
0.81 0.7910
0.82 0.7939
0.83 0.7967
0.84 0.7995
0.85 0.8023
0.86 0.8051
0.87 0.8078
0.88 0.8106
0.89 0.8133
0.90 0.8159
0.91 0.8186
0.92 0.8212
0.93 0.8238
0.94 0.8264
0.95 0.8289
0.96 0.8315
0.97 0.8340
0.98 0.8365
0.99 0.8389
1.00 0.8413
1.01 0.8438
1.02 0.8461
1.03 0.8485
1.04 0.8508
1.05 0.8531
1.06 0.8554
1.07 0.8577
1.08 0.8599
1.09 0.8621
1.10 0.8643
z Area
on Left
1.10 0.8643
1.11 0.8665
1.12 0.8686
1.13 0.8708
1.14 0.8729
1.15 0.8749
1.16 0.8770
1.17 0.8790
1.18 0.8810
1.19 0.8830
1.20 0.8849
1.21 0.8869
1.22 0.8888
1.23 0.8907
1.24 0.8925
1.25 0.8944
1.26 0.8962
1.27 0.8980
1.28 0.8997
1.29 0.9015
1.30 0.9032
1.31 0.9049
1.32 0.9066
1.33 0.9082
1.34 0.9099
1.35 0.9115
1.36 0.9131
1.37 0.9147
1.38 0.9162
1.39 0.9177
1.40 0.9192
z Area
on Left
1.40 0.9192
1.41 0.9207
1.42 0.9222
1.43 0.9236
1.44 0.9251
1.45 0.9265
1.46 0.9279
1.47 0.9292
1.48 0.9306
1.49 0.9319
1.50 0.9332
1.51 0.9345
1.52 0.9357
1.53 0.9370
1.54 0.9382
1.55 0.9394
1.56 0.9406
1.57 0.9418
1.58 0.9429
1.59 0.9441
1.60 0.9452
1.61 0.9463
1.62 0.9474
1.63 0.9484
1.64 0.9495
1.65 0.9505
1.66 0.9515
1.67 0.9525
1.68 0.9535
1.69 0.9545
1.70 0.9554
z Area
on Left
1.70 0.9554
1.71 0.9564
1.72 0.9573
1.73 0.9582
1.74 0.9591
1.75 0.9599
1.76 0.9608
1.77 0.9616
1.78 0.9625
1.79 0.9633
1.80 0.9641
1.81 0.9649
1.82 0.9656
1.83 0.9664
1.84 0.9671
1.85 0.9678
1.86 0.9686
1.87 0.9693
1.88 0.9699
1.89 0.9706
1.90 0.9713
1.91 0.9719
1.92 0.9726
1.93 0.9732
1.94 0.9738
1.95 0.9744
1.96 0.9750
1.97 0.9756
1.98 0.9761
1.99 0.9767
2.00 0.9772
z Area
on Left
2.00 0.9772
2.01 0.9778
2.02 0.9783
2.03 0.9788
2.04 0.9793
2.05 0.9798
2.06 0.9803
2.07 0.9808
2.08 0.9812
2.09 0.9817
2.10 0.9821
2.11 0.9826
2.12 0.9830
2.13 0.9834
2.14 0.9838
2.15 0.9842
2.16 0.9846
2.17 0.9850
2.18 0.9854
2.19 0.9857
2.20 0.9861
2.21 0.9864
2.22 0.9868
2.23 0.9871
2.24 0.9875
2.25 0.9878
2.26 0.9881
2.27 0.9884
2.28 0.9887
2.29 0.9890
2.30 0.9893
182 statistical inference for everyone
Cumulative Normal Distribution (cont.)
4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4
z
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
P
(z
)
area
z Area
on Left
2.30 0.9893
2.31 0.9896
2.32 0.9898
2.33 0.9901
2.34 0.9904
2.35 0.9906
2.36 0.9909
2.37 0.9911
2.38 0.9913
2.39 0.9916
2.40 0.9918
2.41 0.9920
2.42 0.9922
2.43 0.9925
2.44 0.9927
2.45 0.9929
2.46 0.9931
2.47 0.9932
2.48 0.9934
2.49 0.9936
2.50 0.9938
2.51 0.9940
2.52 0.9941
2.53 0.9943
2.54 0.9945
2.55 0.9946
2.56 0.9948
2.57 0.9949
2.58 0.9951
2.59 0.9952
2.60 0.9953
z Area
on Left
2.60 0.9953
2.61 0.9955
2.62 0.9956
2.63 0.9957
2.64 0.9959
2.65 0.9960
2.66 0.9961
2.67 0.9962
2.68 0.9963
2.69 0.9964
2.70 0.9965
2.71 0.9966
2.72 0.9967
2.73 0.9968
2.74 0.9969
2.75 0.9970
2.76 0.9971
2.77 0.9972
2.78 0.9973
2.79 0.9974
2.80 0.9974
2.81 0.9975
2.82 0.9976
2.83 0.9977
2.84 0.9977
2.85 0.9978
2.86 0.9979
2.87 0.9979
2.88 0.9980
2.89 0.9981
2.90 0.9981
z Area
on Left
2.90 0.9981
2.91 0.9982
2.92 0.9982
2.93 0.9983
2.94 0.9984
2.95 0.9984
2.96 0.9985
2.97 0.9985
2.98 0.9986
2.99 0.9986
3.00 0.9987
3.01 0.9987
3.02 0.9987
3.03 0.9988
3.04 0.9988
3.05 0.9989
3.06 0.9989
3.07 0.9989
3.08 0.9990
3.09 0.9990
3.10 0.9990
3.11 0.9991
3.12 0.9991
3.13 0.9991
3.14 0.9992
3.15 0.9992
3.16 0.9992
3.17 0.9992
3.18 0.9993
3.19 0.9993
3.20 0.9993
z Area
on Left
3.20 0.9993
3.21 0.9993
3.22 0.9994
3.23 0.9994
3.24 0.9994
3.25 0.9994
3.26 0.9994
3.27 0.9995
3.28 0.9995
3.29 0.9995
3.30 0.9995
3.31 0.9995
3.32 0.9995
3.33 0.9996
3.34 0.9996
3.35 0.9996
3.36 0.9996
3.37 0.9996
3.38 0.9996
3.39 0.9997
3.40 0.9997
3.41 0.9997
3.42 0.9997
3.43 0.9997
3.44 0.9997
3.45 0.9997
3.46 0.9997
3.47 0.9997
3.48 0.9997
3.49 0.9998
3.50 0.9998
z Area
on Left
3.50 0.9998
3.51 0.9998
3.52 0.9998
3.53 0.9998
3.54 0.9998
3.55 0.9998
3.56 0.9998
3.57 0.9998
3.58 0.9998
3.59 0.9998
3.60 0.9998
3.61 0.9998
3.62 0.9999
3.63 0.9999
3.64 0.9999
3.65 0.9999
3.66 0.9999
3.67 0.9999
3.68 0.9999
3.69 0.9999
3.70 0.9999
3.71 0.9999
3.72 0.9999
3.73 0.9999
3.74 0.9999
3.75 0.9999
3.76 0.9999
3.77 0.9999
3.78 0.9999
3.79 0.9999
3.80 0.9999
